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The pressures of climate change, growing energy demand and geopolitical competition 
make the study of energy policies extremely important for the future of Europe at both 
the national and supranational levels. This research focuses on the external energy 
policies of France (one of the EU member states with a distinct energy vision) vis-à-vis 
the respective policies of the EU. How does France, a powerful nation-state yet an 
intrinsic part of the EU, formulate its strategic visions in terms of energy and project 
itself strategically on the national, European and global scenes? Do these projections 
complement or contradict each other? What is their relation to the formulations and 
projections of EU external energy policy? To explain the mechanisms behind strategic 
formulation and projection of external energy policies of an EU member state, and 
their interactions with energy policy narratives formulated and projected by the EU, 
this thesis engages with three theoretical models and seeks novel synergies between 
them. These are constructivism (the macro-level theorisation), strategic narrative 
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 : Introduction 
 
The pressures of climate change, growing energy demand and geopolitical competition 
make the study of energy policies extremely important for the future of Europe at both 
the national and supranational levels. This research focuses on the external energy 
policies of France (one of the EU member states with a distinct energy vision) vis-à-vis 
the respective policies of the European Union (EU). How does France, a powerful 
nation-state yet an intrinsic part of the EU, formulate its strategic visions in terms of 
energy and project itself strategically on the national, European and global scenes? Do 
these projections complement or contradict each other? What is their relation to the 
formulations and projections of EU external energy policy? To explain the 
mechanisms behind strategic formulation and projection of external energy policies of 
an EU member state, and their interactions with energy policy narratives formulated 
and projected by the EU, this thesis engages with three theoretical models and seeks 
novel synergies between them. These are constructivism1 (the macro-level 
theorisation), strategic narrative theory2 (the meso-level model) and cascading 
activation framing theory3
 
(the micro-level theory). 
 
1 Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," The American Political 
Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994). 
Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory," World Politics 50, no. 02 
(1998). 
2 Alister Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, vol. 
3 (New York; London: Routledge, 2013). 
3 Robert M. Entman, Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy 
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1.1 A Global Energy Crisis? 
“…And Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical  
arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired 
nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus, man had the wisdom necessary 
to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not…”4 
 
In our modern world, Prometheus’ stolen fire can be understood as an analogy for 
energy. Energy is the means by which everything else happens. Yet humanity’s lack of 
wisdom has resulted in its unsustainable use, which has led us to the climate change 
crisis. 
Climate change is a global threat caused in part by the burning of fossil fuels, which 
emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.5 Currently, 80% of the world’s energy is 
provided by fossil fuels.6 As countries emerge their energy demands increase and put 
pressure on existing energy supplies. This growth is highly unsustainable and there is 
a high demand to find new solutions to limit gas emissions and increase energy 
efficiency. 
Meanwhile many of the EU’s member states are heavily dependent on Russia’s supply 
of gas. Here again, lack of political wisdom can cause conflict and crisis. Flipo makes 
the point that “this fire, or energy, is the means through which human beings are able 
 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
4 Plato and Reginald E. Allen, The dialogues of Plato (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
5 International Energy Agency, "Energy, climate change environment: 2014 insights," (2014). 
6 Thijs Van de Graaf, The politics and institutions of global energy governance (Springer, 2013). 
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to exercise greater power over their environment… and over one another.”7 His point 
relates mostly to energy as a means of production and thus of oppression over working 
classes. However, his notion of power over one another can be expanded to the use of 
energy in the relationship between international actors. By largely controlling gas 
supply to Eastern European countries, Russia holds an important political tool, one 
often described as a “weapon”8 to exert pressure on other countries. Therefore, one of 
the EU’s priorities is to secure its energy market by diversifying the sources of its 
energy supply. 
Finally, the Fukushima disaster in Japan has shaken up the nuclear power industry 
and many countries are reconsidering using this type of energy. This has disrupted 
energy policies in France. Nuclear energy represents a 71.6% share of total electricity 
production (as of 1 January 2018).9 It has been an important part of France’s energy 
policy since the 1979 oil crisis.10 Gabrielle Hecht theorised the role of nuclear energy 
in the construction of French identity after the Second World War.11 She argued that 
the use of nuclear energy is associated with notions of French “grandeur.”12 However, 
 
7 Fabrice Flipo, "Energy: prometheus bound or unbound? A conceptual approach," S.A.P.I.EN.S 1, no. 
2 (2008). 
8 Walter Mayr, "Using Russian Energy as a Political Weapon," Der Spiegel 9 January 2006. 
Karen Smith Stegen, "Deconstructing the “energy weapon”: Russia's threat to Europe as case study," 
Energy policy 39, no. 10 (2011). 
Andreas Goldthau, "Rhetoric versus reality: Russian threats to European energy supply," Energy Policy 
36, no. 2 (2008). 
9 Nuclear Energy Agency, "Country Profile: France," https://www.oecd-
nea.org/general/profiles/france.html. 
10 Gabrielle Hecht, The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II, 





after Fukushima, politicians pledged to reduce the share of nuclear energy to 50% of 
the electricity mix.13 This was a significant change in French politics. French political 
elites have historically only put forward pro-nuclear policies.14 Additionally, 
Fukushima disrupted France’s nuclear industry’s prospects for global nuclear energy 
exports as the predicted “nuclear renaissance”15 didn’t take place. 
Thus, the geostrategic importance of energy resources is undeniable and puts energy 
at the heart of politics today. 
 
1.2 Energy: a Shared Competence 
Energy is an increasingly shared competence between the EU’s supranational 
authority and its member states’.16 Even though energy was not included in the Treaty 
of Rome and subsequent treaties, the Treaty of Paris established the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and a treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community was signed in 1957.17 However, these treaties were founded on a 
logic of political integration rather than economic integration. In subsequent years, 
 
13 S. Brouard and I. Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French 
pro-nuclear energy policy," Journal of Public Policy 35, no. 1 (2015). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Joseph Szarka, "From inadvertent to reluctant pioneer? Climate strategies and policy style in France," 
Climate Policy 5, no. 6 (2006). 
16 Frédéric M Marty, "L’Europe de L’énergie: de la concurrence à la solidarité?(The European Energy 
Policy: From Competition to Solidarity?)," The European Energy Policy: From Competition to 
Solidarity  (2016). 
J. Bain et al., "A polyphonic marketplace: Images of EU external energy relations in British, French and 
German media discourses," Comparative European Politics 15, no. 1 (2017). 
17 Marty, "L’Europe de L’énergie: de la concurrence à la solidarité?(The European Energy Policy: From 
Competition to Solidarity?)." 
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the European project became more focussed on the economic dimensions of 
integration and thus energy was left to the way-side. Member states thus reclaimed 
authority over their energy policies including in terms of choice of energy mix and 
international supply agreement, thus fragmenting the European energy landscape.18 
This resulted for instance in France’s particular energy mix. 
However, the Treaty of Lisbon reintroduced energy as a topic of EU competence. First 
of all, article 122 evokes the spirit of solidarity between the member states with regard 
to security of supply. Meanwhile, article 194 defines a number of energy policy 
objectives including guaranteeing performance of the energy market, security of 
supply and the promotion of energy efficiency.19 
From 2006, the EU has formulated an external energy policy centred around three 
goals: sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness.20 Additionally, it 
identified emerging actors as important energy partners. Thus, this research selected 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a case study because of 
their importance to global energy governance. They are also symbolic of a changing 
world order.  
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the unipolar hold on politics and the world 




20 European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy," in COM(2006) 105 (2006),  
David Buchan, Energy and climate change: Europe at the crossroads (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
Jale Tosun, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze, Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the 
agenda, vol. 28 (Springer, 2015). 
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the BRICS are emerging and asserting influence on the international order. This new 
multipolar world cannot be ignored. Countries in Europe need to take the 
opportunities presented by the emergence of regional powers so as not to be left 
behind. Energy is to play a key role in this new world order. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) predicts global energy demand to rise by 30% to 2040.21 Much of this 
demand increase will take place in the BRICS, particularly China and India. These 
countries are also important markets for France’s nuclear energy industry. Meanwhile 
Russia and Brazil are energy producers of increasing significance. 22 
 
1.3 Theoretical Approach 
How then, does the EU form narratives and communicate on its external energy 
policies, a shared competence? And do these narratives match those of a member state 
such as France, which has very different energy priorities to the rest of the EU? These 
are the questions that will be addressed in this research. 
Miskimon et. al., who introduced the concept of strategic narratives, state that: 
“Political actors attempt to create a shared understanding of the world, of 
other political actors, and of policy through the use of strategic narratives. The 
hope for these political actors is that strong narratives will triumph over 
 
21 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2016 (Lanham;Paris: Organization for 
Economic Cooperation & Development, 2016). 
22 Ricardo Ubiraci and Thais Narciso, "Brazil as an International Energy Player," in Brazil as an 
economic superpower?: understanding Brazil's changing role in the global economy, ed. Lael Brainard 
and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2009). 
Stefan Hedlund, Putin's energy agenda: the contradictions of Russia's resource wealth (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014). 
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counternarratives, that legitimacy will be strengthened, that power will be 
heightened.”23 
This research uses the context of external energy policies of the EU and France to 
analyse the formation and projection of strategic narratives to a domestic audience.24
 
Miskimmon et. al. argue that actors use strategic narratives in their communications 
in order to align other actors to their way of viewing the international system (system 
narratives), themselves, other actors (identity narratives) and specific policy issues 
upon which they communicate (issue narratives). 
Taking a rationalist perspective of constructivism, this research sees political actors as 
primary agents in the formation of strategic narratives. It hypothesises that the 
interests and policies of actors will direct the way they frame their strategic narratives. 
Moreover, looking specifically at the relationship between the EU and one of its 
member states (France) this research theorises the concept of narrative alignment. It 
divides the concept into two strands: 
- Internal coherence is used to describe the alignment between the levels of a 
single actor’s strategic narratives. This concept is important since this research 
theorises that narratives with the best alignment between system, identity and 
issue narratives will be more persuasive and have more resonance. 
- External convergence is used to describe the alignment of strategic narratives 
between different actors. 
If strategic interests of actors direct the way they form their strategic narratives, and 
 
23 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Forging the World 
Strategic Narratives and International Relations (University of Michigan Press, 2017). 
24 Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, 3. 
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since France is a member state of the EU, this research also hypothesise that when 
France has no strategic interest of policy salience with the EU, it will align its strategic 
narratives to that of the EU’s. However, where their interests differ, particularly with 
regards to nuclear energy, it is predicted that France will put forward energy related 
narratives different to the narratives formulated and projected by the EU. 
Looking more specifically at the notion of formation, this research expects that 
external energy actors will be framed according to France and the EU’s energy policies 
and interests. It also looks at the role of executive leaders and their own political 
concerns and argues that strategic narratives will reflect their ideologies and views of 
energy interests. Following a rationalist logic of constructivism – which will be 
explained further in Chapter 3, this research assumes the agency of actors in forming 
their strategic narratives. 
This helps link the theory of strategic narratives with Entman’s cascade activation 
theory which is used to explain the projection of narratives at the domestic level. 
Entman conceives the spread of frames on foreign policy as a cascade with the 
executive branch of government having the most influence on the frames that are 
spread to the media. 
According to this logic, this research hypothesises that that strategic narratives from 
executive powers with more internal coherence will resonate more in the media. 
However, media are receptive to other actors’ narratives including other elites and 
external actors. Entman argues that an inverse dynamic whereby frames from the 
media may make their way up the cascade back to the executive level of government. 
Thus, Entman’s cascade allows the observation of the projection of strategic narratives 
22 
 
from government bodies as well as the potential contestation of these narratives.25 
Nevertheless, this research hypothesises that French strategic narratives about 
external energy policies will have a stronger resonance in French newspapers than 
those of other actors, including the EU. 
 
1.4 A Word on Methods 
This research uses the content analysis of two different discourse in order to observe 
the formation and projection of Strategic narratives at the domestic level. To analyse 
formation, of France’s official narrative on global energy governance, communications by 
the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea26, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs27 as well as communications made by the Presidents of the Republic and their 
Prime Ministers for the period 2009-2015 were analysed. These four entities can be 
seen to represent what Entman calls the Administration in his theory of cascading 
activation.28 Administration should be understood to mean the executive branch of 
government. For the purposes of this study, the President, the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
are seen as the members of the executive branch with the most power to set the 
narrative on global energy governance. 
 
25 R. M. Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11," Political 
Communication 20, no. 4 (2003).n 
26 Entman, Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. 
27 In French: Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Energie et de la Mer, previously known as: le Ministère 
de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du Développement durable et de la Mer 




In order to analyse projection, this study also analyses four French newspapers – Le 
Figaro, Le Monde, Les Echos and Libération. 
Both political communications and news articles were observed one month a year for 
the years 2009 to 2015 - two weeks prior to UN Conference of Parties (COPs), the week 
of the conference and one week after the conference. It is assumed that media visibility 
of energy matters and issues at this period will be heightened. 
The methodology used for the content analysis is based on the tried and tested 
methodology from the international project The EU through the Eyes of Asia-Pacific29 
led by Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban.30 It draws on both quantitative and 
qualitative tools in its analysis and outlines formal and substantive features of 
discourse and narratives. 
Entman argues framing can be distinguished from other type of content by its 
“capacity to stimulate support of or opposition to the sides in a political conflict.”31 
This capacity, he then states, can be measured by cultural resonance and magnitude. 
Cultural resonance describes frame that is noticeable, understandable, memorable 
and emotionally charged, while magnitude refers to the prominence and repetition of 
 
29 Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions 
and media representations, vol. no. 4 (Christchurch, N.Z: National Centre for Research on Europe, 
University of Canterbury, 2005). 
Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: media, public, and elite 
perceptions of the EU, vol. 6. (London;New York;: Routledge, 2008). 
Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, Communicating Europe in times of crisis: external perceptions of 
the European Union (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
30 Also see National Centre for Research on Europe, "Eu Global Perceptions," 
https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/ncre/research/euperceptions/. 
31 Entman, Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. 
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the framing. Entman adds that “the more resonance and magnitude, the more likely 
the framing is to evoke similar thoughts and feelings in large portions of the 
audience.”32 
The methodology of this study follows that same pattern. Visibility is analysed through 
the volume of coverage (number of articles containing our key words) and degree of 
centrality (assesses the prominence of the EU and the BRICS in each article). Sources, 
focus of domesticity, thematic frames, issues and actors are used to analyse whether 
stories are understandable to a local audience. Finally, emotional charge is measured 
through a general evaluation of actors with a range of five options ranging from 
negative, neutral to positive and a mixed category as well as through the analysis of 
conceptual metaphors. 
However, these categories of analysis are divided into elements of narratives. 
Miskimmon et al. note that “a narratives requires an actor, an action, a goal or 
intention, a scene and an instrument.”33 They also add “Narrative is distinguished by 
a particular structure through which sense is achieved. This structure is comprised of 
actors, events, plot, and time; and setting and space.”34 It also goes without saying that 
narratives require narrators. Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe argue that 
“Narrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker's concept of self, for it is the self 
that is located at the centre of the narrative, whether as active agent, passive 
experiencer, or tool of destiny.”35 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, 3. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, "Narrative in political science," Annual Review of 




Table 1-1: Framework of analysis of narratives 
Elements of a narrative Categories of analysis 
Narrator Source 
Actor Degree of centrality of actors, evaluation 
of actors, non-state actors 
Action Framing 
Goal Issues mentioned 
Instrument Types of energy mentioned 
Event – time Date, events mentioned 
Scene – setting Focus of domesticity, other dimensions 
 
 
1.5 Synopsis of Chapters 
Chapter 2 elaborates on the context introduced in this chapter. It will start by 
reviewing literature on global energy governance before evaluating literature on the 
EU and France’s energy policies. The purpose of this chapter is in part to establish the 
strategic interest of both France and the EU, including France’s nuclear energy 
diplomacy and the EU’s three energy priorities: competitiveness, security of supply 
and sustainability. Establishing France and the EU’s strategic interests in energy will 
assist in assessing their influence in the formation of strategic narratives. Chapter 3 
will follow directly on this logic and look at the energy situation of each of the BRICS 
as well as France and the EU’s energy relations with each. 
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Chapter 4 will set out the theoretical framework of this research detailing the 
theoretical background this research is based on. It will explain theoretical innovations 
and the research questions and hypotheses which direct this study. Chapter 5 will then 
detail the methods used to carry out this research. 
Chapter 6 presents the results from political discourse from France and the EU. It will 
display the link between strategic energy interests and strategic narratives about external 
energy in the formation of these narratives. It will also display alignments and 
misalignments between France and the EU’s strategic narratives. 
Meanwhile, the projection of these narratives will be observed in Chapter 7, presenting the 
results from the analysis of French newspapers. 
Finally, Chapter 8 will bring all these results together and demonstrate the hypotheses 
of the research. 
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 : Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Scholarship dealing with the energy issue-area in a globalising world is vast and 
multifaceted. Informed by the logic of the leading research questions and hypotheses, 
this research will begin with a critical review of the works exploring the concept of 
global energy governance. The chapter will then focus on the literature dealing with 
the EU’s external energy policies in the context of global energy governance. It will 
outline the three priorities of the EU in this policy area, namely: competitiveness, 
security of supply and sustainability. The EU’s expertise regarding nuclear energy 
(through the development of Euratom) gets special attention in this chapter since 
nuclear energy is of strategic importance to France, as discussed above. The chapter 
then will move to discuss the EU’s competences with regards to external energy 
policies and scholarly reflections on these. The chapter will conclude with review of 
literature discussing France’s external energy policies. It will begin with the works that 
advocated the importance of nuclear energy to France and linked the development of 
France’s modern national identity to its nuclear programme. The chapter will also 
engage with the works that argue two factors driving France’s energy diplomacy -- the 
export of its nuclear industry and a wish to stand for sustainability globally. 
 
2.2 Global Energy in A Multipolar World 
2.2.1 Global Energy Governance 
Global governance is defined by James N. Rosenau as encompassing not just “the 
activities of governments but it also includes many other channels through which 
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‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies 
pursued.”36 Global governance is used to describe a system under which no one actor 
is in charge. Multiple actors are involved in decision making and the establishment of 
rules. Schimitter et. al summarised this establishing that governance comprises 
“horizontal forms of interaction between actors who have conflicting objectives but 
who are sufficiently independent of each other so that neither can impose a solution 
on the other and yet sufficiently interdependent so that both would lose if no solution 
were found.”37 Thus, global energy governance is characterised foremost by the 
multiplicity of actors that engage in it, ranging from governments, NGOs and civil 
societies, corporations and businesses as well as consumers and citizens.38 There is no 
specific place where global energy rules are made, but rather multiple fora through 
which actors further their views and interests. Ann Florini et. al. pointed out that there 
are many forums in which energy governance take place such as: the IEA, OPEP, the 
G8, the UNFCCC.39 Each have their own purpose and agenda. However, this research 
will focus on the UNFCCC COPs as energy governance events. 
The phrase “global energy governance” emerged in the mid-2000s with the G8 Gleneagles 
 
36 James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-first Century," Global Governance 1, no. 1 (1995).p14 
37 Philippe C Schmitter, "Participation in governance arrangements: is there any reason to expect it will 
achieve “sustainable and innovative policies in a multi-level context”?," in Participatory governance 
(Springer, 2002). p53 
38 Natalia Chaban and Michèle Knodt, "Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder 
diplomacy: The EU and BICS," Cooperation and Conflict 50, no. 4 (2015). 
39 Ann Florini and Benjamin K Sovacool, "Who governs energy? The challenges facing global energy 
governance," Energy Policy 37, no. 12 (2009). 
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summit taking on the theme.40 It has been widely picked up and has turned out to be 
a catch-all phrase. It is largely defined as collective actions taken in the view of tackling 
international energy issues.41 Andreas Goldthau argues there are four interrelated 
dimensions that actors aim to address globally when it comes to energy governance: 
energy markets, security of supply, sustainability and development.42 
2.3 The EU’s Energy Policy 
2.3.1 History of Energy Policy 
Energy has arguably been a central part of the European integration project since its 
first apparition as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. However, the early 
efforts to integrate the initial six member states’ coal and steel markets were primarily 
to guarantee peace on the European continent.43 The creation of the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom), whose role was to coordinate atomic research and 
develop common safety standards, came soon after in 1957. The importance of 
coordinating energy policies of its member states became clear early on with the High 
Authority of the ECSC seeking to expand its competences to other types of energy in 
 
40 Thijs Van De Graaf and Jeff Colgan, "Global energy governance: A review and research agenda," 
Palgrave Communications 2, no. 1 (2016). 
41 Benjamin K Sovacool and Ann Florini, "Examining the complications of global energy governance," 
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 30, no. 3 (2012). 
42Andreas Goldthau, The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (Hoboken, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 
Incorporated, 2013).. 
43  David Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions," in Policy making in the 
EUropean Union, ed. Hellen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, and Alisdair R. Young (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
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the wake of the Suez Crisis.44 However, scholars argued that failure to find common 
ground between member states hampered the further development of a community 
wide energy policy.45 To this day, the EU’s control over energy policy remains limited. 
Nevertheless, relevant literature notes three important challenges that have led the 
Commission to seek further responsibility in the area and have shaped the EU’s energy 
priorities: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability.46 These three policy 
axes first appeared relatively late in the history of the European project – they were 
officially announced in the Commission’s Green Paper on the EU’s energy strategy 
published in 2006. Importantly, the Green Paper introduced the EU’s external energy 
policy.47 These goals are characterised by three important projects for the EU which 
will be discussed below: the establishment of an internal energy market, diversification 
of its sources of energy, and reduction of the level of its carbon emissions. Jale Tosun 
Sophie Besenberg and Kai Schulze argue that the EU has gained authority over these 
areas of energy policy through a process of agenda setting.48 
 
44 Samuel R. Schubert, Johannes Pollak, and Maren Kreutler, Energy policy in the European Union 
(London;New York, NY;: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions." 
Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the agenda, 28.. 
47 European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy,"  
N. Chaban, M. Knodt, and A. Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global 
normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'," Comparative European Politics 15, no. 1 
(2017). 
48 Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the agenda, 28. 
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2.3.2 Internal Energy Market 
The creation of an internal energy market has long been an ambition of the EU. 
However, energy is subject to a number of conditions which have made integration 
into a common market difficult. Samuel Schubert, Johannes Pollak and Maren 
Kreutler detail how the existence of ‘natural monopolies’, as well as energy’s strategic 
nature led to the development of national energy giants with control over national energy 
industries rather than an interdependent supra-national system.49 These authors add 
that different technological choice made by member states has led each country to rely 
on different types of energy with different political priorities which have further 
hindered integration.50 As Europe’s use of coal decreased in favour of oil and a chain 
of crises in the Middle East disrupted its supply, the European Commission 
endeavoured to convince its member states to work on the creation of a common 
energy market.51 However, the idea of a common energy market was only brought 
forward a decade later when the Council argued in favour of it in 1986, giving member 
states guidelines to try to converge their energy policies.52 Two years later, the 
Commission published a working paper The Internal Market for Energy.53 Fikland 
described this paper, stating that it “envisioned a ‘common carrier’ system for gas and 
electricity across the members in which any consumer could purchase energy from any 
supplier across the community, regardless of ownership of the intermediary grid 
 
49 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, Energy policy in the European Union. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. p 97 
52 Ibid. p149 
53 European Commission, "The Internal Energy Market. Commission Working Ducument," in COM 
(88) 238 Final (1988),  
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structures.”54 Such a project required extensive liberalisation of the energy sector 
which went against many member states interests. Schubert et al. observed that “the 
so-called common carrier principle […] proved to be the most contentious point,”55 
and the path to formulating policy became challenging. The Council finally adopted 
the Electricity Directive in 1996 and the Gas Directive in 1998. Both directives sought 
to gradually liberalise both markets by opening up access to energy networks. While 
the Commission was unable to fulfil its vision of liberalised EU-wide energy market, it 
lay important ground work for the future of the EU’s energy policy.56 The second and 
third liberalisation packages were adopted in 2003 and 2009 respectively and sought 
to further reinforce competition in the EU’s energy market. Scholarly commentators 
noted now the second package, in 2003, required energy companies to separate their 
energy production from their supply networks by creating subsidiaries for the later 
and the 2009 package “forced energy companies either to sell their networks outright 
or to put these networks under entirely independent management.” 57  Achieving a 
fully-integrated energy market remains one of the Commission’s top priorities. In 
2011, it announced that it sought to complete this project by 2014. However, at the 
time of the thesis submission (2019), this objective is yet to be fulfilled. 
Schubert et al. classify the energy market as an internal policy of the EU,58 and it is 
easy to understand why. However, scholars also argued that creating an internal EU 
 
54Per Ove Eikeland, "EU internal energy market policy: Achievements and hurdles," in Toward a 
Common European Union Energy Policy (Springer, 2011).  
55 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, Energy policy in the European Union. p106 
56 Ibid.  p114 
57 Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions." p362 
58 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, Energy policy in the European Union. 
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market has important implications for its external policy as well. Richard Young 
suggested that the EU’s effort to guarantee its energy security makes creating a pan-
European energy community an element of its foreign policy. 59 He stated that the EU 
in its conduct of external energy policies has a choice between a geopolitical approach 
and a market driven one. In his words, “the rules and regulations of the internal market 
were certainly presented as the key foundation to the EU’s international projection in 
energy matters.” 60 Young’s argument is that member states aim to benefit from both 
strategies, gaining influence through a European-wide market while pursuing 
geopolitical goals. Moreover, creating an internal energy market has important 
implication to the EU’s energy security. The Commission’s Green Paper on 
establishing an energy strategy in Europe argues that completing the internal energy 
market would help ensure the EU’s security of supply. 61 
Importantly, issues of security of supply have in part contributed to the development 
of the internal market. For example, the internal energy market package adopted in 
2009 followed the second gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Researchers in the 
field underlined that the package encouraged solidarity and cooperation between EU 
member states and promoted the internal market as a means to tackle the challenge of 
energy security. 62 To conclude, the development of the internal market has been both 
influenced by external events and is used by the EU as a means to export its 
 
59Richard Youngs, Energy security: Europe's new foreign policy challenge, vol. 53 (New 
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2.3.3  Security of Supply 
The EU is largely dependent on external sources of energy in the form of oil, gas, coal 
and uranium. According to Eurostat, in 2015, 54% of the EU’s energy needs were met 
through imports. 63 Schubert et al. noted that while the EU’s sources of coal and 
uranium are relatively reliable, the same cannot be said for oil and gas. 64 Eurostat 
estimated that, in 2015, the EU imported 88.8% of its oil and 69.1% of its gas. The 
disruption in the supply of both types of energy sources would have important adverse 
effect on the EU’s economy. The oil crises in the 1970s have led European countries to 
reduce their dependency on oil in primary energy production. Nevertheless, oil 
remains the backbone of the transport industry. Szarka pointed how gas has become 
an essential source of energy in many countries in part due to the said oil crises. 65 The 
same author argued that in addition gas is comparatively more environmentally 
friendly than other fossil fuels. The EU has sought to diversify the source of these 
imports, yet it remains largely dependent on a handful of producers. In 2016, over 66% 
of the EU’s oil imports came from five countries (Russia, Norway, Kazakhstan, Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia) and oil imports from Russia alone represented 30.9% of the total. 
66 Supply dependence on gas is even more severe, with Russia and Norway accounting 
 
63 Eurostat, "Energy dependence," 2017a, 
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for 39.5% and 34.4% of imports respectively in 2016, followed by Algeria representing 
15.1% of imports. 67 
Importantly, the level of dependence on energy imports varies between member states. 
A report from the European Commission found that smaller member states are the 
most vulnerable, with Malta and Cyprus almost fully dependent on energy imports 
with a non- diversified energy mix, relying almost entirely on oil imports.68 Other 
countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia), while having 
more diversified energy mixes, are heavily reliant on Russia for their gas imports. 69 
This dependence is in large part due to the existing infrastructure which links Russia 
to Eastern Europe through a network of pipelines. A large majority of the EU’s gas is 
imported through pipelines which means that it is beholden to the transit states and 
countries supplying gas. While the EU’s particular energy relationship with Russia will 
be discussed further in the following chapter, this chapter stresses that this 
relationship is central to the EU’s concern over energy security. Pierre Bocquillon and 
Tomas Maltby put forward an idea that the EU’s focus on energy security increased 
after the 2004-2007 Eastern European enlargement. 70 Likewise, Elina Brutschin 
pointed out that a coalition of Eastern European countries led by Poland have 
continuously attempted to upload their preference for a securitisation of the EU’s 
energy policy, with mixed success. 71 Securing supply of energy is one of the priorities 
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the Commission outlined in its Green Paper of March 2006 – a challenging priority 
that is aimed to be tackled through establishing a coherent external energy policy. 72 
Putting the paper against a broader context, it was published straight after the first gas 
crisis when Russia cut all gas destined to Ukraine, causing disruptions in the supply of 
EU member states. Similar crises between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 and 2014 have 
done nothing to reassure European countries of the stability of their gas supply. As 
mentioned previously, the Internal Energy Market package was adopted a few months 
after the second gas crisis in 2009, and after the crisis in Crimea, Poland once more 
called for increased solidarity in the EU’s energy policy.73 Thus energy security 
continues to be an important concern on the EU agenda, one shaped by external events 
and particularly by the EU’s relations with Russia. 
 
2.3.4 Climate Change 
In the 1990s, increased concern over climate change and environmental protection paved 
the way for a new EU energy policy. Indeed, climate change is arguably an area that 
has driven much of the EU’s developments in energy legislation with many scholars 
arguing that it has been the most powerful motor of EU energy policy.74 During a 
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number of international conferences in the early 1990s, it was made clear that energy 
production’s significant carbon footprint would need to be cut back to limit the 
environmental damage.75 The Commission took the opportunity to take action, 
publishing in February 1990 “Guidelines for an environmentally-friendly energy 
policy.” 76 In 1998, the EU signed the Kyoto protocol which required committed countries 
to cut back their carbon emissions by 8% by 2012 compared to 1990 levels. To do so, the 
Commission proposed to double the share of renewable energy (from 6% of the energy 
mix to 12%) as well as increasing the use of biofuels (by 5.75%) and improving energy 
efficiency (by 1% annually) by 2010.77 The Commission has sought to take on a 
leadership role in the fight against climate change, taking advantage of the US’ refusal 
to partake in international agreements such as the Kyoto protocol. 78 
As pointed out by Schubert et al., the EU’s ambition to lead the efforts against climate 
change have an internal and external component.79 In order to effectively take 
leadership in international climate change negotiations, the EU would need to lead by 
example, and to do so would require a transformation of its member states’ economies 
to reduce their environmental cost. In January 2007, the EU proposed to further 
increase post-Kyoto protocol ambitions with three important binding targets: 
unilaterally reduce carbon emission by 20% compared to 1990 levels by 2020 (with an 
option to increase this target to 30% if an ambitious international agreement was 
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made); increasing its share of renewables by 20% by 2020; and improving energy 
efficiency by 20% by 2020. 80  More broadly, these targets are parts of the EU’s 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 81 To reach these targets, the 
Commission introduced the 2020 climate and energy package that was adopted in 
January 2008. It included: a revision of the EU’s 2003 emission trading scheme (ETS) 
directive; targets for sectors not included in the EU ETS (like transport, agriculture, 
services, small industry, food industry and buildings); and a directive on the promotion 
of renewable energy including binding targets for member states. 82 By 2013, the EU 
had made significant progress, almost achieving the reduction of emissions and 
increase in renewables targets. 83 Building on the 2020 package, in October 2014 the 
EU adopted further targets to be reached by 2030: reducing emissions by 40% (from 
1990 levels); increasing by 27% the share of renewables; and improving energy 
efficiency by 27%. 
Meanwhile, the EU sought to take leadership of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (also known as the Conference of Parties 
(COPs)) with mixed success. Literature commented how the EU sought an 
international agreement on climate change with binding emissions reduction targets 
for all parties to replace the Kyoto protocol ending in 2013, but failed to make other 
actors see eye to eye. 84 Bertil Kilian and Ole Elgström argued that the COP15 in 
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Copenhagen, “where expectation were high of a decisive breakthrough in climate 
change negotiations, ended in what is generally described as a fiasco.” 85 Charles 
Parker, Christer Karlsson and Mattias Hjerpe concluded that the image of the EU’s 
climate change leadership suffered as a result. 86 For example, a study based on 
interviews of elites in China and India found that interviewees regarded the failure of 
Copenhagen as proof of the EU’s weakening global leadership. 87 Drawing on survey 
data, Parker and Karlsson found that recognition of the EU as a leader in the field of 
climate change declined from the COP14 in 2008 Poznan to the COP15 in Copenhagen 
a year later, passing from 62% to 46%.88 
Kilian and Elgström explained this decline in EU external perceptions by three 
leadership shortfalls from the EU.89 Firstly, they argued, the EU failed to act as a 
unified actor and was unable to negotiate as a block. Secondly, the EU’s directional 
leadership, and its bid to lead by example, was undermined by a lack of ambitious 
reduction targets. Finally, they argued that the EU lacks structural power in climate 
negotiations, not being one of the major players upon which the fight against climate 
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change relies like big emitters such as the US and China. 
Parker et al. pointed out that “the EU made a comeback with 50% of participants 
recognising the EU as a leader in Durban (2011) and, regaining the top spot by a slight 
margin, with 51% in Doha (2012).” 90 In a later paper they also highlighted that while 
the EU’s leadership continued to be recognised at similar level in 2013 and 2014, the 
US overtook the EU as the most recognised leader in 2014. Finally, they noted that “in 
Paris, at the COP21, the EU’s leadership recognition dropped significantly to 41% while 
the leadership recognition of the US soared and the EU was even eclipsed by China.”91 
Importantly, they also found that over the same period, perceptions of leadership by 
European respondents was significantly higher, fluctuating between 75% in 2008 and 
61% in 2015. So, like in many other sectors, 92 the EU’s self-perception as a climate 
change leader does not match that of external partners. 93 
Parker et al. also analysed the EU’s leadership during the UNFCCC climate 
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negotiations and conclude that the EU was most successful in setting the agenda but 
had less influence over the final outcome of negotiations, often being overshadowed at 
that time by China and the US. Nevertheless, the EU was able to “transcend its agenda 
setting success”94 during the COP 21 in Paris and forge an alliance with the US and 
China in order to achieve a universal deal to limit the impact of climate change. 
Importantly, Parker et al. noted that France’s recognition of leadership rose during the 
COP21 in Paris, going from 1.9% in 2014 to 8.1% in 2015, and point out that this 
increase matches a drop for the EU’s leadership from 48% in 2014 to 42% in 2015. 
They argued that this is largely a cost of “being a complex actor that represent 28 states 
in this issue area.” 95 Nevertheless, the EU was able to have a common message at the 
COP 21 and thus speak with one voice. They add: “The EU’s climate policy has served 
to strengthen a common identity among member states and to establish the EU as a 
credible unified actor in the eyes of the world.” 96 
 
2.3.5 Nuclear competences 
As mentioned, nuclear power was one of the early areas of integration with the creation 
of an institutional framework to govern it in 1957 (Euratom.) Gregoire Mallard noted 
that the integration of nuclear power was in line with Jean Monnet’s vision, for whom 
it would be beneficial to take away national authority over strategic sectors and place 
them under the control of a new community institution. 97 However, due to lack of 
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investment from member states, this vision was never entirely fulfilled. Today, nuclear 
power does not appear as one of the EU’s priorities and as Buchan stressed, “all key 
nuclear power decisions are national and are likely to stay so for a long time.”  98 
Nevertheless, Euratom has acquired important competences over the years. From its 
inception, Euratom had a non-proliferation agenda, requiring member states to 
inform the Commission of any nuclear investments, as well as a body of inspectors to 
supervise both civil and military installations in Europe. Euratom also oversees a 
common market for nuclear material, making sure of regular and equitable access to 
fissile materials between member states. It also sets important safety standards to 
protect those working in reactors against radiation. However, Buchan notes that 
Euratom “has no role in setting safety standards for the design or operation of reactors, 
when for the population at large the risk of radiation exposure comes from faulty 
reactor design or operation.” 99 In 2007, the Commission established the European 
High-level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management regrouping all member 
states’ national regulators in the hope of producing “a common approach in its two 
areas of responsibility.” 100 
One of the most important responsibilities of Euratom is research. More specifically, 
it finances a common research centre tasked with improving nuclear fission safety. 
Euratom is also an important part of the international research project ITER, aimed 
at developing nuclear fusion. 
Finally, the Commission is able to sign cooperation agreements with third countries 
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such as the US, Canada, Ukraine or Japan through Euratom. These agreements must 
be approved by the Council as the areas of responsibility of Euratom. 
It’s important to highlight this EU competence in terms of nuclear energy since, as we 
will see, the EU has little visibility in France as a nuclear actor. 
 
2.3.6 Shared competence and issues of coherence 
According to David Buchan, the development of the EU’s energy policy has largely 
been “organic,” often relying on its “legal competence from economic and 
environmental parts of the EU treaties to justify proposing and passing energy 
measures.” 101  Energy finally became a formal competence of the EU’s after the reform 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in Lisbon in 2007. 102 
Article 194 of the TFEU brings together the three goals of the EU in terms of energy, 
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability: 
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, 
EU policy on energy shall aim, in spirit of solidarity between member 
states, to: 
- ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
- ensure security of supply in the Union; 
- promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of 
new and renewable forms of energy; 
- promote interconnection of energy networks. 103 
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Importantly however, there is an area over which the EU does not have any control. 
Namely, it is about member states’ right to choose from different energy sources. As 
such, while the EU has an increased oversight on energy policies, member states retain 
control of their domestic energy mixes, and this arrangement leads to a multi-
governance of energy. This also means that the EU and its member states’ interest may 
diverge. Previously discussed research argued the level of dependence on external 
energy sources varies between member states while different energy sources involve 
different dynamics of geopolitics. 104 De Jong and Schunz observed that while the 
Lisbon Treaty aimed to increase the coherence of the EU’s external energy policies, it 
has been unable to live up to expectations. 105 Herranz Surralles argued that since the 
late 2000s, the EU has sought an increased role in energy diplomacy. However, in 
practice, the result has been what she calls “a hybrid mode of EU external energy 
policy”: 106  while the European Commission has pushed for an external energy policy 
that has the outlines of an active energy diplomacy, in practice, energy policy is 
divided. At the EU level, a general approach to energy governance with at the member-
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2.4 France - National Energy Priorities 
2.4.1 A French Technological Identity? 
Each country in the EU has chosen different paths and have different priorities in 
terms of energy. Some choose to move away from nuclear energy, others seek through 
renewable energies to diversify their energy mix. France’s attachment to nuclear 
energy makes it an interesting case. As we will discuss further, images of nuclear 
energy are closely linked to images of the French national identity. This makes France 
an EU country of particular interest. 
France is a particular energy actor and is different from other actors in the EU. Its 
energy mix is still focussed on nuclear energy and in fact France generates half of the 
EU’s nuclear power. 108  
Whereas other countries in Europe – and Germany specifically -- have decided to 
move away from nuclear energy, the political situation in France regarding nuclear is 
more complex. Sarah Wiliarty, who analysed the differences between nuclear power in 
France and Germany, argued that the two countries have a similar energy situation 
with high technological capabilities, high energy demands and a shortage of natural 
energy reserves. 109 However, the two countries have very different approaches to 
nuclear energy. For Wiliarty, the main reason for these differences is in the structure 
of the French and German political systems. She concludes that “the German state is 
 
108 Mycle Schneider, "France’s great energy debate," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 1 
(2013).p27. 
109 Sarah Elise Wiliarty, "Nuclear power in Germany and France," Polity 45, no. 2 (2013). 
46 
 
more porous to citizen’s demands than […] the French state.” 110 This tendency towards 
technocracy in France, especially in the field of energy, has been confirmed by many 
scholars. Sophie Meritet argued that “the history of energy policy [in France] has 
always been characterised by a very strong intervention of the state.” 111 France’s 
nuclear energy programme has been led from the start by “technocratic elites” 112 
rather than by the general public. Tuula Teravainen, Markku Lehtonen and Mari 
Martiskainen113 used a classification of states developed by Dryzek et al. 114 to 
categorise a state’s level of openness to external interests in national decision-making 
processes. It details four ideal types, namely: actively or passively inclusive and 
actively or passively exclusive. 115 The authors specifically described France as 
passively exclusive on account of its government-led nuclear policies. 116 This means 
that France’s “long tradition of state-centrism and top-down management together with 
the general suspicion of organised interests has provided few points of access to non- 
governmental organisations into policy-making.” From a different perspective, when 
discussing the relationship between scientific communities and society, Sevin Topcu 
concluded that at least up until the 1970s, France’s development of nuclear capacities 
 
110 Ibid. 
111 Sophie Meritet, "French perspectives in the emerging European Union energy policy," Energy Policy 
35, no. 10 (2007). 
112 Schneider, "France’s great energy debate." 
113 Tuula Teräväinen, Markku Lehtonen, and Mari Martiskainen, "Climate change, energy security, and 
risk—debating nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK," Energy Policy 39, no. 6 (2011). 
114 John S. Dryzek et al., "Environmental Transformation of the State: the USA, Norway, Germany and 
the UK," Political Studies 50, no. 4 (2002). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Teräväinen, Lehtonen, and Martiskainen, "Climate change, energy security, and risk—debating 
nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK." 
47 
 
were technocratic in nature, with the programme led by a handful of experts with 
“homogenous profiles.” 117 Robert L. Frost described the development of France’s 
technocratic energy policies from 1946 to 1968. 118 
This technocratic lead is exemplified by the nationalisation of production, transport 
and distribution of electricity and gas with the creation of Electricité de France (EDF) 
and Gaz de France (GDF) 119 in 1946. 120 Partial competition was introduced in the 
1980s under the impulse of the European Commission, 121 however the energy market 
was opened up for non-domestic consumers only in July 2004 and for domestic 
consumers in July 2007. 
France’s technocratic ambitions led it to develop a nuclear energy industry that 
exceeds that of any other country in the world. Today, only the US has more nuclear 
plants than France. Moreover, when calculated per capita, France has far more nuclear 
energy capacity than anywhere else in the world. For Gabrielle Hecht from the onset, 
the development of France nuclear industry was linked to ideas of France’s grandeur, 
or in her words, “the radiance of France.” 122 The term came to life after a 1948 visit of 
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the then French President Vincent Auriol to France’s first nuclear reactor. He was 
reported to have declared: “This achievement will add to the radiance of France.” 123 
The word ‘radiance’, which is synonymous to greatness, recalls nuclear radiation of 
course, but also a sense of grandeur in France’s history. “The notion referred back to 
glorious past days, invoking Louis XIV, Napoleon and the heyday of French 
imperialism.” 124 Hecht studied in depth the relationship between the development of 
France nuclear energy industry and French national identity. She also argued that 
technology became a way for France to regain its former status of world leader, after 
the embarrassment of the Second World War. 125 
French nuclear energy programme started in 1945, when, the then prime minister 
Charles De Gaulle created the Commissariat de l’Energie Atomique (CEA) in a bid to 
rebuild France after the devastation of the war. The programme had two objectives. 
One was to provide a stable energy source for France. The other was to produce 
weapon grade plutonium in order to develop France nuclear strike capabilities. De 
Gaulle viewed the latter objective as essential to guarantee France’s national security. 
126 Gabrielle Hecht explained that this objective was obvious in the design of the CEA’s 
first reactor built in 1953. A number of features allowed for the rapid extraction of fuel 
rods which she argues is proof that the reactor was designed to optimise production of 
weapon grade uranium. Had the reactor been designed for the express purpose of 
producing electricity, the fuel rods would have been left for as long as possible rather 
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than extracted and replaced while the fission reaction was occurring. 127 Therefore the 
initial development of nuclear energy, like in the US and the UK, was born from 
France’s strategic national interests.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘frenchness’ of France’s nuclear programme seemed 
to be primordial. The gas-graphite nuclear reactor, developed by the CEA and EDF was 
viewed as the quintessential French technology. Whether or not this claim can be made 
in view of the external expertise that influenced the development of this technology is 
beside the point. Hecht points out that “there is no such thing as an essential French 
technological style. Engineers did not make the choices they did because they were 
French.” 128 Nevertheless, in France it was perceived as quintessentially ‘French’ and it 
became a symbol of French national pride. 
 
2.4.2 Perceptions of nuclear energy 
While France is arguably a “special case” in the EU in terms of nuclear energy policy, 
it would be wrong to assume that this is due to a lack of internal contestation of nuclear 
energy policies. In the 1970s important protests took place in France with large 
manifestations and at times violent confrontations with the authorities. 129 However, 
protests themselves are not necessarily indicative of overall support. This led some 
scholars to assess the level of support for nuclear energy in France. Sylvain Brouard 
and Isabelle Guinaudeau compiled longitudinal data on support for nuclear energy in 
France. They aimed to understand why, unlike in other countries, France had never 
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gone through a phase-out of nuclear energy until very recently. In order to get such 
longitudinal data, they used multiple surveys from different agencies and used a 
“public mood” 130 indicator in order to deal with the heterogeneity of the data. They 
found that over the past four decades support for nuclear energy among French people 
has in fact been mostly below 50%.131 They found that in the 1975-1987 period, support 
for nuclear energy averaged at about 55.1%, which they noted was surprising as anti-
nuclear protest were strongest around that time. They also found that after the 
Chernobyl incident in 1986, support dropped significantly (18.8 points over five years). 
While this trend was reversed in the 1990s, with support increasing slowly, it has never 
regained its pre-Chernobyl levels and never again gained a majority. What is most 
surprising is that while there is a sharp decrease of support in 2011, probably due to 
the Fukushima disaster, there was nevertheless a renewed increase in support for 
nuclear energy in 2012. Moreover, a study made by the IFOP in April 2016 found that 
53% of people surveyed were against the closure of nuclear plants. Only 47% saw it in 
a positive light.132 
Brouard and Guinaudeau found that support for nuclear energy differs depending on 
the sides of the French political spectrum. They found that, over the whole period of 
observation, a majority of right wing and far-right-wing voters viewed nuclear energy 
favourably, while support for this type of energy within socialist and communist 
parties was on average below 50% and fewer than 30% of green voters supported it. 133 
 
130 This methodology was developed by Stimsom  
131 Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-
nuclear energy policy." 
132 IFOP, "Les Français et l’énergie nucléaire," 2016, accessed 19/09/16, 
http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3370-1-study_file.pdf. 
133 Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-
51 
 
They found, however, that support for nuclear energy had declined over the years 
within all parties’ constituencies. The sharpest decline happening in the 1980s.134 
However, despite this finding, it would appear that political parties were not 
incentivised to back anti-nuclear policies. The authors concluded in their article that 
the stability of France’s nuclear energy sector could not be explained by strong public 
support as nuclear energy has had less than 50% support since the end of the 1980s. 
Brouard and Guinaudeau sought to explain France’s continued nuclear policy through 
different means. They hypothesised that “the disconnection between the preferences 
of the median voter and the decision of nuclear policy in France could be rendered 
possible by a low salience of this issue in the public sphere. 135 To verify this hypothesis, 
they measured the number of articles published in Le Monde about the issue between 
1977 and 2012. They found that the visibility of the issue varied greatly over the years 
but was highest at the end of the 1970s with over 600 articles in 1977. The intensity of 
coverage peaked once more at the time of the Chernobyl accident with more than 
article per day. More recently, concerns over nuclear dissemination, global warming, 
energy costs and opportunities for France’s nuclear energy industry have driven media 
coverage. They found however that the issue “acquired a historical level of visibility in 
the months following the Fukushima accident and the 2012 presidential campaign.”136 
However, they argued that while the coverage of nuclear energy has fluctuated over 
the period, the issue has been present in the media routinely, thus negating the 
hypothesis of low issue salience. 
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They then analysed the effects of France’s technocratic lead hypothesising that the 
issue had been kept off parliamentary agendas. 137 However, between 1965 and 2006, 
they were able to “identify 22 laws dedicated to matters of safety of nuclear plants, 
treatment sites and radioactive waste disposal sites.” They concluded that the focus of 
the laws on the negative aspects of nuclear energy could have given rise to 
parliamentary debates over the wider issue of nuclear energy. 
Finally, they analysed party politics. They argued that the main right-wing party 
(UMP-Les Republicains) were historically devoted to nuclear energy as a means to 
ensure France independence. Likewise, the communist party (PC) supported the 
policy due to their closeness to EDF’s main trade union (CGT) and strong ideological 
beliefs in “the power of science and technology to transform the world.” 138 They argue 
that opposition to nuclear energy would most likely emanate from the main left wing 
party (PS). However, due to internal party politics and “the necessity of 
accommodating the pro-nuclear PC” 139  the party avoided the issue all together. The 
authors also pointed out that when Francois Mitterrand, a PS president, was governing 
in the 1980s, path dependence elements were already at play. The initial investment 
into the construction of nuclear power plants had already been expended. A change of 
policy would have negated these investments and thus been very costly. With the 
ecological movement gaining ground in the early 1990s, the Green Party became 
increasingly important. Brouard and Guinaudeau argue that the party was the first to 
break the trend of “issue avoidance and consensus regarding nuclear energy in 
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electoral competition.” 140  Losing supporters to the ecologists, the PS sought to form 
a coalition with the Green party at the end of the 1990s. With this new political 
incentive, the nuclear issue became a point of contention between political parties. In 
2007, Ségolène Royal, the PS presidential candidate expressed for the first time an 
aspiration to reducing the share of nuclear energy in France’s energy mix. In 2012, the 
issue of nuclear energy was politicised once more and Francois Holland, seeking a 
coalition with the Green party, promised to reduce the share of nuclear energy by 25% 
before 2015. The law on energy transition adopted in July 2015 aims to reduce nuclear 
energy to 50% of the energy mix by 2025 and marks a historical change in France’s 
energy policy. 
Importantly, Brouard and Guinaudeau concluded that “arguments in terms of 
technocracy, interest groups, path dependency and ‘constraints’ of all kinds cannot 
fully account for the observed lack of democratic responsiveness”. 141 They contended 
that “this explanation has to be complemented with respect to a neglected variable: 
party politics.” 142 
In a study of French engineering students’ perception of nuclear energy, Roh Pin Lee 
and Silke Gloaguen found that the student associated nuclear energy most strongly 
with four imageries: safety and danger related issues, efficiency, nuclear waste, and 
costs.143  Moreover, it was found that the students were aware of France nuclear 
history, starting with Charles De Gaulle’s nuclear programme and the development of 
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nuclear energy during the oil crisis. France was viewed as a pioneer of nuclear energy. 
Lee and Gloaguen add that due to this history “[students] felt that nuclear technology 
[was] safer and better controlled in France than in other countries”. 144  Politically 
their analysis showed two trends. First that the political landscape in France was 
viewed as unanimously pro-nuclear and the French Green party (Europe Ecologie les 
Verts) was seen as having very low credibility. Economically, nuclear energy was 
viewed as a driver of France’s economy and as a way to keep prices of electricity down. 
The students viewed the media focus on energy as low, however they noted that in the 
aftermath of Fukushima, the media would often highlight the safety of France’s 
nuclear energy industry in their coverage. Finally, the students felt that overall, due to 
the low prices of energy in France, energy as such was not at the forefront of people’s 
minds. They sensed “a strong feeling of nuclear acceptance in the French 
population.”145 Of course, Lee and Gloaguen’s study is focussed on a very particular 
part of society. Engineering students are more likely to be pro-nuclear. It has been 
shown that professionals with physics or engineering backgrounds often have 
favourable views of nuclear energy. 146 Their research however was focussed on the 
concepts of path dependence and lock-in effects that may constrain energy decisions. 
The authors argued that young engineering students will be the future decision makers 
in the energy sector. This is particularly true in a country such as France where 
engineers and technicians have a strong influence over political decisions relating to 
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energy. 147 These images however reflected the visions that France has promoted since 
the end of the Second World War, as noted by Hecht. 148 
 
2.4.3 Climate Change, Renewable Energy and Energy Transition 
This chapter has so far demonstrated how France’s nuclear energy policy makes it an 
exception in Europe, and indeed in the world. However, the EU has also exerted its 
weight in some areas of energy policy in France, and specifically in its use of 
renewables. 
Sustainability is an area where Europeanisation had a strong influence on France. 
Valerie Lacroix and Edwin Zaccai explained that while in the 1970s, the idea of 
environmental protection went contrary to the development of the economy and 
industrialisation, the idea of sustainable development slowly made its way through the 
minds of politicians in France. Still, the issue of climate change was unheard of in 
policy making circles. 149 Pierre Bocquillon and Aurelien Evrard noted however that 
despite being “a latecomer and follower” in international climate conferences, “from 
the early 1990s onwards France developed the ambition of displaying international 
climate leadership.” 150  Joseph Szarka pointed out that France had reduced its carbon 
emissions significantly, before other nations. Yet, France was an “inadvertent pioneer” 
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since the drivers of the policy that helped reduce emission (the choice of nuclear 
energy) had nothing to do with concerns over climate protection. 151 So, without 
meaning so, France’s economy had become one of the world’s least carbon intensive. 
However, Szarka argues that instead of seeking ‘climate leadership’ during the Kyoto 
protocol negotiations in 1997 and subsequent EU level negotiations in 1998, France 
agreed to only stabilise its carbon emissions at 1990 levels. As a consequence, in the 
mid-1990s, France appeared to merely “rest on its laurels,” without seeking to match 
the tougher targets other countries set for themselves. 152 
In the early 2000s, with increased international focus on climate change, it became 
unsustainable for France to lag behind. Rhetorically at least, the French government 
took a stand with President Jacques Chirac famously declaring at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002: “Our house is burning and we 
look elsewhere.”153 It soon became clear that France would not meet its emission 
targets and would in fact emit 10% more carbon in 2010 that in 1990 if it did not 
implement important changes. Jacques Chirac’s government therefore organised in 
2003 a ‘national energy debate’. According to Joseph Szarka, this debate “drew the 
predictable (and predicted) conclusion that France needed to extend the life of its 
nuclear power stations and build a new generation.” 154 Two other energy related 
actions also started appearing in policy at the time. These were aiming at the increase 
of energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy, two areas of policy which have 
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been heavily affected by Europeanisation, according to Bocquillon and Evrard, 155 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s election in 2007 marked a turn in France’s climate change policies. 
Sustainability, which had been an important topic of the 2007 presidential campaign, 
was made a policy priority. At the EU level, France agreed to increase the share of 
renewable energy in its energy mix by 23% (from 1990 to 2020) and integrated this 
goal in the 2007 law “Grenelle de l’environment.”156 Bocquillon and Evrard discussed 
two dynamics of Europeanisation that were active at this time. The first one is vertical 
Europeanisation, where supporters of renewable energy used the EU’s targets to 
request concrete measures to meet them, using the EU as a legitimising factor. The 
second one is horizontal Europeanisation, which used the example of other European 
countries far ahead of France in renewable energy. Compared to other European 
countries, particularly Germany and Denmark, France’s share of renewable energy has 
remained low. Evrard in fact discovered that the share of renewable energy in the 
French energy mix has stagnated for the most part over the last 30 years. 157 
During France’s EU presidency in 2008, Sarkozy made the adoption of the EU climate 
and energy package a priority, thus changing its position from norm importer to norm 
entrepreneur. Bocquillon and Evrard argued that “the package embodied domestic 
environmental and climate commitments and represented an opportunity for the 
government to position itself at the vanguard of EU climate leadership.” 158  They also 
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concluded that France’s position on climate action evolved from being seen as a threat 
to industrial development to a diplomatic opportunity, one that politicians would often 
use to legitimise nuclear energy. 
Finally, a third shift in France’s approach to climate action happened arguably post 
2012, under the leadership of Francois Hollande. The Law on the Energy Transition 
which was adopted in August 2015, introduced the target of reducing the share of 
nuclear energy to 50% of the energy mix by 2025, which marks an unprecedented 
change in France’s energy policy. This change is in large part a result of the 2012 
presidential election which opposed among others Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois 
Hollande. As discussed earlier in this Chapter, president Sarkozy and his 
administration had been very supportive of France’s nuclear industry, often justifying 
this choice through the need for independence and the threat of climate change. 
However, in the aftermath of Fukushima, Francois Hollande made a pact with the 
green party whereby if he was to win the presidential election, the greens and his own 
socialist party would form a coalition in the National Assembly, in exchange in part for 
a reduction in the share of nuclear energy. The Law on the Energy Transition also 
reiterated goals on the increase of renewable energy and energy efficiency and the 
reduction of carbon emissions. In essence, while previous governments used climate 
action as a legitimising factor for nuclear energy, often times trying to upload this 
preference in international fora such as the UNFCCC COPs and even the EU, 
Hollande’s government made the fight against climate change the centre piece of its 
external energy policy, moving away from nuclear energy. This attempt at climate 
change leadership was best illustrated by the 2015 COP21 in Paris: “President 
Hollande made COP21 one of the landmarks of his term in office towards which national 
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environmental and foreign policies have been geared.” 159 
 
2.4.4 Perceptions of Climate Action 
Importantly, a large majority of French citizens is in favour of climate action. In a 
survey by Eurobarometer on attitudes towards climate change, 79% on French 
respondents believed climate change to be a ‘very serious’ problem, and rating it in the 
top three most serious problem facing the world along with ‘poverty, hunger and lack 
of drinking water’ (37%) and ‘international terrorism’ (24%) (14% placed it as the single 
most serious problem facing the world). 160 Meanwhile, when asked who would be 
responsible for tackling climate change, 53% of French respondents answered national 
government, followed closely by the EU with 51% and business and industry with 43% 
(multiple answers were possible). 161 This seems to indicate that climate action from 
both France and the EU would be seen as legitimate. Finally, a large majority were in 
favour of national targets to increase the share of renewable energy with 52% seeing it 
as ‘very important’ and 42% as ‘fairly important'. 162 
Bocquillon and Evrard point out however, that attitudes to climate change have varied 
according to the national and international context. In the build up to the Copenhagen 
conference in 2009, the Agence de L’Environment et de Maitrise de l’Energie 
(ADEME) in a survey conducted by Opinionway found that 28% of French people 
surveyed thought climate change was the most concerning environmental issue. This 
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proportion dropped to 19% in 2010 and remained low in the next three years, and 
picked up again in 2014 and 2015 reaching 32% the year of the COP21. 163 
 
2.4.5 French energy diplomacy and environmental foreign policy 
France’s nuclear focussed domestic energy policy influenced aspects of its foreign 
policy, particularly energy diplomacy. Joseph Szarka argues that “France took on a 
self-appointed leadership role in promoting the revival, seeking to restore the 
legitimacy of nuclear power and generalise its use worldwide. Thereby the French 
nuclear lobby attempted to turn a national exception into an international norm.” 164 
This search for a French-led nuclear ‘renaissance’ has been exemplified by Nicolas 
Sarkozy who set up in 2008 the Agence France Nucléaire International in order to 
promote nuclear energy to ‘newcomer’ states. Its primary purpose is to ‘help countries 
prepare the institutional, human and technical environments needed for the 
development of a nuclear industry that respects safety, security and non-proliferation 
conditions and respects the environment.” 165 
In the 1990s, the imperative to reduce industry produced gas emissions emerged. The 
world saw the development of norms and rules regarding climate change with, for 
example, the introduction of the Kyoto protocol. In parallel to this, research began to 
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put forward arguments about the benefits of nuclear energy for reducing green-house 
gas emissions thus legitimizing French discourses on nuclear power. 166 While France’s 
policy had originally been driven by concerns of energy security and competitiveness, 
sustainability became a primary factor in its continued promotion. 167 In the early 
2000s France sought persuade the EU and the wider international community to 
include nuclear energy as a strategy to tackle climate change. 
As we will see, both climate change and nuclear energy are major drivers of France’s 
energy diplomacy with emerging countries. 
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 : Case Study: Energy Relations with 
the BRICS 
 
“The degree of competition or cooperation between the dominant and 
emerging powers depends on the analysis that the protagonists make of their 
own power and vulnerabilities, respective intentions and of the international 
conjecture. It is thus a dynamic process that occurs over several decades, in 
which the change of behaviour of one leads to the adaptation of the other. This 
process is principally the result of signals and of their interpretations, 
depending on the non-negligible risk of misperceptions.” 
Tanguy Struye de Swieland, 2012, p16168 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the energy situations in each 
of the BRICS. These descriptions will provide a good basis for comparison between the 
energy ‘realities’, as best achieved through a thorough review of literature, and the strategic 
narratives of France and the EU and the media frames in the written press. It will first 
explain why BRICS provide a good case study for global energy governance and in 
particular France and the EU’s external energy policies. 
 
168 Tanguy Struye de Swielande, "From Emerging power to Superpower: A long Way to Go?," in The 
European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global 
Order, ed. Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2012). p16 
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After painting a picture of the energy situation in each of the BRICS it will describe 
each country’s energy relations with the EU and France, paying particular attention to 
France and the EU’s energy diplomacy efforts. Goldthau defines energy diplomacy as: 
“the way countries give their energy companies a competitive edge in bidding for 
resources by using the state’s power: consumer countries strengthen their supply 
situation by diplomatically flanking energy contracts, whereas producer countries use 
diplomacy to enhance access to markets or reserves.”169 
 
3.2 Why Study the BRICS? 
3.2.1 What are the BRICS? 
The terms BRICS is the acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The 
concept started as BRIC, a term coined by a Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O’Neill in 
2001, to refer to countries with fast growing economies that were expected to rival 
other great economies like the US and the EU in terms of global importance. What 
started as a convenient way of expressing “emerging economies of the world” quickly 
became a grouping of political importance. The first BRIC summit took place in June 
2009 in Yekaterinburg in Russia and the summit has become a yearly occurrence. 
South Africa was invited to join the grouping in December 2010. 
There are many debates around the coherence of the BRICS grouping and whether 
each country has its place within the concept. Many debate for instance the 
appropriateness of adding South Africa within the group, as it is seemingly dwarfed by 
 
169 Andreas Goldthau, "Energy diplomacy in trade and investment of oil and gas," Global energy 
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its partners. 170  Others have voiced the opinion that the group should be shortened to 
BICS as Russia’s economy has not performed as well as envisioned in the past 
decade.171  Likewise, recent events in Brazil have led some to question the country’s 
ability to sustain high levels of growth. 172  Other ‘constellations’ have been put forward 
such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) or BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa and Mexico) with more valid argument regarding the 
inclusion of different countries.173 All of which raise more questions over which 
countries should be included in this group of emerging powers: if BRICSAM includes 
Mexico, then South Korea should also be included? What space does that leave the 
MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey)? etc. 174 
While the groupings are relevant and used in different discourses, BRICS remains the most 
widely used grouping, one that is a symptom of a rising multipolar world order. 
 
3.2.2 The BRICS and the multipolar order 
There is little doubt that these five countries are inherently different geopolitically, 
ideologically and culturally speaking. Despite these differences, the concept should not 
be dismissed, for what these countries perhaps lack in commonalities they make up in 
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a shared goal: reforming global institutions and shifting global weight to the “Global 
South”. 175   
“The increasingly dense networks between the five countries are based on a common 
goal: that is to advance the G20 and other new multilateral settings as an international 
forum and to counter what they perceive as an undemocratic and unjust Western-
dominated multilateral world. The BRICS phenomenon should therefore be seen as 
reflecting a general shift in the international balance of power with the centre of gravity 
moving from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific area and from the North to the 
South.” 176 
Under-representation of the developing world in multilateral institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank is among the top concerns of 
BRICS. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) by BRICS is an 
important example of counterbalancing of western powers by BRICS. For BRICS the 
NDB is about mobilising “resources for infrastructure and sustainable development 
projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement 
the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and 
development.” 177  Many commentators have been sceptical of the achievability of this 
purpose, many criticising the vagueness of the statement and the lack of a clear 
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infrastructure and objectives. 178 However, despite the diplomatic language used in 
their statement, Cooper and Flemes argue that the true purpose of the BRICS NDB is 
to create an alternative to the World Bank. 179 
Andrew Cooper and Daniel Flemes talk about shared “politics of resentment” 180  
among BRICS noting that BRICS “relate to the global system with a mutually 
reinforcing sense of historical grievances and claim to represent the interests of all 
developing countries.” 181 Fabiano Mielniczuk shows through a study of the BRICS’ 
statements at the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly from 1991 to 2011 that 
there has been a convergence in their discourses regarding development and the 
international community. Indeed, he argues that within the last decade, Brazil, Russia 
and South Africa’s discourses have started to mirror those of China and India with 
what he identifies as a “move from a liberal–unilateral to a developmental–multipolar 
set of social claims.” 182  Thus, he argues, creating a state of “discursive alignment” 
183 within BRICS which has enabled their rise in international affairs. 
So regardless of debates over the commonalities and differences within the BRICS or 
indeed on the economic weight and global influence these countries may hope to gain 
in the future decade, relevant literature finds that that these countries seek to update 
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and supplement an existing international order. Attention to discourses in previous studies 
of BRICS justifies a focus of this research on strategic narratives as they seek to 
influence other’s perceptions of a global order and main players within it. 
 
3.2.3 The BRICS and the EU 
The BRICS concept is often seen as a powerful example of a changing world order. The 
power of the US is eroding and its long theorised unipolar hold on international 
politics in the post-Cold War era is weakened. “Rather than ‘laying down the law’ in a 
disciplinary manner, the USA must negotiate and bargain” 184  with these emerging 
powers which as discussed, have the ambition to change current international 
institutions. Likewise, the EU must cooperate with these powers and create ties if they 
are to remain relevant global powers in the future. 
Cooper and Flemes argue that “as a result of the relative decline of the United States 
and the “old West” due to the emergence of new powers […] one can already witness a 
shift towards a less transatlantic and less Eurocentric world.” 185  They add that these 
circumstances have created major shifts in which actors are best able to influence 
global developments and that these changes have added “pressure on Europeans to fill 
the gaps and to rise to the challenges of both regional and global affairs.” 186 
In this context of rising multi-polarity in world politics, the study of the relationship 
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between Europe and emerging actors is crucial. The BRICS are a key part of Europe’s 
global strategy and ambition and the EU has set up strategic partnerships with each of 
these countries. The European Security Strategy first mentioned the concept of 
strategic partnerships in 2003 and today, the EU has ten strategic partners, including 
BRICS. Yet, as Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard note, the concept still somewhat lacks 
common understanding and clear objectives. 187 As a result, not all of the EU’s strategic 
partnerships are alike. Thomas Renard argues that there are many distinctions 
between them, some are established or resurgent powers (Canada, Russia, the US and 
Japan), others are emerging actors (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, South Korea 
and Mexico). 188  He also divides them between essential partners (the US), pivotal 
partners (Russia, China, Brazil, India), natural allies (Canada, Japan, South Korea) 
and regional powers (Mexico and South Africa). Each partnership is different, with 
varying priorities and frameworks. However, regardless of content, each partnership 
makes a clear political statement about the importance of these countries to the EU’s 
foreign policy. Together they are an indication of the strategic importance of these 
countries to the EU. Importantly for this research, EU dialogue with these actors on 
environmental issues, energy and climate change are some of the most developed 
aspects of the EU’s strategic partnerships with emerging actors. 189 This suggests the 
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high priority assigned to these issues by both the EU and the BRICS. 
 
3.2.4 The BRICS’ role in Global Energy Governance 
As discussed in previous chapters, the IEA predict global energy demand to rise by 
30% to 2040. 190 Much of this increase in energy demand occurs in emerging countries 
where economic growth and growing population lead to an increase of energy use. Put 
simply, energy is an essential enabler of development. It is therefore a crucial issue for 
emerging countries; one that raises many important challenges for these countries and 
for the global community. One of the major concerns for emerging countries is 
securing energy sources. In order to do so they generally turn to fossil fuels as they are 
the most readily available and affordable source of energy. However, as the reality of 
climate change sinks in, they have become large markets for low carbon sources of 
energy as well, such as renewables and nuclear energy. As such, emerging countries 
have been important markets for global energy companies. Relevant for this research, 
they have been growing markets for France’s energy sector, particularly that of nuclear 
energy. 
The BRICS grouping include both emerging countries with fast growing energy 
demands (India, China and South Africa) and important energy producer with global 
ambitions (Brazil and Russia). In either case they are important partners for both the 
EU and France in terms of energy as they represent much potential. Other studies on 
EU-BRICS energy relations 191 have excluded Russia from their frame of analysis, 
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because the relationship between Russia and the EU is materially different to that of 
other partners. Russia and the EU are interdependent in terms of energy, and thus 
their relationship is far more complex. However, as will be discussed, the EU and 
France’s interests regarding Russia diverge. France’s gas sector is more diversified, 
including more countries of origin than many other EU countries. Additionally, its 
economy relies on this source of energy to a lesser extent. Therefore, its relationship 
with Russia is very different to that of the EU more concerned with Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas. This important distinction necessarily influences the 
strategic relationships France and the EU have towards Russia and since this study is 
tasked with comparing their strategic narratives, Russia presents an important case 
study for these narratives. 
 
3.3 Brazil 
3.3.1 Energy in Brazil 
A large share of Brazil primary energy production comes from renewable energy, 
making Brazil a comparatively clean energy producing actor. Much of this renewable 
energy is provided by large hydropower plants which account for around 80% of domestic 
electricity generation.192 However, concerns about environmental and indigenous 
rights have constrained the expansion of hydropower in recent years. Therefore, other 
sectors such as natural gas, oil, wind energy and biofuels are growing and expected to 
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continue to do so. 193 
Figure 3.1: Primary energy consumption by fuel in Brazil in 2017194 
 
 
Like in France, the oil crisis in 1973 impacted Brazil’s economy heavily. The country 
had been highly dependent on external oil supplies, importing 80% of its petroleum. 195  
Political elites then sought to find ways to better Brazil’s energy independence. In the 
early 70s, France turned to nuclear energy to decrease its dependence on fossil fuels, 
and besides produce weapon grade uranium for its military program. 196 Brazil on the 
other turned to two solutions: increasing the domestic oil production and encouraging 
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the production of biofuels created from sugar canes. 
In the early 1970s, the government obliged the national energy company, Petrobras, 
to engage and invest in the domestic exploration and production of oil products. 197  
Domestic oil production started to grow in the mid-1980s with Petrobras investing in 
offshore oil fields. Andre Furtado notes that the domestic production of oil “jumped 
from the level of 8.4 million tons in 1979 to 28 million tons in 1985.” 198 Moreover, the 
discovery of large oil reserves offshore allowed the production to surge in the 1990s. 
By 2006, Brazilian oil production had reached near 90 million tons. 199  More 
discoveries of offshore oil have been made in the last decade with 63% of the global 
deep-water discoveries made in Brazil between 2010 and 2014. 200 These discoveries 
have contributed to elevating Brazil’s global energy presence and importance 201 by 
making Brazil the world leader in deep water and ultra-deep-water production 
projects. 202 
De Jesus notes that a significant number of bilateral agreements have established 
cooperation regarding fossil fuels between Brazil and states around the world. 203  He 
argues that the Brazilian government has used diplomatic tools to support Brazilian 
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companies abroad including Petrobras. He points to an increased leadership role in the 
International Energy Forum (IEF), where energy ministers gather informally to discuss 
issues relating to the oil and gas industries. 
However, since 2014, Petrobras has been implicated in an important corruption 
scandal when an investigation found bribes had been given by Petrobras to politicians 
in return for contracts. 204 The scandal has led to the bankruptcy of some Petrobras 
partners as well as the arrest of many Petrobras executives and Brazilian top officials 
involved in money laundering and fraud. 205 It has also led to weakening of Petrobras’ 
and indeed Brazil’s international reputations with investors preferring other international 
companies involved in oil drilling in Brazil. 
While discovery of offshore oil reserves has increased Brazil’s international standing 
as an independent and somewhat controversial energy producing nation, its biofuel 
industry has made it an important and influential energy player. De Jesus points out 
that while bilateral agreements have been agreed upon in the area of fossil fuels, it’s 
with biofuels that Brazil shine in multilateral settings. 206 
The origins of Brazil’s ethanol policy date back to 1931 when the Brazilian government 
decided that small amounts of ethanol should be blended into petrol. Daniel Sperling 
noted that “the number of distilleries producing fuel-grade ethanol increased from one 
in 1933 to fifty-four in 1945.” 207 He also states that during the Second World War, with 
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the relative shortage of petrol, fuel could be up to 40% ethanol in some regions and 
that in 1966 a rule sought to encourage the use of up to 25% of ethanol towards fuel 
products. He concludes therefore that by the early 1970s, Brazil already had much 
experience in producing fuel-grade ethanol from sugar-canes. So, with the added 
benefit of stabilising the market for sugar cane products, it was an obvious choice of 
energy source for Brazil to turn to. 
In November 1975, the government created the National Alcohol Program (ProAlcool). 
The policy had the double advantage of increasing independence and providing market 
growth and stability to sugar producers who were already an important part of Brazil’s 
agricultural economy. 208  Over the next decade, the government sought to provide 
incentives for the production and use of ethanol as well as the production of alcohol-
based cars. 209  Anil Hira and Luiz Guilherme de Oliveira argue that overall, with 
important investments in research and infrastructure and in providing support for the 
market, Brazil succeeded in creating a viable industry in the long term. 210 
 
Nuclear energy 
A small percentage (around 3%) of Brazil’s electricity is provided by nuclear energy. 
But Brazil’s nuclear foreign policy has been an important turf for the country to exert 
its autonomy from other world powers, particularly that of the United States. In the 
early days, Brazil’s nuclear programme was closely linked to the US. In the 1940s, 
President Getulio Vargas signed an agreement with the US government regarding the 
 





exploitation of Brazilian uranium. Daniel Flemes argues that Brazil’s leaders intended 
to supply the US with uranium in return for a technological transfer. 211 Diego Santos 
Vieira de Jesus notes that the Baruch plan, proposed at the UN in 1947 by the US and 
which intended to eliminate nuclear weapons while allowing for the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology, was heavily criticised by Brazil’s representative at the UN Atomic 
Energy Commission, Alvaro Alberto. He argued that “in practice, [the Baruch plan] 
guaranteed the US a monopoly on technology and nuclear materials in the West.” 212  
However, the US government was reticent to let nuclear technology proliferate. 213 
Alvaro Alberto would later become in the 1950s the leader of Brazil’s nuclear research 
programme newly created under the national research council (Conselho Nacional de 
Pesquisas, CNPq). In this capacity, he proposed a diversification of international partners 
in the field in order to reduce Brazil’s dependence on the US. It’s around this time that 
Alvaro Alberto was allowed to send a delegation to Europe, particularly, France and 
West Germany to negotiate on nuclear cooperation. In West Germany, Alberto 
successfully negotiated for the delivery of ultracentrifuges build for uranium 
enrichment. However, the UK and the US, still occupying part of Germany, intercepted 
and banned the delivery. 214 In the mid-1950s with a new administration, Alberto was 
forced to leave office at the CNPq. This ushered a new phase of compliance with the 
US’s foreign policy. In 1955, Brazil signed two agreement with the US. “One aimed at 
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strengthening the cooperation in development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
and established the cooperation in construction and operation of research reactors. The 
other established a joint program for research and investigation of natural uranium 
fields in Brazil.” 215 
As mentioned, the oil crisis of the 1970s deeply affected Brazil’s economy and 
deepened the need for the country to find alternative energy sources. Nuclear then 
became an important strategy to achieve energy independence. Ernesto’s Geisel’s 
government sought to do just that. Brazil’s first nuclear reactor, Angra 1 was built by 
the American nuclear energy company Westinghouse. The reactor was started in 1971 
under the US’s Atoms for peace program, 216 and entered commercial operations in 
1985. However, as noted by Flemes, Brazil was unable “to free itself from the 
technological dependence from the US.” 217 
In 1975, the government signed a cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the peaceful uses on nuclear energy. The agreement provided for eight 
nuclear plants to be built in Brazil with German technology. 218 Flemes argues that 
Washington was still reticent to see nuclear technology being transferred to Brazil. He 
notes that both the Ford and Carter administrations threatened the West German 
government with economic sanctions. Flemes points to Brazil’s intention to allow a 
transfer of technology to other developing countries as the main reason for 
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Washington’s reticence. 219 “On the one side the U.S. government feared the 
destabilization of the international system and a reduction of its global dominance. On 
the other side well developed commercial interests came into play, since the U.S. 
delivered 90% of the reactors traded on the world market at the end of the 1970s.” 220  
The U. S. insisted that the Brazilian government ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Economic difficulties in Brazil along with internal pressures in West Germany led the 
Bonn government to impose a moratorium on the agreement to postpone it for four 
years. 221 In the end after much delay, Angra II commenced commercial operations in 
2000. 222 Angra III which is still under construction, is now through a series of 
acquisitions under the direction of the French company Areva. It is important to note 
that unlike in other BRICS countries, the Areva contract for Angra III is not a result of 
French nuclear diplomacy but a consequence of Siemens’ nuclear business merging 
with Framatome in 2001 which later became known as Areva. 223  However, Areva 
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As previously mentioned, offshore oil discoveries have increased Brazil’s status as a 
global energy player. However, it is Brazil’s renewable energy that remains at the 
centre of its energy diplomacy efforts. Sybille Roehrkasten argues that “the high share 
of renewables in the Brazilian energy mix and its international pioneering in 
transforming the transport sector constitute two important sources of soft power in 
international relations.” 225 
Today, Brazil is one of the largest ethanol-fuel producing countries, only preceded by 
the US. 226 Brazil’s ethanol industry has become a platform for the country’s strategy 
to become a leader in global energy governance. Roehrkasten highlights that President 
Lula de Silva made the promotion of biofuels one of Brazil’s top priorities in foreign 
policy, noting that he “engaged in highly visible ethanol diplomacy.” 227 She adds that 
since Lula’s departure from office, this policy has continued but with lower visibility. 
This renewable energy soft power is further enhanced by concerns over climate 
change, an issue that Andréa Freire Lucena and Murillo Machado Santos argue has 
emphasised in its energy diplomacy particularly in promoting biofuels. 228 
Brazil has been particularly active in promoting biofuels in the Global South, 
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particularly in African countries. Africa is particularly attractive to Brazil’s ethanol 
industry for two important reasons: geography and history. Geographically, many 
African countries have the right type of climate to grow sugar cane. Coupled with the 
availability of land in Africa, this represents an opportunity for Brazil which is 
unrivalled in the South American and Asian continents. 229 Moreover, Brazil has 
important historical and cultural ties to Lusophone countries in Africa such as Angola 
and Mozambique, due to a shared colonial history. 230 
 
3.3.2 EU Brazil energy relations 
Diplomatic relations with the EU began in the 1960s and were further deepened with 
Portugal and Spain’s accession to the EEC in 1986.231 In 1992, the Framework 
Agreement for Co-operation brought the EU and Brazil together with the basis for a 
legal framework. 232 Finally, in 2007, the strategic partnership was established 
between Brazil and the EU. Aline Ribas and Roberto Schaeffer point out that since 
then, the trade relationship between Brazil and the EU has grown, with the EU 
becoming Brazil’s most important trading partner. 233 
Multiple dialogues and forums on energy have been established between the EU and 
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Brazil, including the EU-Brazil Regular Energy Policy Dialogue between the 
Commission’s DG energy, the EEAS, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations and 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy. At the first EC-Brazil Regular Energy Policy 
Dialogue, the parties agreed on three objectives: (1) an exchange of knowledge and 
experience on best practice in the area of energy policy, particularly regarding energy 
security, competitiveness and sustainability; (2) a dialogue on the future of oil and 
biofuel technologies; (3) and a dialogue on “possible strategies for the development of 
a secure and sustainable energy.” 234 
Sustainable and renewable energy has been an important aspect of the dialogue 
between the EU and Brazil, however, in practice cooperation between the two in this 
area has been challenged, particularly for biofuels. Indeed, EU-Brazil relations have 
been impacted by the development of EU standards on biofuels. Rhetorically, the EU 
argues that these standards have been implemented due to concerns regarding the 
sustainability of biofuel production. 235 However, in practice, these standards have 
been branded as protectionist rules by Brazil. 236  Stravos Afionis and Lindsay Stringer 
note in fact that “the normative power perspective is largely unable to explain why an 
actor so keen on promoting the environmental sustainability of international biofuels 
trade, actually impedes imports of biofuels that are far more efficient compared to 
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their heavily subsidized domestic counterparts.” 237 
 
3.3.3 France- Brazil energy relations 
For two countries that share a border (through the French department of French 
Guyana), a stronger relationship in the field of energy could be expected. Bilateral 
cooperation between Brazil and France in the field of energy is limited. In 2008, 
President Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Lula signed an action plan for their strategic 
partnership for increased political dialogue, economic and commercial cooperation 
and cooperation on issues such as defence, sustainable development, space, education 
and nuclear energy. The two countries declared that they share similar visions in term 
of sustainable development and climate change. However, tangible partnerships are 
lacking. As discussed, Brazil has developed large capacities in terms of renewable 
energy. It has a large hydro-energy industry, it has developed capacities in terms of 
biofuels like sugarcane ethanol, all of which make it one of the cleanest energy 
producing countries in the world. In addition to this Brazil has shown much potential 
with regards to offshore oil extraction. Yet France has made few efforts to promote its 
own energy industry in the country, certainly not at the same level as with other BRICS 
actors such as Russia and China. 
Interestingly, parallels can be drawn between Brazil’s promotion of its biofuel industry and 
France’s promotion of nuclear energy. Both industries were developed in their 
respective countries around the same time and for the same reason, namely reducing 
dependence on external imports of fossil fuels. Today both countries seek to promote 
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these industries externally in order to give their domestic industry a competitive edge 
and take a leadership role in international energy negotiations. To do so they both 
draw on the threat of climate change to justify their policies. 
 
3.4 Russia 
3.4.1 Energy in Russia 
Figure 3.2:Primary energy consumption by fuel in Russia in 2017238 
 
Russia energy sector has been described as a pillar of its economy.239 With a strong 
reliance on energy exports, Russia’s economy is very vulnerable to fluctuations in 
global commodity prices, particularly oil prices.240 
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Gas and oil export dependence 
Russia is the biggest energy producer of BRICS. According to the US Energy 
Information Administration, Russia was the third biggest oil producer in 2018 and 
second largest producer of gas in 2017.241 Additionally, according to BP statistics, 
Russia was the largest energy exporter in 2017.242 This makes Russia one of the most 
important energy players in the world.243 However, Russia’s economy is highly 
dependent on the prices of fossil fuels. Andreas Benedictow et. al. demonstrated that, 
between 1999 and 2008, Russia’s economic growth was closely tied to increasing oil and 
gas prices.244 Reversely, oil prices decline in 2008 and 2014 adversely affected Russia’s 
economy.245 The high importance of energy to Russia’s economy means that energy 
decisions are made at the highest levels of government.246  This is demonstrated by the 
role that state-owned energy companies play in energy production. The oil company 
Rosneft produces nearly 50% of the country’s oil and Gazprom 75% of gas 
production.247 It is also exemplified by the role of President Putin who generally make 
key decisions in the sector.248 
This economic dependence on hydrocarbon exports means that the Russian system is 
in dire need of reform. 
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First of all, it should be noted that, historically, the USSR was a strong actor in nuclear 
energy since the 1950s, a heritage that should not be underestimated.249 However this 
chapter will focus on nuclear energy in the modern Russian state. 
In 1998, the Russian Government approved the ‘Program for the Development of 
Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation in 1998-2005 and for the period up to 2010.’ 
According to this program, 16 new reactors were to be put online by 2010. The aim of 
the program was to create the conditions for a move towards large-scale nuclear energy 
development and to contribute to the Russia’s energy security. It also mentioned the 
importance of expanding exports of nuclear technologies to other countries.250 
In 2007, the Russian government created the State Atomic Energy Corporation 
Rosatom to oversee all things nuclear, including medical radiation, atom bombs, 
submarine propulsion and, of course, energy. 
Despite the initial failure of the Russia’s nuclear ambitions, in 2007, Rosatom planned 
the construction of over 30 reactors by 2020.251 In 2014 these predictions were 
reduced, but Rosatom still expected the construction of 12 reactors by 2020. In fact, 
only three new reactors were completed after 2010.252 In 2017, Russia had 35 reactors 
in operation and 9 reactors under construction on its territory. 253 Moreover, Rosatom 
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is involved in the construction of reactors outside Russia’s borders in Iran, Turkey, 
Belarus, China and India. 
Kasperski argues that this nuclear revival in Russia conveyed an attractive image of its 
technological greatness, including its international reach through an aggressive export 
policy for nuclear technologies in other countries. This image was well inscribed in a 
state nationalism that the Kremlin promoted in the 2000s and that mobilized a vision 
of a glorious Soviet past, as well as images of a modern, technologically advanced and 
even Westernized Russia in the present and future.254 This argument is highly 
reminiscent of the Hecht’s argument on the role of nuclear energy in the identity and 
development of the modern French nation.255 
 
3.4.2 EU Russia Energy relations 
It should be noted that the energy relationship between the EU and Russia is quite 
complicated and merits a thesis of its own. This section can only summarise a 
multifaceted energy relationship. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many EU 
member states have a high dependence on Russian gas supply.256 This dependence 
governs the relationship between Russia and the EU. 
Interdependence between Russia and the EU gradually developed from the 1970s 
around the first major agreements with specific EU member states (Austria 1968, the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1973, Italy and Finland in 1974). Through Gazprom, 
which holds a monopoly exports to Europe, Russia supplied almost 40% of EU imports 
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in 2018.257 Additionally, 30% of the EU’s oil supplies and 34% of its coal is imported 
from Russia.258 Conversely, two-thirds of Russia's total gas exports are destined to the 
EU.259 As mentioned, since Russia’s economy is reliant on hydrocarbon exports, the 
EU energy market is a determining factor of Russian economic growth.260 
From 2006 to 2009, conflictual gas relations with its neighbours -- through which gas 
destined to the EU transits (Belarus and Ukraine) – complicate the relationship 
between Russia and the EU. 261 These complications culminate in 2014, at the time of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea which caused the diplomatic isolation of Russia, 
through the use of economic sanctions from the EU. Russia then launched a counter-
manoeuvre to establish an anti-Western front. In May 2014, Beijing and Moscow 
announced the signing of an agreement of a record $ 400 billion for gas supply 
contract.262 Another consequence of the conflict in Ukraine is the cancellation of the 
South Stream project.263 
Finally, Russia and the EU conflict over issues of competition in the energy market. 
For the EU, energy must be managed by a market-based competition regime. 
However, Gazprom’s monopoly over the transit of gas to Europe led to an investigation 
of the company by the EU commission.264 
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3.4.3 France Russia energy relations 
Russia and France cooperate in the use of mineral oil, gas and in the fields of 
innovation in energy and energy efficiency.265 
On February 10, 2003, Russia and France signed a ‘Joint Declaration for Russian-
French cooperation in the energy sector,’ in which both countries expressed their 
intention to deepen relations in this area. They expressed interest in attracting 
investment by French companies in extraction and production of hydrocarbons in 
Russia.266 
On 18 November 2011, during then French prime minister Francois Fillon’s visit to 
Moscow, Russia and France agreed on a declaration of cooperation in the field of 
nuclear energy, in which both countries expressed that nuclear energy is an essential 
component in the strategies both countries. They mention the need for dialogue on 
energy in the spirit of strengthening the protection of the environment, improvement 
of the international nuclear security regime.267 
The participation of the French energy companies in Russian energy projects are 
important pillars in economic relations between the two countries. GDF Suez and EDF 
have both been involved in the pipeline projects Nord Stream and South Stream. The 
French oil company Total and the Russian independent gas company Novatek signed 
a deal recently on extraction of liquefied natural gas in the Arctic, giving Total a 10% 
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stake in a plant.268 
In June 2012, a memorandum was signed between the Russian company Rosatom and 
the French agency for management of radioactive waste (ANDRA) in order to develop 
cooperation between the two countries in order to improve technologies on the 
treatment of radioactive waste. 
 
3.5 India 
3.5.1 Energy in India 
National Energy Policy 
The most significant trend affecting India’s energy sector is the country’s rising 
demand for energy. India’s energy demand is rocketing with energy use almost doubling 
from 2000 to 2015, the country has been responsible for a 10% increase in global 
energy demand. 269 
This trend has affected India’s energy policy which is faced with three important 
challenges, namely energy access, energy security and fighting climate change. 270 
In 2013, India became the world’s third largest producer of electricity, behind Japan 
and Russia. 271 Yet, energy consumption per capita remains far below the global 
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average, with many areas in energy poverty. The IEA estimates that almost a quarter 
of India’s population does not have access to energy. 272  This is the major challenge 
India is facing in terms of energy, and indeed economically, since energy access is 
indisputably related to development. 273 As India strives to provide energy access to its 
entire population, its energy consumption is expected to continue to rise rapidly. 
 
Figure 3.3: Primary energy consumption by fuel in India in 2017274   
However, with rising energy demand comes the challenge of finding energy sources to 
meet this demand. This imperative has led to an increased dependence on energy 
imports (oil, coal and natural gas). The IEA notes that from 1990 to 2009, “as total 
energy imports increased from 34 Mtoe to 236 Mtoe, India’s import dependence 
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increased from 11% to 35%.”275  However energy imports tend to be unreliable. Price 
fluctuations or supply disruptions can have an important negative impact on India’s 
economic policy and energy access. India seeks therefore to increase its national 
energy production and diversify its energy mix. 
Accounting for 7% of total global emissions, India was the world’s fourth largest 
emitter of carbon dioxide in 2015 behind China, the US and the EU. 276 The country’s 
emissions continue to grow with a 5.1% increase in 2015, compared with 2014. 277 With 
an energy mix highly dependent on fossil fuels and rising energy demand, this trend is 
likely to continue and India will likely overtake the EU by 2020. 278 
While Indian politicians and public opinion accept the existence of climate change and 
its negative impacts, priority is given to growth and development. At UN Climate 
change conferences, India is generally opposed to any binding agreements on cutting 
carbon emissions, taking the view that India is less responsible for carbon emissions 
than developed countries and that the country needs to develop and industrialise. 279 
Nevertheless, India ratified the Paris agreement in October 2016 and pledges to make 
efforts to cut back the rate at which its emissions are increasing. 280 With a strong 
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dependence on fossil fuels, particularly coal to provide energy to the country, this will 
go through diversifying its energy sources towards more carbon neutral sources like 
renewables or nuclear energy. 
Meeting demand with fossil fuels 
As mentioned, India’s energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, with 44% of India’s 
primary energy mix supplied by coal, 23% by oil and 6% by natural gas. 281 The share 
of fossil fuels in India’s energy mix has risen steadily as the population moves to urban 
centres and reduce consumption of biomass, traditionally used for cooking. 
Coal 
India’s economic growth since the 1990s has been largely powered by coal. 282 A 
resource that the country holds in large quantities. In 2010, it was estimated that India 
had the third largest reserves of coal and was the third largest producer and consumer 
of coal in 2011, after the US and China. 283  Moreover, the IEA predicts that it will 
surpass the US and become the second largest consumer by 2025. So, coal due to its 
availability and affordability will continue to be the backbone of Indian growth for the 
next couple of decades at least. 
With energy security one of the country’s priorities, India has sought to increase its 
domestic production of coal. James Goodman qualifies India’s coal policy as a ‘coal 
rush.’ 284  In 2015, the Indian government announced a plan to increase the country’s 
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coal production from 603 million tonnes to 1.5 billion tonnes by 2020. 285 While the 
IEA’s predictions seem to put in doubt the achievability of this policy, it illustrates well 
India’s energy thirst and endeavour to satiate it with coal. 
There are however a number of challenges faced by the coal industry in India. The Coal 
India Limited (CIL), India’s biggest player in the coal mining industry, produces about 
80% of India’s domestic coal. 286 However, this big state-owned company is deemed to 
have low productivity in part due to low availability of modern mining equipment and 
infrastructure. Moreover, the quality of domestic coal reserves is low, which affects the 
efficiency of coal power plants and structural impediments have slowed the expansion 
of the coal production industry in India. 287 
In part due to these challenges, imports of coal have risen in order to meet the growing 
energy demand. The country is one of the biggest importers of coal and the IEA expects 
it to become the largest importer by 2020. 288 
 
Oil and Natural Gas 
India’s third largest energy source after coal and biomass is oil. While India has some 
oil reserves, with proven reserves of 5.7 billion barrels in 2014, the country is heavily 
reliant on imports, largely from the Middle East and Africa.289  As discussed, this 
dependence on imports is a severe weakness for India and with demand for oil 
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increasing this dependence will continue to rise. 
However, while natural gas only represents 6% of India’s energy mix, reserves are in a 
much healthier state with 7.9 trillion cubic meters recoverable resources from conventional 
and unconventional extraction. 290  Important discoveries in the early 2000s raised 
expectations, but recent production numbers have not met projections. 291  As 
production of older gas fields stagnates, these new discoveries were predicted to 
compensate the decline, but the government was obliged to review its projections. 
Consequently, while over a quarter of India’s total gas supply is imported, imports are 
predicted to rise significantly. 292  
Fossil fuels are expected to continue to play an important role in India’s energy mix. 
However, due to concerns for the country’s energy security and preventing climate change, 
India seeks to diversify its sources of energy further. 293 
Increasing capacity through nuclear energy and renewable energy  
Renewable Energy 
In 2014, renewables accounted for 28% of India’s energy mix, however this figure 
tends to be skewed by the wide-spread use of biomass as cooking fuel. 294  Nevertheless, 
growth in the sector is expected to take the share of renewables up to 40% of India’s 
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energy mx by 2040. 295 
 
Solar power 
In 2009, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) policy planned to 
reach 20GW solar power capacity by 2022. This policy has been the starting point for 
an important momentum in solar energy development in India. 296 The goal was 
subsequently increased to 100 GW by the Modi government in 2015. Despite this 
policy, solar energy still represents a more than negligible share of India’s total energy 
mix, amounting to less than 1%. 
In the future however, India could use solar energy to phase out of fossil fuels as well 
as increase its energy security and reduce its gas emissions. The country has an 
important potential for solar energy with many regions favourable for solar 
technologies. 297  The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy in India notes that solar 
energy is the most secure source of energy by virtue of its availability. 298  In the short 
term at least, newly installed capacity will help meet rising demands. 
The goal of the JNNSM was to make India a world leader in solar energy, including 
encouraging domestic production of low-cost solar panels.299 In order to develop 
manufacturing in India, the JNNSM requires that solar PV projects use Indian 
 
295 Ibid. 
296 Komali Yenneti, "The grid-connected solar energy in India: Structures and challenges," Energy 
Strategy Reviews 11-12 (2016). 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, "Mission Document: Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 




components. However, this policy has been heavily criticised by those who think that 
there should be a learning period for India to produce high quality equipment at 
competitive prices and that the domestic content policy will slow down expansion of 
solar capacity due to a bottle-neck effect. Others argue that the rule goes against the 
WTO rules. American solar companies particularly have voiced their disagreement 
with the policy. 300 
 
Wind power 
In 2015, India had the fourth most installed wind capacity in the world behind China, 
the US and Germany, and overtaking Spain. The country has currently 26GW wind 
power capacity and aims to reach 60GW by 2022. 301 The recent push for wind energy 
could also place India in the top three wind energy markets by 2022. 302 A number of 
estimates have been made about the potential for wind energy, but the latest estimates 
by the National Institute of Wind Energy are assessed to be the most reliable by the 
IEA. 303 They place India’s onshore wind potential from 102GW to 302GW. 304 This 
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India has a long history with nuclear energy. Atomic research began before 
independence was won and while India remained open to foreign assistance, 
particularly from the US and Canada, it built its first indigenous research reactor as 
early as 1956. 305  Its first commercial reactor, built with US assistance started 
commercial operations in 1969. 306 
In 1974, following a nuclear bomb test, the US and Canada stopped assisting India’s 
nuclear program and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) placed restrictions on India 
obtaining nuclear fuel, technology and expertise.307 Moreover, India has remained outside 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), taking the view that the regime, instead of helping 
to eradicate nuclear weapons, maintained the status-quo, allowing Nuclear Weapons States 
(NWS) to retain their nuclear armaments while prohibiting others from obtaining them.308  
This decision however had the effect of excluding India further from the global nuclear 
community. 309 
India’s nuclear program, designed by Dr. Homi Bhabha, the first Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, has a tree-stage strategy designed to utilise thorium, present 
in large quantities in India. 310  The first stage entailed the construction of mainly 
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Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) fuelled with natural uranium. It is 
currently the most completed step of the three-stage program. 311  The second stage 
involved building Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) which not only produces more fissile 
material than it uses, but, through indigenous technology, could be used to convert 
thorium into uranium. 312 In the long-term India aims to deploy thorium-based power 
plants. However, the feasibility of this project remains challenged. 313 India remains 
committed to the program however, having much more secure resources of thorium 
than of uranium. 
Despite the restrictions placed on the country, “India remained steadfast in its resolve 
to develop nuclear power technologies and achieved several notable successes.” 314 
India’s indigenous nuclear program is well regarded around the world particularly its 
thorium-based reactor expertise. 315  Siegfried S. Hecker, Professor at Stanford 
University and emeritus director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, wrote about 
India’s nuclear program: “Constrained by sanctions, India developed most of its 
nuclear energy capabilities indigenously, especially its excellent nuclear R&D; the 
extent and functionality of its nuclear experimental facilities are matched only by those 
in Russia and are far ahead of what is left in the US. I believe India has the most 
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technically ambitious and innovative nuclear energy program in the world.” 316    
In July 2005, US President George W. Bush and India’s Prime Mister Manmohan 
Singh signed an agreement under which the US would assist India in accessing global 
nuclear trade in return for “India’s commitment to separate its civilian and nuclear 
facilities, and put the civilian facilities under IEAE safeguards.” 317  In September 
2008, the NSG lifted its restrictions on India 318  and India signed a Safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA in February 2009. 319 
Vinod Kumar point out that India’s “return to the non-proliferating mainstream and 
participation in global nuclear commerce seemed promising at first glance, especially as it 
entailed uninterrupted access to fissile materials, new generation reactor technologies, 
rapid expansion of nuclear power generation and the liberty to export its nuclear 
know- how – all of which were expected to initiate tremendous growth of India’s 
nuclear energy industry, and in the process create a renaissance of sorts.” 320 
Today, India counts 22 operational reactors with a nuclear energy production capacity 
of 6.7GW. 321  Despite India’s long history with nuclear energy, the share of nuclear 
energy in India’s total energy mix is limited, representing less than 2%.322 
Since the NPR waiver, India has proved to have a hunger for uranium, making 
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agreements with France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia and mineral rich 
African countries for the import of uranium. 323 Along with these agreements was “the 
promise of initiating a sweeping expansion of the nuclear energy sector in the country,” 
324 by building new power plants with foreign support. Thus, six projects have been 
announced including projects led by Areva, Westinghouse, General Electric-Hitachi 
and Rosatom. Yet, with India remaining an exception under the NPT, many countries 
remain reticent to allow transfer of technology to India. In this, France has been an 
exception. 325 
There have been however some remaining challenges to India’s nuclear program. Post- 
Fukushima, public sentiment towards nuclear energy has been increasingly negative 
with growing concerns over the safety of nuclear plants. At times, construction of 
power plants and uranium mines have been delayed due to protests from local 
populations.326 
 
3.5.2 EU-India relations 
India was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the EEC in 
the 1962. 
In 2004, India and the EU became strategic partners and signed a Joint Action Plan 
in 2005. Already then, energy figured as one of the strategic sectoral dialogues with 
the EU recognising that India’s energy policy was “based on overstretched domestic 
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coal production.” 327 The Commission then proposed to work with India in diversifying 
its energy mix and collaborating on best policy practice. The Joint Action Plan and the 
EU- India Energy Panel that has met every year since 2005, established three working 
groups in the following domains: (1) Energy efficiency and renewable energies; (2) 
Coal and clean coal conversion technologies; (3) Fusion energy including India’s 
membership in ITER. 328 Despite not being part of the NPT, India became an ITER 
partner in 2005. Like many other partners, India’s contribution to the project is in the 
form of components manufactured in India. 329 
The Joint Work Programme on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change was 
adopted during an EU-India Summit in 2008 and was further enhanced in 2012 and 
2016. This work programme includes initiatives to collaborate in areas such as off-
shore wind farms, clean coal technologies, smart grids and more generally on energy 
security, safety sand sustainability. 330 
It is also important to note that dialogue on the environment has also been at the 
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3.5.3 France Bilateral Energy relationship with India 
After the NSG restrictions were lifted, Nicolas Sarkozy took the opportunity to initiate 
nuclear energy diplomacy with India in September 2008, when Prime Minister Dr. 
Manmohan Singh visited France. Together they signed an Agreement on Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation. Soon after, the first import of natural uranium arrived in India from 
Areva. 331 During Sarkozy’s visit to India in 2010, Areva and NPCIL signed a General 
Framework Agreement and an Early Works Agreement for the implementation of EPR 
reactors in Jaitapur. 332  Finally, two memorandums of understanding were signed 
between Areva and two Indian companies (L&T, Nuclear Power Corporation of India 
Ltd.) during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in April, 2015. 333 
 
3.6 China 
3.6.1 Energy in China 
 China and Global Energy Governance 
China is the world biggest energy consumer (23% of global energy consumption) and 
producer (19% of global energy supply) in the world. 334 It also the largest importer of 
oil, of coal and the largest emitter of carbon dioxide. 335  It goes without saying that 
this places China at the centre of all discussions about global energy governance. 
Domestic energy trends in China deeply affect the world’s energy trends. For instance, 
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the US Energy Information Administration reports that in 2014, “China’s oil 
consumption growth accounted for about 43% of the world’s oil consumption 
growth.”336 
Figure 3.4:Primary energy consumption by fuel in China in 2017337 
 
The IEA points to an increased awareness of the importance of global energy 
governance by the Chinese government noting that “in recent decades, China’s 
position in global energy governance has shifted from that of outsider to insider, 
follower to influencer, its presence and influence increasing gradually.” 338 Looking at 
China’s energy policy framework, they note that global energy governance was first 
mentioned in the 12
th Five-year energy plan (2010-2015) and has since been a feature 
 
336 US Energy Information Administration, "China," 2015, 
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of China energy policy. This is a clear sign that China seeks to engage in international 
energy cooperation not just through bilateral arrangements but also through 
multilateral frameworks. The IEA points out that growing interdependence between 
China and the rest of the world as well as an evolution of China’s view of its global 
engagement and the nature of the global order have contributed to China’s growing 
leadership in global energy governance. 339  Tracing China’s engagement in 
international energy frameworks they assert that at a time when China was completely 
energy independent, the country kept itself isolated from the international 
community, however with increased demand of energy and therefore increased 
dependence on imported sources of energy, China has become an important voice and 
influence in global energy governance. 340 
However, there remains some challenges to China’s involvement in global energy 
governance. The IEA itself admits that China does not “fully accept the existing global 
energy architecture.” 341 In fact, while China established co-operation with the IEA in 
1996, it is not a member of the organisation. Gaye Christoffersen notes that China is 
reluctant to join the IEA due to the requirement of holding a 90-day reserve of oil 
which would force China to disclose petroleum data to the IEA. 342  So, while China has 
had an increased involvement in international energy frameworks, it continues to mistrust 
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community. 343 Christoffersen argues that China’s current domestic energy governance 
does not allow it to work well within energy institutions created by the West. Moreover, 
criticism from established institutions such as the IEA have not been met favourably 
in China. Calls from the IEA to take more responsibility in reducing carbon emission 
were rejected for instance on the grounds that China owes the world no responsibility 
regarding its energy consumption. 344  So, despite increased involvement in global 
energy governance, China’s relationship with existing structures remains strained. 
Nevertheless, China recognises the need to have a structure governing energy relation 
and wishes to have a leading role in global energy cooperation. Thus, Christoffersen 
argues that “Chinese energy diplomacy has […] concentrated on constructing an 
alternative energy governance structure in the BRICS organisation, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and in Central Asia through the Silk Road 
Initiative.”345 
 
China and Climate Governance 
China has been a member of the UNFCCC from the beginning, taking part in all the 
climate change negotiations. Like India it has always refused take responsibility for 
global carbon emission and therefore has resisted the establishment of binding targets to 
cut down on emissions. In 2009, at the Copenhagen conference, China was held largely 
responsible for what has been dubbed: “the failure of Copenhagen.” 346 At the time, the 
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US attempted to make an international fund to help developing countries with the 
challenges of climate change conditional on a binding agreement on the reduction of 
emissions. 347 China refused to commit to targets and was generally uncooperative, 
arguably trying to undermine Barack Obama’s climate leadership. 348 By contrast, 
China’s action during the Paris agreement was met with largely positive responses and 
has been regarded as one of the leaders in the negotiations. 349 This has been a 
significant shift in China’s foreign policy and climate policy. 
As the IEA report argues, China has come to the realisation that its domestic energy 
interests align with global objectives in energy security and sustainable development. 350  
As such, China’s role in energy and climate governance has changed significantly over 
the years. 
Since 1995, China has known important peaks in energy demand, however with many 
energy intensive industries on the decline and a slowing of economic growth, the rate 
of demand growth has reduced in recent years. 351 In effect China energy demand will 
continue to grow but a slower pace. 
China’s most important challenge today regarding energy policy is sustainability. In 
recent years, smog and haze has been an important environmental issue worrying the 
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Chinese public and sparking the Chinese government into action on sustainability. 352 
With the 12
th Five-Year Plan , the government made transitioning to low carbon energy 
sources a major goal for the 2011-2016 period. 353 While the 11
th Five-Year Plan had 
the goal of reducing China’s energy intensity, the 12
th plan goes further with a target of 
reducing by 17% the country’s carbon intensity over the period. 354 
 
Fossil Fuels 
Coal remains the backbone of China’s energy mix, but with an ongoing diversification 
policy, the share of coal in China’s electricity production has stagnated and the IEA 
expects nuclear energy and renewables to meet the country’s rising energy needs in 
the future. 355 
China is largely self-sufficient in natural resources, with vast coal resources. However, 
with energy consumption increasing rapidly in the early 2000s, China went from a 
major coal exporter in 2003 (second to Australia) 356 to a net coal importer by 2009. 
357 Likewise, domestic oil production in China is expected to stagnate with the largest 
oil fields in the country reaching the peak of their production, leading to an increased 
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dependence on imports. 358  Finally, imports for natural gas have been increasing to 
meet the rapidly growing gas demand. 
 
Renewable energy 
As discussed, sustainability is one of the major challenges to China’s energy policy. 
Therefore, the use of renewable energy is an important part of the country’s energy 
policy. 
China has established renewable energy programs since the mid-1990s however, 
renewable energy really became a policy issue in 2005 with the introduction of the 
Renewable Energy Law (REL). 359  The REL set important rules for the development 
of renewable energy. For instance, it requires that the government set a goal for the 
growth of renewable energy in its energy policy. 360 
Currently, China’s proportion of renewable energy in its energy mix remains below the 
global average. 361  Based on IEA statistics, renewable energy represents 23% of China’s 
electricity production, with hydro representing 81% of these renewables. 362 
Despite this, China has become a world leader in terms of renewable energy generation 
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along with the European Union. 363 Whereas a decade ago, Chinese renewable energy 
in electricity supply represented only 1.2% of the global total, it now represents around 
17% of it. 364  China’s has put important effort in increasing its renewable energy 
capacity. In 2015, China’s wind energy capacity additions represented half of the global 
total, it overtook Germany as the country with the most solar PV capacity and its solar 
thermal capacity represents around 70% of the global total. 365 
 
Nuclear Energy 
In parallel to its renewable energy policy, China has also been seeking to increase its 
nuclear energy capacity. Currently, nuclear energy represents only 4% of China’s 
electricity production, however, the 13
th Five-Year Plan expects this share to rise to 
10% by 2030. 
While China developed nuclear technology for military purposes in the 1960s, China 
has been a relative newcomer to nuclear energy with its first civil reactor coming online 
in 1994. 366  However today the country counts 57 reactors either in operation (37) or 
under construction (20). 367 While other countries have been deterred from pursuing 
nuclear energy programs by the Fukushima accident, the Chinese government’s plan 
seem to have gone forward unhindered. 
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3.6.2 EU-China Energy relations 
The EU dialogue with China on energy is one of the most developed of the BRICS with 
many agreements, summits and working groups set up between the two partners. 
Energy discussions between the EU and China began in 1981 when the Commission 
sent a delegation from DG Energy to China. 368  The China-EEC Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement, the first official agreement mentioning energy as an area for cooperation, 
was signed in 1985. In 1994, the China-EU Energy Conference was set up between DG 
Energy and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and brings together 
energy businesses and experts from Europe and China every few years. DG Energy and 
MOST have also set up a working group connecting government officials and experts 
from both side every year since 1995. 369 
So, EU-China cooperation over energy matters has featured in their relationship for 
many decades. However, in the last decade, the two have intensified this aspect of their 
relationship. In 2005, the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s primary policy 
maker in the area of energy. 370  The MoU created the Strategic Dialogue on Energy 
and Transport Strategies which set up a dialogue between DG Energy and the National 
Energy Administration (NEA), one of the top bodies in China for the creation and 
implementation of energy policies. 371 
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There are many other dialogues set in place around energy between China and the EU. 
The main topics of discussions are the development of renewable energies and energy 
efficiency, sustainability, energy security and urban development. 
These dialogues have resulted in concrete partnerships between the EU and China, 
such as initiatives for research, training, and technology transfer. 372 
However, this idyllic picture of energy relations has been somewhat over-shadowed by 
trade controversies in the EU. 
 
3.6.3 France Chine Energy relations 
The bilateral energy relationship between France and China is focussed around two 
main areas of cooperation, nuclear energy and climate change. 
Nuclear energy cooperation between France and China dates back three decades with 
the signature in 1982 of an agreement between the French Commission of Atomic 
Energy (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA)) and 
the Chinese ministry for nuclear industry. Following this, French nuclear reactors were 
built in China initiated by the Daya Bay reactors in 1994. More recently, French energy 
actors have been contracted to build EPR technology reactors for the Taishan nuclear 
power plant currently under construction in the Guangdong region. 
Beyond this industrial partnership, the two countries also enjoy a strong partnership 
in research and development, with the creation of laboratories shared by CEA and 
Chinese research institutes and the exchange of Chinese researchers and engineers 





During a state visit by the Chinese Prime-minister to France in July 2015, the two 
countries reiterated their willingness to establish a durable partnership in the area 
with the signature of a joint declaration on the deepening of Franco-Chinese 
cooperation in nuclear energy. 
Coming up to 2015, climate change took a central role in the bilateral relations between 
France and China. With the COP21 taking place in Paris in December 2015, France 
took a leadership role in trying to get China to accept more ambitious targets in the 
fight against climate change. 373 The two countries have a partnership in developing 
energy efficient urbanism in China with for example the ADEME and the FFEM 
financing a program on “energy efficiency and sustainable development in 
construction in China.” 374 
 
3.7 South Africa 
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Figure 3.5: Primary energy consumption by fuel in South Africa in 2017375 
 
 
Dependence on Coal 
South Africa’s coal reserves make it one of the biggest producers of coal in the world 
and one of the top net exporters. 376 A large portion of all coal used in African countries 
is of South African sources. The country has taken advantage of this geological feature 
and uses coal to produce approximately 71% of its primary energy 377 and around 90% 
of its domestic output.378 Many have ascribed South Africa’s dependence on coal to 
path dependence. 379 The reserves of coal in the country have allowed South Africa to 
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provide its citizens low cost electricity for many years and well as self-sufficiency and 
independence. Until 2008, South Africa had the cheapest energy prices in the world.380 
However, constraints on infrastructure has driven electricity prices up. Electricity 
prices provided by the state–owned utility company Eskom, tripled from 2005 to 2014. 381  
Eskom has been obliged to buyback electricity from high-intensity users who were 
therefore paid to scale back production. 382 
Moreover, this dependence on coal has its drawbacks on sustainability, which has led 




In 2009, at the Copenhagen Conference, South Africa pledged to reduce its carbon 
emissions by 34% by 2020 and 44% by 2025. In 2011, the SA Department of Energy 
(DoE) launched the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 
Program (REI4P), an initiative aimed at increasing the renewable energy capacity of 
SA by 17.8GW by 2030. 383  Its objectives are threefold: the reduction of SA’s carbon 
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intensity, creating additional energy capacity and creating opportunities for 
development. 384 The policy had some success in opening up the market to new 




Potential reserves of shale gas have opened up the possibility of using gas as an 
alternative to coal. The South African government issued exploration license to a 
number of national and international companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Falcon Oil 
and Gas and Bundu Gas & Oil. 386 
 
Nuclear energy 
South Africa has two nuclear reactors which generate around 5% of its energy needs.387  
The power plant, build by Framatome (now Areva), came online in 1984. In 2006 the 
government of South Africa decided to increase its nuclear capacity to meet its energy 
needs. The Nuclear Energy Policy planned to build six new nuclear power plants by 
2030. Westinghouse and Areva which were both short-listed for South Africa’s plans. 
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However, in 2008, South Africa pulled out from either bid due to financing issues. 388  
Since then South Africa has been courted by many international nuclear energy 
companies such as Rosatom with which the government signed an agreement in 
September 2014. 389 That same year, South Africa signed nuclear cooperation 
agreements with France and China and similar agreements exist with the US and 
South Korea. In 2015, the government renewed its call for bids for the construction of 
nuclear power plants. Westinghouse, Rosatom, SNPTC, KEPCO and Areva/EDF were 
all invited to make proposals. There are no official decisions from the South African 
government at the time of writing. 
 
3.7.2 EU-South Africa Energy relations 
The EU is recognised in South Africa as a potential partner to overcome the energy 
challenges it faces. Bilateral energy cooperation between the EU and South Africa takes 
place within the framework of the Strategic Partnership through an energy dialogue forum. 
The EU has recognised South Africa’s need for infrastructure and in 2013, ahead of the 
EU-South Africa summit, approved a financial assistance program for infrastructure 
development. 390 The EU is also interested in assisting South Africa in a path towards 
sustainability and has helped in the creation of clean coal working group and has 
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3.7.3 France-South Africa Energy Relations 
President Francois Hollande and President Jacob Zuma signed in 2014 a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with an important focus on energy. As has been discussed, for 
South Africa, France and more particularly Areva/EDF are important potential 
partners in building new nuclear capacity. For France, energy is seen as a facilitator of 
development in South Africa. 392 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the energy policies and situations in the 
BRICS and their energy relationships with the BRICS. By focussing in the EU and 
France’s energy diplomacy efforts, this chapter contextualises the interests that the EU and 
France have in their external energy policies aimed at the BRICS. This will help 
contextualise the strategic interests that – it is hypothesised – will guide the formation 
of France and the EU’s strategic narratives. This theoretical perspective will be 
explained in the following chapter. 
 




 : Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
Constructivism is the broad theoretical approach adopted in this research on a macro-
level. The first part of this chapter will detail this approach starting with the 
assumptions of the way international relations are governed. This discussion is crucial 
to delineate the ways this research conceives international system in which state actors 
interact with other non- state actors (including supranational ones). In particular, the 
section will specify how the research is informed by a constructivist understanding of 
state identity, a concept of central importance in this study. Its relation to the so-called 
supranational identity will be also considered. 
The second and third parts of this chapter will then detail the theories of strategic 
narrative
393 and cascading activation framing 394 – the meso- and micro-level theories 
respectively. 
In the concluding section, this chapter elaborates how both theories are synergised 
innovatively and propose a new explanation in understanding how states form 
narratives about their own identity, that of other actors and the nature of the 
international scene itself. In the former model, a key concept of strategic narrative guides 
this research. Strategic narrative is defined here “representations of a sequence of 
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events and identities, a communicative tool through which political actors - usually 
elites - attempts to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to 
achieve political objectives.”395 
The theory postulates the three levels of strategic narratives (identity, issue and 
systemic) and argues three phases in the narrative cycle (formulation, projection and 
reception). Strategic narratives theory is the main theoretical lens through which 
France’s formulations and communications of global energy governance are analysed 
vis-à-vis the EU’s formulations and communications. Strategic narratives may be 
directed to external and/or domestic audiences. It is the domestic dimension in the 
life-cycle of a narrative which is in the main research focus here. 
The latter theory of cascading activation contributes another key concept – the one of 
framing. Framing is defined in this analysis as the selection of “some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”396 By conceptualising the 
spread of frames and ideas about foreign policy through society as a cascading activation, 
Entman proposes that higher levels of government administration have the most 
independence and power in shaping and spreading these frames. He also prescribes a 
special role to mainstream media in activating and disseminating these frames. 
 
The thesis argues an innovative synergy between these two theoretical models. In the 
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most recent revision of his theory, Entman argues that “framing research [offers] critical 
insights into the influences of communication on consciousness, behaviour and 
power.”397  As such, Entman’s theory on cascading activation framing helps 
conceptualise the ways in which strategic narratives formulated and projected by the 
government and ruling elites are projected through the media to the public. 
 
This research asks: 
1) How is a strategic policy area of external energy relations formulated and 
communicated at the domestic level of an EU member state (case of France)? 
2) How do the EU’s narratives about global energy governance (communicated by 
French opinion-makers) relate to France’s narratives in the same issue-area? 
 
This analysis hypothesises that the EU’s particular energy interests and policies will 
direct the way the EU frames and projects itself as a sui-generis international energy 
actor (H1). It is logical to expect that France’s energy concerns and energy policies will 
resonate with the EU’s energy positions, including parallels between France’s and the 
EU’s narratives of global energy governance and relations with global energy actors 
(H2). France, after all, is an EU member state. 
However, as has been discussed earlier, France is a particular energy actor within the 
EU. It has distinct interests and priorities in this issue-area, often different to other 
EU countries. This underlines an expectation that there will be areas of external energy 
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policy in which France’s national interest will differ from the interests of the EU as a 
whole. Respectively, this may trigger France-specific energy-related narratives 
different to the narratives formulated and projected by the EU (H3). 
This research also hypothesises that France’s local concerns and self-visions will frame 
France’s strategic narratives on relations with external energy actors (H4). Here, 
official state actors will seek to frame other actors in a way that legitimates their foreign 
policy actions in the eyes of national constituencies. In addition, French narratives on 
external energy policies will be heavily influenced by the political concerns of the 
elected leaders of the country (H5). Changes in ideology at the higher levels of 
government may impact visions of France’s key interests in global energy governance. 
For example, leaders with a stronger market focus are likely to view France’s interests 
in shale gas differently to environmentally driven leaders. 
Once formed, strategic narratives with the strongest internal coherence will resonate 
more when projected in France’s local media (H6). Finally, French strategic narratives 
will resonate more in French local newspapers than EU strategic narratives and frame 
the presentation of external energy actors (H7). 
 
4.2 Macro-level Theoretical Approach: Constructivism 
The overarching theoretical approach for this research lies within the realm of 
constructivism. Constructivist outlook, which developed in international relations (IR) 
theory in the late 1980s-early 1990s, was a reaction to the dominant realist and liberal 
thought paradigms. As a point of distinction, theories within a broader constructivist 
approach postulate that states’ interests are socially constructed and that they need to 
121 
 
be interpreted as “consequences of collective meaning.” 398  
  This ontological approach has been increasingly popular in IR. It also has gained 
many followers within European integration studies. Much work in IR has 
conceptualised the relationship between international actors to be driven almost 
entirely by material forces, such as power and interests. 399 However, the works of 
Michel Foucault on the knowledge/power nexus, 400 Antonio Gramsci on hegemony401  
and Max Weber’s differentiation between power and authority402 have paved the way 
for a new conceptualisation of the structure of international politics, 403 one that puts 
emphasis on the social construction of international relations. In 1989, Nicholas Onuf, 
coined the term “constructivism”. Having doubts about the centrality of anarchy in the 
international system, Onuf argues that “we construct worlds we know in a world we do 
not” 404  and that states themselves operate in a constructed world. The theory was 
then taken up by Alexander Wendt, who argued that this new conception has for goal 
to “reclaim power and interest from materialism by showing how their content and 
 
398 Ben Rosamund, "New Theories of European Integration," in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle 
Cini (2007). 
399 Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics, vol. 67 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
400Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 
1972-1977 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980). 
401 Antonio Gramsci and David Forgacs, The Gramsci reader: selected writings, 1916-1935 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2000). 
402 Max Weber, Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology, vol. 2 (New York: 
Bedminster Press, 1968). 
403 Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International 
Security 23, no. 1 (1998). 
404 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of our making: rules and rule in social theory and international 
relations (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). p38 
122 
 
meaning are constituted by ideas and culture. 405 Likewise, John Ruggie argues that 
“ideational factors have normative, as well as instrumental dimensions; that they 
express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and 
significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place.” 406 
Since then, constructivist works have shown that identity and norms play an important 
role in states’ conduct of foreign policy. Important for our research, this theoretical 
approach has been used increasingly in EU studies offering explanations to events and 
phenomena to explain the phenomenon of a supra-national entity, not for seen by 
realist and liberal thinkers. The end of the Cold War particularly challenged these 
theories and revealed their shortcomings to accurately predict the behaviour of states 
– and supranational entities -- in the post-modern era. 
One of the major criticisms that have been made of constructivism is a lack of clear 
definition. Indeed, given the multiplicity of approaches which have been described as 
constructivist, there is little agreement within the field about what it entails 
specifically. 407 It is therefore important that this research list the assumptions it 
makes in order to define the strand of constructivism it places itself under. 
 
4.2.1 Reflexive and rationalist poles 
This analysis shares one particular maxim of constructivism -- “the manner in which 
the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on 
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dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” 408 According 
the Checkel, constructivist thought makes two assumptions about how international 
politics work: “(1) the environment in which agents/states take action is social as well 
as material; and (2) this setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their 
interests (it can ‘constitute’ them).”409  The first assumption, he explains, means that 
while there are some material truths within our environment, these are necessarily 
given meaning through socialised interpretation. The second reflects the interactions 
between structures and agents theorised in constructivist thinking as mutually 
constitutive. These two assumptions inform this research. 
Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wendt draw on the 
constructivist theorizing in IR and analyse them in relations to European integration. 
410  They argue that constructivist approaches “bridge the gap” between rationalist and 
post-modernist theories. They add that different approaches within constructivism 
may relate to rationalist and reflexive approaches to a certain degree, but, essentially, 
all of them “share a research interest in the influence of soft institutions such as ideas, 
norms, and rules on the one hand and/or sociological factors, such as identity, 
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4.2.2 Identity in constructivism 
Central to the ideas of constructivism in IR is the concept of identity and since primary 
unit in international relations are states, state identity. These identities in constructivism 
are formed by social structures. Alexander Wendt defines identity as “a subjective or 
unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings.”412 He argues however that 
identities are formed both internally and externally since interaction with other actors 
will also define identity. He then argues that states are actors in which individuals 
generate a shared identity. Wendt distinguishes two types of state identity. Corporate 
identity is that which a state places upon itself. He explains that it refers to state’s 
“constituent individuals, physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in 
virtue of which individual function as a "we.””413 By comparison, social identities are 
formed through interaction with other actors, be they domestic or external. 
Perceptions of the “Other” and potential demarcations between “Self” and “Other” can 
give us information about how an actor sees itself.414 It is assumed that perceptions 
and images of international relations and partners will influence the behaviour, policies 
and actions of actors. As Emanuele Castano, Sacchi and Gries argued, images and 
perceptions are the “key to interpreting the action.”415 Likewise, Siamak Movahedi 
argues that, “images and perceptions of other nations provide the basic framework 
within which the conduct of international relations and conflict resolution takes 
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place.”416 It is therefore important to understand the perceptions of these actors in 
order to understand what might be the impact of their actions and how these are 
interpreted. 
Constructivist research assumes that the identity of states is variable, and depends on 
particular social or political contexts.417 This assumption is particularly important for 
this research since it is primarily concerned France’s identity with regards to energy 
plays a role in how France portrays itself as an actor in global energy governance 
domestically and internationally. Moreover, identity also plays an important role in 
the way actors define their interests. Unlike a rationalist understanding where interests 
are defined by the material world, constructivists see them defined by a state’s 
conception of its identity. As such interests along with identity can change over time. 
Wendt argues that “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what 
it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural 
content so will interests.”418 
The definition of interests based on identity has important implications for the 
formation of collective identities. Wendt conceptualises identification on a continuum 
from positive to negative. Negative identification with another actor will elicit a more 
self-interested response. By comparison, positive identification, one where an actor 
will perceive similarities with another actor will generate more collective action.419 This 
rationale is used to then explain the formation of supra-national entities such as the 
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EU, where individual states may put aside perceived self-interests for the benefit of the 
collective. 
The process through which states take on norms and practices is identified by Bearce 
and Bondanella as international socialisation.420 International socialisation theories 
have looked extensively at how the political actors of member states are influenced by 
norms and practices at the European level. Socialisation is defined by Checkel as: “a 
process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome 
is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting 
community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of 
consequence to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is 
quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions” 421 
Checkel emphasises the importance of understanding the macro-micro level linkages 
within socialisation. He points out that while much focus has been placed on micro-
level analysis to analyses socialisation empirically, the question of how socialisation 
on the micro level interacts with the macro level is of value. 
 
4.3 Meso-Level Theory: Strategic Narratives 
4.3.1 Strategic Narratives and Constructivism 
Strategic narratives is one of the theories within a constructivist tradition that 
“examines how political actors use narratives that address actors’ inter-subjectivity 
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and subjectivity (conception of self) strategically in pursuing foreign policy goals.”422 
In doing so, the authors of the theory (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle) attempt 
to conceptualise the role of narratives in larger theoretical debates about the 
construction of order in international relations. 423 They argue that strategic narratives 
are useful in understanding the construction and changing nature of identity in 
international relations as well as the behaviour of actors.424 To them, “actors work to 
frame their own character and that of others, by selecting and highlighting some facets 
of their history or actions in order to promote a particular interpretation and 
evaluation of their character.”425 
Strategic narratives both structure the behaviour of actors at the same time as they are 
conceptualised by them. Thus, strategic narrative theory places itself clearly at the 
theoretical junction of reflexive and rationalist thinking.426 However, different works 
give more or less weight to the agent or the structure depending whether they take a 
more rationalist or reflexive point of view. From a reflexive perspective, structures 
such as narratives impose meanings and identities on agents. Rationalist studies focus 
on the agent’s ability to select and create characterisations. 427 
Theoretically, this study is primarily concerned with the two phases in the life-cycle of 
the strategic narrative -- formation and projection. Strategic narratives are created by 
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political actors in order to influence the structure of international relations. The 
research can be placed therefore in the latter group. However, strategic narratives also 
address the other end of the spectrum since narratives once received, seek to constrain 
other actors understand of the world. Laura Shepard argues that strategic narratives 
therefore address both rationalist and reflexivist perspectives arguing that “at the ‘thin 
end’, of the spectrum are highly rationalist approaches, which presuppose a rational 
actor working with language to attain a particular outcome, and at the ‘thick end’ of 
the spectrum are post- structural approaches, which investigate the ways in which the 
actors and their structural contexts are co-constituted through discourse.” 428 
Finally, as discussed by Thomas Risse, while the distinction between the rationalist 
and reflexive perspectives are theoretically useful, they are by nature ideal types. 
Indeed, he argues that “the controversies [between the two theoretical poles] mainly 
focus on how far one can push one logic of action to account for observable practices 
and which logic dominates a given situation.” 429 Actors in the real world will 
necessarily be influenced by both their rational choice as well as guided by rules and 
norms. The theoretical model for this research will include variables with both 
rationalist and reflexive aspects. 
 
4.3.2 Phases and types of strategic narratives 
Miskimmon et al. propose a set of concepts related to the notion of strategic narratives. 
First, they conceive it as a tripartite process of formation, projection and reception: 
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➢ Formation: is the process through which strategic narratives are shaped by 
political actors. The process of formation can be viewed differently according 
to the theoretical spectrum which was just discussed. For the purposes of this 
research, formation is assumed to be based on an actors’ strategic goals and 
interests and is the initial expression of these. 
➢ Projection: is the stage at which strategic narratives are spread through the 
media to the public. It is also the stage at which they can be contested within 
the media. 431 
➢ Reception: is the stage at which both internal and external audiences receive 
the narratives and their response to them. 
 
Additionally, Miskimmon et al. identify three different types of strategic narratives: 
system narratives, identity narratives and issue narratives. 
➢ System narratives: are narratives about the international order. Miskimmon 
et al. believe that order in international relations is created through system 
narratives because order is given meaning through narratives. This recalls much 
of the constructivist thinking which emphasises the social construction of 
international relations. They argue that “the construction of narratives of order 
by political actors provides a compelling explanation of how orders emerge and 
 
430 Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, 3. 
431 Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, "Introduction." 
130 
 
are maintained, as well as their demise.” 432 When talking about energy issues, 
global energy governance is the international order under which decisions are 
made. As discussed, when reviewing the literature about energy, the concept of 
global energy governance encompasses many definitions but for the purpose of 
this research, global energy governance encompasses all forms of collective 
regulation of energy. These regulatory actions can emanate from governments, 
as well as the private sector. 433 The aim of this research is therefore to identify 
the ways in which the French government communicates on issues which relate 
to global energy governance and analyse the ways in which order is conceived 
in that system. 
➢ Identity Narratives: Miskimmon et al. argue that “actors are given meaning to 
themselves and others by narrative.” 434 Identity narratives are closely linked 
to the theorisation of identity in constructivism. Generally speaking, identity 
narratives set out an actor’s values and interests. 435 
➢ Issue Narratives: refer to narratives about policy issues. Miskimmon et al. 
argue that “they are strategic in the sense of seeking to shape the terrain on 
which policy discussions take place.” 436 In the case of this research, the issue 
at stake is energy. Issue narratives about energy can encompass narratives on 
energy prices, on energy sustainability, energy security, etc. While this study is 
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mainly concerned with the external dimension of energy policies, the domestic 
political scene will be considered as well in order to understand France’s issue 
narratives about energy.  
 
4.3.3 Strategic narratives aimed at a domestic audience 
Importantly, strategic narratives are “as a means for political actors to construct a 
shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape the 
behaviour of domestic and international actors.” 437  Therefore, the difference between 
strategic narratives and other types of narratives is that strategic narratives aim at 
changing or at least influencing the behaviour of others. They also have two targeted 
audiences, a domestic audience and an international audience. This research is 
concerned foremost with strategic narratives on external relations intended for 
domestic audiences. 
Barbara Farnham argues that foreign policy-makers are constantly concerned with the 
“acceptability” of their policies to the domestic public. 438  Miskimmon et al. argue 
further that not only is domestic context important in foreign policy, but policy seek to 
shape people’s understanding of that context through strategic narratives. As such, 
domestic- focused strategic narratives aim at aligning narratives about international 
scene with domestic interests in order to legitimise domestic and external policies to a 
domestic audience. 
Indeed, Miskimmon et al. argue that “strategic narratives cannot outstrip the domestic 
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will in engaging with third parties, which is further complicated by their diffusion in 
the media.” 439 While strategic narrative theory talks about communication and 
reception of strategic narratives, they mainly look at the spread of narratives 
internationally and their contest to establish world order in the minds of people. 
However, it does not provide us with a good frame of analysis for the spread of strategic 
narratives internally. Entman’s cascading activation theory, detailed below, is useful 
in analysing the spread of these narratives domestically. It theorises the way highest 
levels of the imaginary “cascade” -- government – is able to influence framing of 
foreign policy in communications with elite and in the media. It also prescribes a 
central role to mainstream influential media in spreading frames that feed the 
narratives. 
 
4.3.4 Narrative alignment 
Scholarship on strategic narratives has recently focussed on the concept of alignment 
of narratives. 440  Chaban, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin postulate that “alignment 
between system, policy and identity narratives increases opportunities for persuasion 
and influence.” 441 This form of alignment will be described as internal coherence, as 
it requires for all three levels of a narrative to be consistent with one another. 
Miskimmon and O’Loughlin showcase this type of alignment in “Russia’s narratives of 
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Global order” and argue that “Russia’s strategic narrative of the international system 
is underpinned by its identity narrative and this plays out in how it narrates its policy 
preferences.” 442 
They also use the term alignment to compare Russia’s narratives to the West’s by 
focusing on the divergence between the strategic narratives of Russia, the EU and the 
US. This type of alignment has also been observed by Wellings et al. who compared 
the strategic narratives of NATO from Australia and New Zealand. Their study shows 
that the division into types of narratives – system, identity and issue – is useful in 
analysing alignment. They point out that “although there was significant alignment of 
system narratives around the notion of a rule based global order, Australian and New 
Zealand identity narratives diverge over specific issues.” 443 
 
This research will also analyse alignment between the different phases of strategic 
narratives, particularly formation and projection. It will be argued that strategic 
actors, in our case the French government and the EU Commission, frame their own 
narratives about the world, in alignment with their own strategic interests, in order to 
influence the views of domestic actors. In other words, actors “seek to set the terms of 
the debate, affect the process of thinking about and deciding on a policy and how to 
guide how policies play out.” 444 In doing so, they use narratives about the external 
reality, framing it in order to legitimise internal narratives and policies. This logic may 
 
442 Miskimmon and O'Loughlin, "Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a 
Polycentric World." 
443 Wellings et al., "Narrative Alignment and Misalignment: NATO as a Global Actor as Seen from 
Australia and New Zealand." 
444 Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, 3. p8 
134 
 
seem self-evident; however, this research seeks to use empirical data in order to outline 
the ways this alignment of strategic interest and communication takes place. 
Further, analysing the alignment between the stages of communication of narratives 
allows an observation of their resonance, as they are picked up – or not – by other 
actors. Central to this research will be an observation of how narratives emerge in the 
media during the phase of projection. To do so this research will use Robert Entman’s 
cascading activation theory as a micro level theory in order to observe the spread of 
strategic narratives. 
 
4.4 Communication through Media Ecologies: Cascading 
Activation Theory 
4.4.1 Integrating strategic narratives and cascading activation theories 
 
One of the major theoretical innovations of this research is proposing synergy between 
strategic narratives theory and cascading activation theory by Robert Entman.445 
Integrating these two theories enables an analysis of the mechanisms behind the spread of 
strategic narratives domestically. According to Entman, top level political executives 
have a higher power to influence activation of ideas and frames about issues of foreign 
policy and international relations that are spread to society through the media. 
Entman argues the communication of frames as a stratified structure where some 
actors have more power to initiate the spread of ideas through a metaphorical cascade 
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to media organisations and the public. 446   According to his conceptual framework, the 
top levels of the executive branch of government have the most independence in choosing 
how to frame international events and “the highest probability of having their thoughts 
become part of the general circulation of ideas.” 447 He identifies five different levels 
within the cascading: (1) the administration by which is to be understood the executive 
body of government, (2) other elites which include other members of government, 
experts and ex-officials, (3) the media, journalists and news organisations, (4) their 
news frames, and (5) the public. He also argues that the inverse dynamic whereby 
frames from the public or from the media make their way up to the administration, is 
also possible but with more difficulty. 
 
This is an important point where strategic narrative and cascading activation theories 
fit together. While both give much agency high level political actors to influence others, 
it still leaves room to analyse the thoughts of other actors. With changing 
communication environments, it is increasingly difficult for states to impose their 
narratives over those of others actors within society. It is therefore crucial in our 
analysis to not overshadow the ability of other international and domestic actors to 
communicate their own narratives. Robert Putnam argues that “a more adequate 
account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations 
must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and 
noneconomic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive 
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officials and institutional arrangement.” 448 This research aims to understanding the 
relationship between domestic and international levels in the conduct of states and how 
they play a role in reaching foreign policy objectives. 
Entman’s theory therefore allows an observation of the projection of strategic 
narrative by government bodies to their domestic public as well as potential 
contestation of the dominant national framing. 
 
4.4.2 Frames as narrative snapshots 
Entman’s most famous theoretical contribution is on the concept of framing which he 
defines as the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality and [the construction 
of] messages that highlight cognitive and linguistic connections among them in ways 
that promote an interpretation favourable to their political interests and policies.” 449 
Thus, the concept of framing is closely related to strategic narratives since they are 
used to disseminate “interpretations that favour [an actor’s] interests or goals.”450 
The major difference between the two is the notion of temporality. Strategic narratives 
include a sequence of events and aim to construct impressions of the past, present and 
future. By contrast, frames are snapshots used in narratives about particular events or 
issues. 
Entman argues that frames “can be distinguished from the rest of the news by their 
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capacity to stimulate support or opposition to the sides in a political conflict.” 450 This 
ability, he argues, can be identified through two measurements, magnitude and 
cultural resonance. Magnitude is the ability of a frame to reach large portions of 
audience and is distinguished by prominence and repetition. Meanwhile, he argues that 
“frames that employ more culturally resonant terms have the greatest potential for 
influence.” 451 Culturally resonant frames are noticeable, understandable, memorable 
and emotionally charged. 
 
4.5 Theorising the Role of the EU 
France is a member state of the European Union and therefore cannot be 
conceptualised outside of this paradigm. The EU has its own vision on foreign policy 
and energy policy. The question is therefore to what extend does France’s self-visions 
match those set out by the EU. By distinguishing differences in the strategic narratives 
on energy of France and the EU part of this thesis aims to identify how the EU projects 
its own strategic narratives within member states and how narratives created and 
projected by member states resonate or clash with the EU’s narratives. In doing so, this 
research aims to identify the ways in which the EU’s narrative about global energy 
governance may be used strategically by member states. One theoretical innovation of 
this model is that it allows us to identify how the EU fits into cascading activation 
theory. As mentioned, cascading activation theory has never been used to trace the 
communication of a supranational actor. Miskimmon argued that “the EU has relied 
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on strategic narratives since its inception to the present day.”452 However, due it’s its 
hybrid nature, its ability to find a unified message is hindered. Using the example of 
the euro crisis, Miskimmon asked the question: “who narrates?” the EU’s message. 
While representatives of EU institutions invariably communicate on the EU’s issues, 
the narratives they present can be contradicted by member state officials who present 
their own narratives. The aim of this research is therefore to understand the 
relationship between strategic narratives formed at the EU’s supranational level and 
the member state level. 
Today, with the EU facing numerous crisis it is of paramount importance to 
understand how the EU communicates to domestic publics. Kratochvil et al. argue that 
while academics have often questioned whether the EU is a legitimate, attractive or 
recognized actor, few studies have focussed on the EU’s ability to frame internal 
debates about foreign policy. 453 They divide these characteristics into four different 
foci in academic debates. Studies dealing with internal governance of the EU, seen 
from the EU they argue are concerned with the EU’s legitimacy. Those dealing with 
internal governance viewed from the outside look at the EU’s attractiveness, and those 
looking at EU external policies viewed externally are studying whether the EU is a 
recognised actor. However, they see an academic deficit in the area of EU external 
policies viewed from within the EU, an area that they call framing. This is the main 
area of focus of their study. They look at the Commission’s ability to influence the EU’s 
 
452 Alister Miskimmon, "Finding a unified voice? The European Union through a Strategic Narrative 
Lens," in Forging the World, Strategic Narratives and International Relations (University of Michigan 
Press, 2017). 
453 Petr KratochvÍL, Petra CibulkovÁ, and Michal BenÍK, "The EU as a ‘Framing Actor’: Reflections on 
Media Debates about EU Foreign Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 2 (2011). 
139 
 
foreign policy, particularly in area where member states do not agree among each 
other. They point out that while the role of the Commission in external policies is clear 
on issues where member states agree, such as EU negotiations with Russia or 
environmental negotiations, the Commission can still influence the choices available to 
member states. In those cases, they argue that where debates within member states 
refer to the EU as the main actor, it would be “fairly difficult for the national political 
elite to pursue a national policy that would starkly contradict the EU’s position.”454 
While this research does not contradict this trend, it seeks to understand the EU’s 
ability to place itself at the centre of a debate within a member state and trace how 
resonant are the EU’s frames and narratives of external energy governance vis-à-vis 




Thus, this research’s primary aim is to theorise the narrative alignment between 
different levels of strategic narratives (internal coherence) and between different 
actors (external convergence). 
It also seeks to observe the formation and projection of strategic narratives by 
integrating this theory with cascade activation theory. Through this model and 
through the observation of narrative resonance in the media, this research seeks to analyse 
contestation of strategic narratives in the media. 









 : Methodology 
5.1 A theoretical note 
Before explaining the methodological underpinnings of this research, it is useful to restate 
its theoretical foundation. This research is informed by three interacting theoretical 
approaches: Constructivism (macro-level), Strategic Narratives Theory (Meso-level) and 
Cascading Activation Framing Theory (micro-level). These approaches in turn inform the 
logic and arsenal of methods used for this research. 
 
5.1.1 Constructivism 
At the macro level, this research takes on a constructivist perspective that supposes 
the socially constructed nature of international relations. Philosophically, 
constructivism assumes that knowledge can never be objective and is necessarily 
achieved through the prism of human experience. Wilfred Carr argues that: “the 
aspiration to achieve a purely rational understanding is illusory, that human 
understanding is never simply ‘given’ in any perception or observation but is always 
‘prejudiced’ by an interpretive element that determines how perceptions and 
observations are understood.” 455 Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener follow this argument 
and specify that constructivism brings together a variety of epistemological 
perspectives, which essentially “share the ontological concerns about social 
understandings and systems of meanings.” 456  Additionally, this research uses a mixed 
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method approach, bringing together quantitative and qualitative insights. For indeed a 
constructivist approach must necessarily value individual’s experiences and perceptions, 
which can best be observed through qualitative data. At the same time, quantitative 
approach helps reduce the interpretative bias and thus increases the validity of the 
research. 
Central to the ideas of constructivism is the mutual constitution of agency and structure 
which places the theoretical approach at a middle ground between rationalist and 
reflexivist perspectives. 457  Reflecting on this ‘middle ground’ methodological position, this 
research is firstly concerned how individual members of government communicate their 
interests in global energy governance. This part of the analysis seems to move to the 
rationalist perspective on the methodological continuum -- whereby actors are assumed to 
have a certain level of agency over the way they communicate their strategic narratives. 
Discourse and the way policy makers engage in it are two main points of interest of 
this thesis. Contemplating the role of discourse, Thomas Diez asks whether its role is 
to “positively enable particular policies or whether it works through constraining the 
policies that can be meaningful and legitimately pursued.” 458 He concludes that the 
latter is more convincing and that “the analysis of foreign policy discourses should 
therefore be refocussed away from their positive shaping of particular policies towards 
the way in which they work to set the limits of policy and how this setting of limits is 
performed by actors engaging in a struggle over foreign policy.” 459 So, if discourse has 
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the power to establish the limits of legitimacy in foreign policy, policymaker will likely 
use it strategically to set limits that are most useful to their policy goals. 
Antje Wiener when describing the rationalist pole of constructivism states: “While this 
approach still works with the positivist assumption of exogenous interest formation on the 
basis of material resources, its novel reference to ideal factors is distinct from the 
research practice of the rationalist pole.” 460 It should be further noted that while these 
individual ideas of interest which this research focuses on are assumed to be based on 
material resources, they are necessarily based on individual’s perceptions of the 
material world. Individuals are expected to make decisions and define interests and 
identities based on what they prioritise and deem important. 
As such, this research follows Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane’s argument 
that ideas or beliefs are based on interpretations of the ‘real’ world. 461  It supposes that 
identities in international relations are ever changing, and self-interests, rather than 
ordained by material structures are constantly re-defined based on actors’ normative 
understanding of these material structures. 462  Therefore, as stated by Maja Zehfuss, 
“in order to appreciate the influence of identities and/or norms it is necessary to explore 
intersubjective meaning and grasping the influence of changing practice, rather than 
empirically validating explanations of independent mechanisms, become central.” 463 
As such, this research’s methods aim to investigate a variety of discourses which may 
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give informed insights into the way actors define and communicate about their self-
interest. 
For, if interests and identities are not fixed, but ever evolving, the flux of interests and 
identities pre-supposes that different actors may have different views on what these 
are, leaving room for argumentation and persuasion. In the words of Thomas Risse, 
“arguing and truth-seeking behaviour presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed 
interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, 
challenges and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus.” 464   
This argument is seen to highlight, once again, the role of communication in 
international relations, a role which can be theorised through strategic narratives. 
 
5.1.2 Strategic Narratives 
In the 1960s, social sciences went through what some describe as a “narrative turn.”465  
Christopher Fenton and Ann Langley argue that this narrative turn is the symptom of 
moving “away from inquiry aimed at establishing universal relationships among 
abstract concepts and towards the understanding of how human beings make 
meaning, constructing experience, knowledge, and identity through narrative.” 466 
Miskimmon et al. further developed this view and suggested that “actors reflexively 
work with discourse to construct narratives with the instrumental aim to influence the 
 
464 T. Risse, ""Let's argue!'': communicative action in world politics," INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 54, no. 1 (2000). 
465 Mona Livholts and Maria Tamboukou, Discourse and narrative methods (Los Angeles: Sage, 2015). 
466 Christopher Fenton and Ann Langley, "Strategy as practice and the narrative turn," Organization 
studies 32, no. 9 (2011). 
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opinions of others.” 467 In other words, actors communicate in a strategic way in order 
to reach short- term and long-term goals based on their perceptions of their own self 
interests. They differentiate discourse and narrative by the latter’s temporal 
dimension. They argue that discourse is the essence of a narrative, however the 
narrative is structured temporarily by actors. 468 Likewise, Onega and Landa define 
narratives as “the semiotic representation of a series of events meaningfully connected 
in a temporal and causal way.” 469 
Miskimmon et al. identify three different levels of narratives, system narratives, about 
the nature of the international order; identity narratives about the actors themselves, 
their nature, their goals and values; and issue narratives aimed at shaping the political 
terrain surrounding a particular problem. 470  The three levels of narrative are 
intrinsically connected and narratives take on more importance and impact when all 
three levels are in alignment. In order to test the alignment of the narratives on 
different levels, this research identifies elements of a narrative and uses categories of 
analysis in order to observe and analyse each of these elements. This is further 
described in the data analysis section of this chapter. 
This research seeks to observe the narratives and test their alignment between 
different levels within the domestic energy policy and information flows. The 
circulation and alignments of the narratives is argued to inform international 
 
467 Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, 3. P7 
468 Ibid. p12 
469 Susana Onega Jaén and José Ángel García Landa, Narratology: an introduction (London: New 
York, 1996). 
470 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Forging the world: strategic narratives 
and international relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017). 
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communications and polices in the energy field. Such a two-tiered perspective is 
largely understudied in the energy policy studies (that tends to overlook the narratives 
dimension) as well as strategic narrative theory literature (that typically focuses on 
narratives within international relations system). Keeping in mind the cyclical nature 
of the narratives – from formulation to projection and communication, and finally to 
receptions and back to formulation,471 this research singles our local influential media 
across political continuum to track how formulated by the French government energy-
related policies -- both of domestic and external nature -- are communicated to the 
domestic audiences on the background of systemic, identity and issue-specific 
narratives. With mass media discourses shifting to the focus of this investigation, this 
research employs Entman’s Cascading Activation Framing theory that proposed 
analytical paradigm to operationalise the analysis of media. 
 
5.1.3 Cascading Activation Framing Theory 
The role of the media as an opinion shaper has been recognised by Walter Lippman 
originally published in 1922. 472 At first, scholarly responses were critical, with Paul 
Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet,473 and later Joseph Klapper 
concluding that media had very little effect on public opinion. 474 Nevertheless, 
Lippmann’s ideas continued to inspire many scholars. In 1963, Bernard Cohen 
concluded that the media was an effective tool to prescribe to the public what to think 
 
471 Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order, 3. 
472 Walter Lippmann, Public opinion (New York Macmillan, 1927). 
473 Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, and Paul F Lazarsfeld, The people's choice: How the voter makes 
up his mind in a presidential campaign (Columbia University Press, 1968). 
474 Joseph T Klapper, "The effects of mass communication,"  (1960). 
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about.475 In the 1970s, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, showed that the media 
was able to set the agenda of a campaign by shaping the political reality and increasing 
the visibility of some issues over others.476 Later, Robert Entman’s defined the concept 
of framing as the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation”477, thus establishing a basis for how the media influences the public. 
All of these works and many more show that the media has power over the perceptions 
of both the elites and public opinion. 
Entman’s Cascading Activation Framing Theory serves a useful model to map how an 
actor’s message on a strategic policy issues (often with external dimension) is 
communicated to domestic publics. Entman’s theory proposes an explanation how 
strategic narratives – and frames of actors that constitute these narratives 478 -- may 
be projected and spread to the public throughout the media. The theory also argues 
that media serves a ‘pump’ that delivers public’s reactions to the projected frames and 
narratives “up” the cascade, providing an insight into public’s reception in the life cycle 
of the narratives. 
As discussed in Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework, according to Entman, the higher 
ranks of the executive government may direct the way foreign policy issues (including 
external energy policy) are framed and transmitted to the public. The spread of these 
 
475 Bernard Cecil Cohen, The press and foreign policy (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
476 Entman, Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Chaban, Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin, "The EU's Peace and Security Narrative: Views from EU 
Strategic Partners in Asia." 
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frames is metaphorically compared to a cascade where information flows from the 
higher administration of government through other elites and the media down to their 
audiences. This flow of information and spread of influence may work particularly 
effectively in France, where historically and traditionally, the executive establishment 
has had a strong influence over the media. Raymond Kuhn confirms this view -- “an 
unequal power relationship between the media and the executive has existed 
throughout the Fifth Republic and to a significant extent still continues today.” 479  In 
addition, as explained in the literature earlier in the thesis, France energy policies have 
had a strong technocratic lead in particular. These conditions justify the application of 
Entman’s theory outside of an American context, where it was originally conceived. 
This research is concerned with the strategic narratives of energy in the global context, 
and specifically in the context of emerging powers of BRICS. This research focus 
means that the analysis included only those media communications that referenced 
the BRICS international actors. As explained in the theoretical framework, the external 
conduct of energy policies is the subject under study, and more particularly, 
communications about said policies. Both Strategic Narratives and Cascading 
Activation theories have a strong focus on foreign policy. Entman theorised the spread 
of frames about foreign policy issues and strategic narratives and hey may be used to 
influence both domestic and foreign actors, look at the conduct of international relations 
by actors. 
 
5.2 Research Design and Choice of Methods 
 
479 Raymond Kuhn, "The media and the executive in France: An unequal power relationship," 
European Journal of Communication 28, no. 2 (2013). 
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Focussing on the issue of French energy policy, and specifically on external energy 
policy towards the BRICS, this research analyses the flows of political communication 
through diverse identity-specific lenses. Reflecting on France’s identity as a sovereign 
state, this research traces external energy policy narratives formulated and projected 
by the French executive branch. Reflecting on France’s identity as an EU member 
states, this research looks into projections and communications by the European 
Commission in this issue- area. These two lenses allow to trace official formulations 
and projections. Reflecting on France’s identity as a liberal democracy with free media, 
this research examines how French mainstream influential press across political 
continuum communicated the narratives about French external energy policy – in 
general, and in relation to BRICS. Here, we are dealing with the communication phase 
investigating the way in which the official messages are then picked up by the leading 
media and the way in which they are presented. The analysis also links the 
communication phase to the reception among the audience. Ultimately, this research 
compares narratives (and constituting then frames) in formulation, projection and 
communication phases. Analysing this transition from formation to 
projection/communication of strategic narratives is seen the key in understanding the 
circulation of the narratives within a given society. 
The starting point of this research was the international project: ‘External images of 
the EU as a Normative Energy Power: BRICS vis-à-vis the EU (EXIE)’. 480  The project 
questioned whether the EU was recognised, framed and communicated as a global 
energy governance actor by leading media in the emerging countries such as the 
 
480 Chaban, Knodt, and Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global 
normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'." 
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BRICS. Essentially, it also compared external views (from BRICS) vis-à-vis internal 
views (inside the EU members state). Specifically, the project analysed media images 
of the EU and BRICS as energy actors in the “big three” EU member states - the UK, 
Germany and France. 481 Media data collected for the French segment of the EXIE 
formed a part of the datasets utilised by this research. 
France provides a valid case to examine and compare the flows of communication on 
external energy policy both on the EU Member State (national) and EU (supra-
national) levels. Chapter 2 “Literature Review” detailed how France’s energy policies 
heavily focused on nuclear energy appear distinctly different from respective policies 
of the rest of the EU member states (and even from other countries in the world). This 
exceptionalism, in a way, provides a firm methodological ground to examine how these 
differing energy policies and interests may influence the formation of distinct strategic 
narratives in France, binding domestic and external perspectives on the process of 
global energy governance. 
This research is delimitated to France’s narratives on global energy governance in 
relation to BRICS. Indeed, other international relationships could have been selected 
for this study, including the United States or countries of the Middle East. However,  
given that this methodology requires individual coding of political communications 
and newspaper articles, the inclusion of the US as a case study would have made this 
impossible without selecting a sample of collected material to analyse. Indeed, while 
the US does not appear in this study, it was nevertheless coded when present in the 
material gathered. While not being a specific code word for this research it was 
 
481 Bain et al., "A polyphonic marketplace: Images of EU external energy relations in British, French 
and German media discourses." 
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nevertheless the most mentioned actor in the analysed material. This means that if it 
had been selected as a keyword, the dataset would have been unmanageable for one 
coder alone. This, however, does not diminish the validity of this research. As 
emerging actors, the BRICS have an important role to play in global energy governance 
and present important challenges and opportunities to both the EU and France in their 
conduct of their external energy policies. They represent a diverse group of energy 
exporters (Russia, Brazil) and importers (China, India, South Africa) and their 
interests in nuclear energy make them interesting case studies in France’s self-
perceived global energy role. As such, the thesis dissects the narratives and framing of 
the relationship between the EU, France and BRICS. 
Respectively, this analysis engages with two types of empirical evidence: policy 
documents (produced by French executive bodies as well as by the EU) and French 
media (influential press across political continuum). 
The first hypothesis of this research concerns the way local energy interests may 
impact the formation of narratives about energy relations with the BRICS. Review of 
the relevant literature detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 established what strategic energy 
interests France and the EU held with regards to the BRICS. Chapter 2 described 
France and the EU’s local energy polices in their historical contexts while Chapter 3 
described the “energy realities” in each of the BRICS and the bilateral relations they 
entertain with France and the EU. While these reviews map the EU’s and France’s 
internal and external energy concerns, the following analysis will focus on the political 
communications formulated and projected by the European Commission and France’s 
executive branch reconstructing the formation and communication of narratives on 
their respective energy relations with the BRICS. The comparison between the “energy 
realities” for all actors involved and the French and EU strategic narratives will allow 
152 
 
this research to test Hypothesis 1. 
The second hypothesis relates to the first as it aims to compare France’s and the EU’s 
strategic narratives observed in these political communications. It anticipates that France’s 
framing of internal and external energy policy -- and of other energy sector actors in 
Europe and in the world -- will differ from the EU’s framing. Chapter 2 has already 
established that France’s and the EU’s interests in the energy domain differ on some 
aspects, particularly when it comes to nuclear energy as well as their energy 
relationship with Russia. Respectively, this research assumes that strategic narratives 
formulated and projected by France (an EU member state) and by the EU will differ 
based on their differing interests. 
The third hypothesis formulates the prediction around the projection of these 
narratives in local (French) media. It expects that French media will communicate 
France’s strategic narrative on global energy governance in a prominent and locally 
resonant way in contrast to less prominent and engaging strategic narratives of the EU 
as a global energy actor. 
To summarise, theoretical models selected for this research informed the research 
design and the logic of the methods. To reiterate, a constructivist lens favours a mixed 
methods approach and justifies the use of discourse from selected individuals as an 
empirical evidence. Both Strategic Narratives and Cascading Activation Framing 
theories justify a focus on meaning when attempting to understand and explain foreign 
policy and external relations. Both theories provide models to explain the influences 
of executive establishment, not only on the conduct of international relations in 
general, and energy ones in particular, but also on formation and projection of 
narratives and meanings that provide a story of past, present and future. These 
theories also emphasise the role of the media in spreading ideas about foreign policy 
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– and external energy relations -- to the general public. 
 
5.2.1 Data Collection to Analyse External Energy Governance 
The main hypothesis of this study concerns the way the EU and France’s local energy 
concerns and policies impact France’s narrative on global energy governance. Roselle 
et al. noted that “if one chooses to focus on political actors’ formation of strategic 
narratives, careful process tracing, textual analysis., and interviews may allow one to 
understand the domestic political pressures evident when studying policy narratives, 
or how national or international narratives constrain how political actors conceive the 
realm of the possible.” 482 
 
The two data sources used in this research correspond to the two narratives processes 
discussed above, formation and projection. It is important to understand these as 
progressions rather than static stations. Formation of Strategic Narratives is the 
process through which narrators, in our case political leaders, make an interpretation 
of domestic and international interests and frame their communications into strategic 
narratives. The process of projection on the other hand is the act of communicating 









Period of analysis 
This research focussed on periods of analysis from 2009 to 2015. It chose to examine 
coverage during the ‘peak’ periods: one month of coverage around the United Nations’ 
Climate Change Conventions (UNFCCCs). The UNFCCCs were chosen as the focal 
point for the analysis as these important summits feature extensive and intensive attention 
to the themes of energy governance, an otherwise uneven subject of discussion in 
international relations. These conferences are also an important reference when 
politicians, media and public interests intersect. Due to the summits’ theme on climate 
change, it is logical to expect that debates originated within them and instigated by 
them in various discourses around the world may be biased towards sustainability. As 
discussed by Chaban et al., “the distinctive feature of energy relations as having a 
strong ‘nexus quality’: energy as a policy field is an almost classical cross-cutting issue, 
standing in very close connection to climate policies.” 483  This is particularly true of 
the EU and France’s energy policies in recent years, both of which have important 
sustainability goals. And while using the UNFCCC’s as peak periods of observation 
may indeed raise the visibility of sustainability issues, these issues are central to the 
political debates on energy taking place in France and at the EU level. 
 
This research explores the evolution of the strategic narratives on energy governance 
in France between two landmark UNFCCCs -- Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015. 
 
483 Chaban, Knodt, and Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global 
normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'." p14 
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Both of these conferences have served the background to key political debates on 
energy in France, and internationally. As discussed in Chapter 2 Literature Review, 
the outcome of the Copenhagen conference of 2009 was largely perceived as a failure 
for the EU. Importantly for this research, the EU’s ability to lead in the UNFCCC 
international negotiations was critically challenged and criticized. 484 By contrast, the 
Paris conference of 2015 has been hailed as a success by many observers. Both France 
and the EU were viewed as having a limited but positive influence on this outcome. 485 
Data collection strategy 
The data was collected following a set of key words. These included actors (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa) and types of energy (energy, oil, gas, coal, fossil, 
nuclear, biofuel, solar, wind, hydro, tidal, renewable, thermal and biomass). Since 
much of the data was in French these search terms were also translated accordingly. 
 
Data collection for political analysis 
To analyse the strategic narratives about energy governance in France and at the EU 
level, this research analyses political communications by the executive branches of 
both actors between 2009 and 2015. In France, this means the presidential position 
and the governmental ministries. Communications by the Ministry of the 
Environment, Energy and the Sea 486, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 487  as well as 
 
484 Bocquillon and Evrard, "Rattraper ou Devancer l'Europe? Politiques Francaises des Energies 
Renouvelables et Dynamiques d'Europeanisation." 
485 Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership." 
486 In French: Ministère de l’Environnement, de l’Energie et de la Mer, previously known as: le 
Ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du Développement durable et de la Mer 
487 In French: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, previously known as Ministère des Affaires Etrangères 
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communications made by the Presidents of the Republic and their Prime Ministers for 
the period 2009-2015 were analysed. These four entities can be seen to represent what 
Entman calls the Administration in his theory of cascading activation. 488  It must be 
noted that Entman’s description of administration is particularly focussed on the 
American context. He notes, “The president and top advisers enjoy the most independent 
ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of 
moving their own thoughts into general circulation.” 489 Understanding 
Administration as the executive branch of government, this study defines the 
President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are members of the executive branch with the most 
power to set the narrative on global energy governance and France’s place and identity 
in it. 
Communications from the executive branch were gathered through the archival 
website, Vie Publique, 490  which is under the authority of the Legal and Administrative 
Information Directorate of the French government, and records all communications by 
members of the French government including speeches, press releases and interviews 
in the media. 
At the EU level, the Commission stands as the executive power. Communications by 
EU Commission were gathered through its website. 491 However, it should be noted 
that the archives kept by the Commission are more limited than France’s. Specifically, 
 
et Européennes 
488 Entman, Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. 
489 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11." 
490 "Vie publique," https://www.vie-publique.fr/. 
491 "News," EU Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/index_en. 
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they do not include the records of the interviews with executive figures. The interviews, 
however, were seen as valuable and rich sources of evidence about narratives, as these 
are typically more spontaneous than pre-prepared speeches or thoroughly checked 









Interviews Speeches Total 
The EU 42 0 29 71 
France 3 36 37 76 
 
Communications were analysed using qualitative interpretative analysis. The volume 
of political communications also allowed for the use of an additional data analysis 
through the programme NVivo. One important feature of the programme is its ability 
to quantify the use of word in documents. This further enhances the reach of analysis 
for policy documents and adds to the validity of this study. From this, word clouds of 
the most used words were produced and are presented in Chapter 7 (policy results). 
 
Data collection for media analysis 
For this research, four newspapers were chosen for analysis based on their reputation, 
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their circulation and their political leanings: Le Figaro, Le Monde, Les Echos and 
Libération. All four of these newspapers figure within the top 10 of national 
newspapers. Le Monde and Le Figaro are the two top newspapers in France both in 
terms of circulation and reputation. 492 Le Figaro has the highest circulation in France 
with over 300 000 paid subscriptions in 2017. Its editorial stance is generally more 
right-wing whereas Le Monde is generally viewed to be more centre-left leaning. It is 
followed closely by Le Monde with over 280 000 paid subscriptions that same year. 493 
Les Echos is a financial newspaper and was chosen as the issue of energy is of 
particular interest to business communities. It has the fourth highest circulation with 
over 128 000 paid subscriptions in 2017. Finally, Libération is the seventh most read 
national newspaper with around 75 000 subscriptions in 2017. 
While some argue that the readership of mainstream newspapers is for ever decreasing 
in favour of new types of media, these outlets (increasingly embracing the online 
editions) continue to influence opinions. Leading national reputable papers continue 
to be read by the national elites and thus “can affect leaders’ strategic calculations and 
activities.” 494 
Importantly, while the number of paid subscriptions may be low each of these 
newspapers have websites which are widely accessed. In January 2018 for example, 
the websites LeFigaro.fr and LeMonde.fr were accessed over 118 million times and 98 
million times respectively, of which 100 million and 78 million visits were made from 
 
492 Rodney Benson, "What makes for a critical press? A case study of French and US immigration news 
coverage," The International Journal of Press/Politics 15, no. 1 (2010). 
493 L'Alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des medias, "Classement Acpm-Ojd Des Sites Fixes Et 
Mobiles Grand Public Janvier 2018," http://www.acpm.fr/Chiffres/Frequentation/Classement-des-
Sites/Classement-Unifie-desSites-GP 
494 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11." 
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a French address. 495 
Additionally, subscriptions to Le Monde, Le Figaro and Les Echos were all on the rise 
in 2017. 496 This is largely due to the fact that these newspapers have retained a good 
reputation for objectivity and good reporting. In an era of fake news and media 
bubbles, the French public trusts these sources over other digital media to give them 
unbiased news. 
Table 5-2: Total volume of media articles by publication 
Le Figaro Le Monde Les Echos Libération Total 
301 325 452 142 1220 
 
5.2.2 Approaches to data analysis 
This research uses content analysis of political communications and press articles, 
using the tried and tested methodology from the international project The EU through 
the Eyes of Asia-Pacific 497 , and one of its sub-project EXIE. 498  This research uses 
two sources of discourse, political communications and media articles, comparing 
narratives and frames created by both. 
The EU perceptions methodology draws on both quantitative and qualitative 
 
495 L'Alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des medias, "Classement ACPM-OJD des Sites Fixes et 
Mobiles Grand Public Janvier 2018," 2018, accessed 09/03/2018, 
http://www.acpm.fr/Chiffres/Frequentation/Classement-des-Sites/Classement-Unifie-des-Sites-GP. 
496  Marina Alcaraz , Presse: première hausse en dix ans pour les quotidiens Les Echos, 
https://www.lesechos.fr/12/04/2018/lesechos.fr/0301553147385_presse--premiere-hausse-en-dix-
ans-pour-les-quotidiens.htm 
497 Holland, Martin, and Natalia Chaban. 2008. The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, 
public and perceptions of the EU. Vol. v.v. 6. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis  
498 Also see EU External Perceptions, http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz/ 
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measurements in its analysis and outlines formal and substantive features of discourse 
and narratives. The approach chosen for this research is the one most consistent with 
Miskimmon’s et. al.’s Strategic Narratives Theory. 
Narratives require narrators. Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe argue that 
“Narrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker's concept of self, for it is the self 
that is located at the centre of the narrative, whether as active agent, passive 
experiencer, or tool of destiny.”499 
Table 5-3: Framework of analysis of narratives 
 
499 Patterson and Monroe, "Narrative in political science." 
Elements of a narrative Categories of analysis 
Narrator Source. 
Actor Volume of coverage of state actors; Degree of 
centrality of state actors; evaluation of state 
actors; other non-state level actors. 
Event – time Date; events mentioned. 
Scene – setting Focus of domesticity; Other dimensions of 
news articles (politics, economics etc…). 
Action – Goal Thematic framing; Issues mentioned 








Formal features include: 
 
-sources of each article and communications are recorded when available. Some press 
articles for example remain anonymously written and at times political 
communications are not ascribed a source other than the institution it came from. 
However, in most case the sources are clearly stated. For press articles, the sources are 
classified according to whether they are local correspondents or agencies or if they are 
from external sources and the names of the journalists are recorded when available. 
As detailed above, sources will give an indication of the narrator for global energy 
narratives. 
- the volume of coverage for both key actors and key terms detailed above. The volume 
is assessed simply by the number of articles or communications in which they are 
mentioned. The volume of coverage for each actor will indicate their visibility in 
speeches and reporting in France of the period of observation. 
-the degree of centrality of actors and of energy. This concept was developed by 
Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland in their seminal word on public perceptions and 
media representations of the EU in the Asia Pacific region. 500  This feature assesses 
 
500 Chaban and Holland, The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media 
representations, no. 4. 
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whether they are a major, secondary or minor focus of articles or communications. For 
example, in an article that focusses solely on Chinese efforts to build renewable energy, 
China and energy will both have a major degree of centrality. In an article that describes 
collaboration between France and India with a paragraph talking about nuclear energy, 
France, India and energy have a secondary focus. Finally, in an article that explains 
global efforts to tackle climate change that mentions multiple actors including Brazil in 
passing and makes a brief mention of the energy sector, Brazil and energy are of minor 
focus. 
-the evaluation of actors, using a scale of five options from positive to negative, this 
feature makes a note of the way actors are portrayed. Additionally, in order to better 
assess the judgement made of each actor, evaluations include a qualitative instrument 
in the form of conceptual metaphors. Developed by George Lakoff, conceptual 
metaphors usually link an abstract subject with a concrete one. 501 To describe it, 
Lakoff uses the metaphorical concept of Time is Money. He explains that in everyday 
language we often link the two concepts to express that time is a valuable and finite 
commodity like money. We use words like “spend”, “invest”, “give”, “have”, “lose”, etc. 
express this concept. The reason for analysing conceptual metaphors is that they often 
betray emotive bias on subjects since “people frequently employ metaphors to make 
sense of the world and communicate their individual conceptions to others by 
contrasting new experiences against existing knowledge.” 502 So, metaphors often give 
an interpretation of actors and their actions that can give an indication of the 
 
501 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language," The Journal of 
Philosophy 77, no. 8 (1980). 
502 Chaban and Holland, The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: media, public, and elite perceptions 
of the EU, 6. p 65 
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evaluation made by the narrator of their subject. 
-the non-state actors to take note of what non-state actors and individuals are 
mentioned. This may include government officials, businesses or civil society actors. 
This is an important tool since, as discussed in the literature review, energy 
governance is engaged in by a multiplicity of actors. 
-the focus of domesticity, whether the actions described in articles and communication 
take place locally (in France), in another EU member state, at the EU level, in a third 
country or at a global level. This will give an indication of the setting of narratives about 
global energy governance. 
-the issues and events mentioned likewise makes a note of the topics related to energy 
that are mentioned such as energy efficiency, sustainable development or the Copenhagen 
conference. This allows a broader view of the context in which energy is mentioned. 
-the types of energy mentioned, is simply taking note of what kinds of energy are 
mentioned in communications and articles, or if energy was mentioned in general 
only. This is conceptualised as the tool through which actors engage in global energy 
governance and the narratives of it. 
Substantive features allow to take note of things that are not necessarily written 
textually in a communication or article. These features are more dependent on the 
researcher’s own point of view of course but they are a necessary tool to understanding 
the sub-text, what is not written down but is expected to be understood. They include: 
-the thematic framing of actors, referring to whether actors’ energy actions fit the EU 
tripartite mould of competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability or if their actions 
are framed in other terms. 
-Other dimensions involves making a note of the context in which energy is mentioned, 
be it political, economic, social, etc. 
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Additionally, the use of word frequency clouds was made for the analysis of political 
communications. Word clouds have been shown to be an effective supplementary 




Going through element of narratives, the next two chapters will present the results 




503 Carmel McNaught and Paul Lam, "Using Wordle as a supplementary research tool," Qualitative 
Report 15, no. 3 (2010). 
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 : Narratives of Global Energy 





This chapter will present the results from the policy discourse of the European 
Commission and the French executive branch of government. The purpose of this 
chapter is to trace the formation of strategic narratives in both discourses. France and 
the EU’s external energy policies and interests towards the BRICS have been traced in 
Chapters 2 and 3. It has been hypothesised that these interests would drive the framing 
of external energy and external energy actors in France and the EU’s political 
discourses. The chapter also aims to compare the two discourses and examine areas of 
alignment and misalignment between the two actors’ narratives. This chapter will 
therefore go through the elements of narratives (Actors, action, events, setting, 
instrument) present in both discourses in order to deduce the strategic narratives 
presented in these communications. 
 
6.2 Context 
Figure 6.1 French communications word frequency cloud and Figure 6.2: EU 
Communications word frequency cloud illustrate structural similarities how external 
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energy policy issues are discussed by the policy discourses of the EU’s and France’s 
executive levels. Unsurprisingly, both discourse producers placed themselves at the centre 
of their communications: for the French sample, it was France and Français, and for 
the European Commission, it was European, Union and Europe. Both discourses 
produced by executive authorities also heavily invested into the visibility of such 
‘governing’ terms as minister, president, commission(er) and government. 
Importantly, French external energy policy discourse also places itself within the 
European context – notions of Europe, europeen(ne)s and Union are of high frequency 
(Figure 2). At first glance, it appears that the theme of energy may be more prevalent 
in EU communications than in French ones. However, this is due in part to the fact 
that French communications use the singular and plural forms of the word (energie 
and energies) and the Word Cloud software sees them as two separate words. 
 
 
These Figures also show common themes that appear in the executive 
communications on external energy of both actors: these are predominantly politics, 
Figure 6.1: French communications word frequency cloud 
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economics and sustainability. The theme of politics is present with the obvious terms 
of political and politiques, but also through the type of actors (global, international, 
countries, government and leaders) and words that qualify the type of politics 
(development, cooperation, partnership, agreement, negotiations, engagement and 
commitment). Economic theme appears through words such as economic, growth, 
investment, market, trade and business. Finally, since the period of observation for 
this study was around the UN COPs, issues related to climate change and sustainability 
were dominant. In fact, climate change often takes a central role in these political 
communications. Both the EU and France have made important commitments 
regarding the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and formulated clear statements 
about them. 
 












In summary, the communications by executive branches from France and the EU are 
comparatively similar – they feature important cross-cutting themes and highlight the 
profile of the executive decisions, actions and actors in understanding of the issue of 
external energy. 
Yet, beyond these general structural and thematic similarities, there is a number of 
differences between the two discourses. There are significant divergences particularly 
around strategic issues such as the importance and diversity of partners as well as a 
differing weight given to particular types of energy and issues. The divergent policy 
outlooks lead to the diverging narratives about global energy governance formulated at the 
French and EU executive levels. This chapter aims to trace these differing narratives 
and show the different ways they frame external energy policy for the EU and one of 
its leading member states. At this point, it is useful to revisit the elements of the 
narrative discussed above. 
 
6.3 Sources and Narrators 
The first element of a narrative is the narrator. The narrators are responsible for the 
formation of the narratives and are therefore assumed to have a certain level of agency 
over the way they communicate strategic narratives (a perspective arguably informed 
by a rationalist approach). 
Thomas Diez, looking at discourse and the way policy-makers engage in it, asks 
“whether the role of discourse is to positively enable particular policies or whether it 
works through constraining the policies that can be meaningful and legitimately 
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pursued.”504 He concludes that the latter is more convincing and that “the analysis of 
foreign policy discourses should therefore be refocussed away from their positive 
shaping of particular policies towards the way in which they work to set the limits of 
policy and how this setting of limits is performed by actors engaging in a struggle over 
foreign policy.”505 Importantly, he highlights the role policy-makers play in setting the 
limits of legitimacy in foreign policy. Therefore, the question: “Who speaks?” is as 
crucial as the question: “What are they speaking about?” 
Answering the questions “Who speaks?”, this thesis identifies a number of narrators 
in France and the EU (Table 2). As detailed in Chapter 5 Methods, the policy discourse 
analysis in this research focusses on the communications of executive members of the 
French government and European Commission, namely ministers and 
commissioners. Following Entman’s cascading activation framing theory, this analysis 
assumes that the executive levels of government have the most power to influence 
framing of external policies.506 Table 6.1 lists narrators and displays differences in 
communications output between the EU and France (the data were collected from two 







504 Diez, "Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy." 
505 Ibid. 
506 Entman, Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. 
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Table 6-1: Framework of analysis of narratives 
 EU France 
President 14 22 
Vice President - Prime 
Minister 
5 17 
The High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 
- Foreign Affairs Minister 
6 20 
Energy and Environment 15 17 
Other507 31 0 
 
Importantly, there are two administrations over the period of observation for both 
France and the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy was replaced by Francois Hollande after the 2012 
election in France and Jose Manuel Barrosso’s commission was followed by Jean 
Claude Juncker’s commission in 2014. 
At times, the issue-areas of energy and environment in France were assigned to one 
 
507 One strong difference is in the category “other”. While each ministry in France has its own 
communication structures, the Commission has a more streamlined unified system. The European 
Commission publishes on its website a number of press releases that are simply attributed to the 




ministry’s portfolio, and at other times they were the responsibility of two distinct 
ministries. Bocquillon and Evrard point out that in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy merged four 
different ministries into one, creating the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable 
Development and Planning (MEEDDAT), “so as to rebalance inter-ministerial 
relations in favour of environmental issues.”508 In the period of analysis in this thesis, 
the ministry was headed by Jean Louis Borloo in 2009. However, already in 2010 there 
was a change -- the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Planning was 
created (headed by Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet) alongside the Ministry of Industry, 
Energy and Digital Economy (headed by Eric Besson). Yet, from 2012, under Francois 
Hollande, the issue- areas were merged once again within a newly created Ministry of 
Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy (headed by Ségolène Royale). Periods 
when the ministries were merged were the periods when the notion of sustainability 
took the foreground in policy discussions. To trace ebbs and flows in the architecture 
of the French executive bodies responsible for handling energy matter is thus 
important. The perturbations reveal the position, internal links and political priorities 
of the narrators and thus may help explain the change in the content of policy narratives 
formulated by the executive level institutions. The distinctions of narrative between the 
two administrations that this chapter will seek to highlight reveal the level of agency 
actors have over the framing of their strategic narrators, an important component of this 
research. By comparison, there are fewer structural evolutions to the DG Energy 
between the two Commission leaderships. 
It is not only institutions/government who are the generic narrators. Individual narrators 
do have their own views and priorities, which often transpire through policy 
 
508 Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership." 
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communications. For example, Joseph Szarka points out that Nicolas Sarkozy and his 
Prime Minister Francois Fillon strongly and vocally championed nuclear energy.509 Under 
the same administration, Ministers of Energy and of the Environment had a stronger focus 
on renewable energy and sustainability. For example, Jean Louis Borloo, head of that 
ministry from 2007 to 2010, was on a personal mission to help African countries access 
renewable energy.510 
 
6.4 Events and setting 
Tracing the dynamic of executive communications on external energy over seven year, 
we observe some differences between the EU and France (Table 6.2). There is a lower 
volume of communications by the EU in 2011 and 2012. This is perhaps is related to 
the EU’s preoccupation with the Eurozone debt crisis, which likely distracted decision- 
makers’ attention away from issues of global energy governance. This finding proves 
that settings and events are the key elements to craft and disseminate policy-relevant 






509 Szarka, "From exception to norm - and back again? France, the nuclear revival, and the post-
Fukushima landscape." 




Table 6-2: Number of communications each year 




7 15 5 4 18 12 6 
From French 
ministries  
22 9 9 9 6 10 14 
 
One such key event was the UNFCCC COP in Copenhagen in 2009. Even though it was 
a climate change focused event, it bore a direct relevance to external energy policy 
discourses, and specifically in terms of relating energy matters to the discussion on 
sustainability. To remind the readers, all communication analysed below had a direct 
focus on energy, thus they entered the sample. In these communications, in 2009, 
France attached a high importance to the UN COP in Copenhagen while 
contextualising it within a wider vision of its energy-focused discourse. As seen in 
Figure 6.1, Copenhagen is the 27
th most used words in French communications on 
external energy policy with 202 mentions. Comparatively, the word does not appear 
in the most used 100 words in EU respective communications. 
In France, the conference in Copenhagen was first presented as having great potential 
and later as being a major disappointment. The EU was framed by French politicians 
as having major responsibilities ahead of Copenhagen. Jean Louis Borloo, asked in an 
interview about what role the EU had to play in the upcoming negotiations, responds: 
“The European Union is the only real organisation in the world, until now, 
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that has made a commitment for a massive reduction [of emissions]. So, I 
understand the EU needs to be supported in this endeavour, with 27 
members, it isn’t so easy. But, when one is at Copenhagen, one understands 
that, honestly, if there wasn’t the European commitment, I think there would 
be great difficulties in Copenhagen.”511 
Overall, on the issue of climate change at Copenhagen, France aligns itself with the 
EU’s position. In his speech in China focussing on the summit, Francois Fillon 
declared: “Of course, France, like the European Union, would have wished for the 
agreement in Copenhagen to go further.”512 The EU was portrayed as a largely positive 
actor that will be trying its best in the negotiations. It is important to remember that 
by 2009, France has made a commitment to lead in the fight against climate change. 
Since Sarkozy’s 2007 election, the issue of combating climate change has been central 
to many policy debates. Perhaps unsurprisingly, during its EU presidency in 2008, France 
made sustainability one of its priorities. The alignment between France and the EU’s 
stances on sustainability is of significance for this analysis. 
While the summit ended with a disappointed France, the responsibility for the failure 
was delegated by French narrators largely to the US and China. When asked by a 
journalist if Barack Obama lacked character in the negotiations, Jean Louis Borloo 
replies: 
“…no, I don’t know. But essentially, an American emits four times more 
 
511 Jean-Louis Borloo, "Interview de M. Jean-Louis Borloo, ministre de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du 
développement durable et de la mer, en charge des technologies vertes et des négociations sur le climat, 
à France-Inter le 11 décembre 2009, sur les enjeux de la conférence de Copenhague sur le réchauffement 
climatique.," news release, 11 December 2009. 
512 François Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, sur la coopération nucléaire 
entre la France et la Chine, à Pékin le 21 décembre 2009.," news release, 21 December 2009. 
175 
 
greenhouse gas than a French person, and the commitment, the difference 
between the French and American commitment, the American commitment 
is seven times less than that of the French, and more generally, five times 
less than the Europeans. So, in reality, the difficulty of Copenhagen is the 
obstruction by the American Congress preventing President Obama from going 
further.”513 
He later adds: 
“…no but, what is the reality here? Having a voluntary agreement, so no one 
is summoned, people come voluntarily to try to build an agreement. Europe 
comes with its level of ambition for reduction, of 20-30%, in a unified 
manner. Does Europe have the means to impose that on China? The answer 
is no. No one has the means to impose to anyone in this type of meeting. And 
even less to a country of 1.4 billion that says: “Me, I need to have 8% growth 
per year, I’m willing to reduce the growth of my carbon intensity but not my 
economic growth.” So, no one is able. Not Europe any more than anyone 
else.”514 
This interpretation of the Copenhagen outcomes highlights the visibility of political 
themes in the external energy discourse. In 2014, President Hollande reviews what 
happened at Copenhagen a year before the Paris conference. He declares: 
“We still have to convince the world. It isn’t easy because the world is 
 
513 Jean-Louis Borloo, "Interview de M. Jean-Louis Borloo, ministre de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du 
développement durable et de la mer, en charge des technologies vertes et des négociations sur le climat, 
à RMC le 21 décembre 2009, sur le bilan du sommet de Copenhague.," interview by Jean-Jacques 




multiple. Let’s start with the two big emitters China and the United States. 
They weren’t the most enthusiastic at Copenhagen. It is probably what 
explained the failure, even if the biggest emitters […] always hide behind 
the smallest to argue that it shouldn’t go too far, and that it could affect the 
growth of the global economy…”515 
Such a portrayal of the US and China is significant since globally, the US and China’s 
leadership in the Copenhagen negotiations was more widely recognised than the 
EU’s.516 However, by 2015, at the COP21 in Paris, China’s role was perceived as 
reversed. Laurent Fabius, Foreign Affairs Minister declares during a press conference: 
“China, I think it has been recognised by all, has played up to now an 
extremely positive and important role in seeking success for the COP 21. 
China is the first carbon emitter in the world, the Chinese president and the 
Chinese government are extremely committed to the fight against climate 
change.”517 
In contrast to French communications, the EU’s official communications that 
referenced external energy matters in the same time period mentioned Copenhagen in 
a marginal way. In the run up to the conference, it is briefly mentioned in a press 
release about the 12th EU- China Summit. President Barosso briefly referenced the 
COP: 
 
515 François Hollande, "Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la lutte 
contre le dérèglement climatique, à Paris le 1er décembre 2014.," news release, 1 Decembre 2014. 
516 Parker and Karlsson, "The European Union as a global climate leader: confronting aspiration with 
evidence." 
517 Laurent Fabius, "Déclaration à la presse de M. Laurent Fabius, ministre des affaires étrangères et 
du développement international, sur la Conférence de Paris pour le climat, au Bourget le 4 décembre 
2015.," news release, 4 December 2015. 
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“From this EU-China Summit we intend to send a strong message on our 
shared determination to face and overcome together global challenges. Only a 
week before the Copenhagen UN conference on Climate Change we will stress 
the need for an ambitious and global result, which includes structures to finance 
mitigation.”518 
At the time, EU communications made no predictions or judgements on the outcome 
of the UN COP in Copenhagen. Only in 2015, in the build-up of the UN COP 21 in Paris, 
EU climate Chance Commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete reflected on Copenhagen: 
“But before, let us step back and look at what happened at the Copenhagen conference 
in 2009. Why did Copenhagen fail? For three reasons: First, because the world was 
not ready. Second, because many countries were not willing to commit. And third, 
because all those countries not willing to commit managed to sharply divide the 
developed and the developing worlds and create two opposite blocks. Indeed, in 
Copenhagen the story was about countries against countries, developed versus 
developing, them and us.”519 
He later comments on the involvement of the BRICS and the EU in the negotiations: 
“Without major developing countries emitters such as China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa or Indonesia, we simply cannot fix the climate. In Copenhagen, 
Europe was criticized for not being in the room where deals were crunched. 
A sentiment of frustration, and even political humiliation, was present in 
many European delegates. In the face of this, the European Union only had 
 
518 IP-09-1835 
519 Miguel Arias Cañete, "Historic Climate Deal in Paris: Speech by Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete 




one option: wipe the tears, get its act together and keep pushing. But pushing 
creatively, strategically.”520 
These examples point to one striking difference between the EU and French executive 
communications. French officials openly – and rather emotionally -- acknowledge the 
fact that the conference did not reach the Europeans’ expectations whereas, European 
officials appear to avoid communicating about it and when they do, they mostly do so 
in a neutral way. However, it must be stressed one more time that the communications 
gathered in this research are only those that explicitly mentioned energy issues. More 
communications about the UN COPs have been released by both actors, but they are 
not in the focus of this analysis. Yet, here lies the second important conclusion: the 
different level of communication on the UN COP with references to energy in this 
analysis may indicate that French officials more readily associate energy issues with 
climate change. Word frequency analysis shows us that while the word “climate” is the 
third most mentioned word in EU communications, with 385 mentions, the words 
“climat” and “climatique” are respectively mentioned 407 and 366 times in French 
communications. The words “emissions” and “sustainable” appear more often in 
French communication than in European ones. These associations are important to 
understand the context within which issues of global energy governance are 
communicated by executive discourses. Generally, the EU’s communications on 
external energy were often focussed on relations with third countries. 
Communications on summits with third countries -- such as China, Ukraine, Russia 
or India -- are often the context within which energy is mentioned by the European 










6.5 Actors and actions 
We now shift to the analysis of the next key element in the narrative structure – actor 
and its actions. Table 6.4 displays the similarities and differences between French and 
EU communications in the visibility of actors. Unsurprisingly, political actors – the 
discourse producers and narrators -- place themselves at the centre of the action. 
France has a more pronounced self-focus, with a larger share of communications 
where it is presented as a major actor. In contrast, many of the EU’s communications 
on global energy issues deal with summits between EU actors and third countries. In 
those communications, the EU is presented to be on an equal footing with other actors, 
rather than a solo lead. This explains why the EU enjoys a role of a secondary actor in 
a large portion of its own communications.  
 
 Local EU general Member 
states 
3rd country Global 
EU 
commission 
0 18 1 31 18 
French 
executive 









In EU discourse 
Table 6-4 shows that the EU’s official communications afford a certain degree of 
prominence to Russia compared to other BRICS, often presenting the country as a 
secondary actor when it comes to external energy matters. This framing demonstrates that 
over the period of observation, the EU had closer energy relations with its neighbour 
to the East compared to other emerging actors. The EU has also placed more 
EU France 
 Major Secondary Minor  Major Secondary Minor 
Brazil 0 2 10 Brazil 0 7 11 
Russia 0 17 17 Russia 0 4 15 
India 0 3 16 India 0 10 23 
China 0 7 30 China 0 20 32 
SA 0 0 10 SA 0 0 8 
France 0 1 6 France 51 22 1 
EU 36 31 0 EU 1 14 12 
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importance on this actor in its communications. Moreover, the EU employed a 
diversity of thematic frames when talking about Russia that included all framing 
categories outlined in Chapter 5: Methods: politics, economics, competitiveness, security 
of supply and sustainability. Arguably, this multifaceted framing points to a complex 
nature EU-Russia energy relationship as reflected by official discourse. 
Politics was the most important thematic framing category for Russia in the EU’s 
executive communications. This is largely due to the fact that many of the 
communications about Russia centre on specific political summits. For example, 
communications about the EU-Russia summit appear in 2010 and 2011.These 
communications often have a secondary focus on energy while primary attention goes 
to political interactions. At times, energy topics are granted political importance on 
their own. A gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine having disrupted the supply of 
gas to a number of European countries in 2009 was one of such occasions where 
energy issues crossed into hard politics. It was also a time where the EU sees itself as 
having a larger role in the conduct of external energy policies. Commissioner in charge 
of energy in 2009, Andris Piebalgs in a speech on “energy in a global environment” 
given in Japan, argues that: 
“This new-found solidarity in energy policy is an important change. It 
came to the fore earlier in the year during the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. 
You will remember that this disrupted gas supplies to large parts of 
eastern and central Europe. As a result, the EU took the unusual step of 
mediating to resolve a dispute between two third parties. It did this 
because Member States recognised that the EU would only have a real 
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impact if it worked together in solidarity.”521 
The issue of Russia-Ukraine energy transit conflict remained an important one for the 
EU after 2009. In 2010, energy – and more specifically, gas – was discussed by those 
EU communications that focussed on the Russia-Ukraine Summits. These 
communications demonstrated, among other things, the geopolitical importance of 
energy. The EU framed itself as a mediator between the two neighbours conflicting over 
energy: “The Council welcomed the trilateral gas accord of 30 October 2014 mediated 
over the course of the last eight months by the European Union, and acknowledged 
the support of the United States and other parties in this achievement.”522 However, 
in acting as an intermediary between Russia and Ukraine, the EU also communicated 
it also acted in securing its own energy supplies. 
Russia’s moderately high visibility in the EU’s communications on external energy 
matters is indicative of the importance of Russia to the EU’s energy stability. 
Competiveness and security of supply are also prominent framing categories in this 
case. In a key-note speech at the EU-Russia 10th anniversary of high level conference 
EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council for Energy, the then Commissioner for 
Energy, Gunther Oettinger talked about what he called “the Europeanization of energy 
policy.”523 He argues that Europe faces a number of energy challenges that would be 
too imposing to be tackled by individual member states and talks about the 
relationship between the EU and Russia.  
This strategic importance of Russia to the EU is further highlighted in 2014 by multiple 
 
521 Andris Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment," news release, 8 December 2009. 
522 European Commission, "Joint Statement Eu-Us Energy Council," news release, 03 December 2014. 
523 Günther Oettinger, "Keynote Speech Given at the Eu Russia 10th Anniversary High Level 
Conference Eu-Russia Permanent Partnership Council for Energy," news release, 22 November 2010. 
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statements from the Commission following an announcement by Russia that it would 
cease the South Stream project.524 In these statements, Energy Union Commissioners 
Maros Sefcovic speaks alongside ministers and representatives from EU member 
states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Romania and Slovenia) and they stress 
that “the EU must remain strongly committed to integrating Central and South-
Eastern European gas markets and diversifying gas suppliers.”525 The mention in this 
context of diversifying gas supply only highlights the structural dependence the EU 
member states have towards Russia gas exports. 
The Commission also underlines the interconnectedness of the energy markets 
between Russia and the EU member states drawing attention not just to the 
importance of Russia as an energy supplier for European countries but also the 
importance of the European market for Russia’s companies. 
Russia is the EU’s most important single supplier of energy products, accounting for 
over 23% of the EU consumption of gas and 30% of its total crude oil consumption. In 
turn, Russia’s economy remains highly dependent on the export of energy raw 
materials, with the EU as its most important destination. In 2010 63% of Russia’s 
exports consisted of crude oil, oil products and natural gas. The EU accounts for 88% 
of Russia's total oil exports, 70% of its gas exports and 50% of its coal exports.526 
In 2011 and 2012, when EU communications about external energy are low, EU-Russia 
summits continues to be a backdrop for energy discussions. In 2013, the 
communications indicate a shift in the conversation with Russia, following the launch 
 
524 European Union, "Joint Press Statement by Ministers and Representatives of Austria, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Greece, Italy, Romania and Slovenia and Vp Sefcovic," news release, 09 December 2014. 
525 Ibid. 
526 European Commission, "Eu-Russia Summit " news release, 15 December 2011. 
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of the EU-Russia Year of Science 2014. In these communications, Russia is framed as 
a “natural scientific partner”527 to the EU. Overall, the EU’s communications in this 
analysis mentioned nuclear energy in fifteen communications, and five of them 
mentioned nuclear as an area of cooperation with Russia. This cooperation includes 
political cooperation such as dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, nuclear safety 
strategies and R&D projects such as nuclear fusion through the ITER programme. As 
such, the EU frames Russia not only as a supplier of fossil fuels, but also an important 
partner in the field of energy science, and nuclear energy in particular. By comparison, 
discussions about Ukraine-Russia relations drop in visibility from 2011 to 2013. 
 
In French discourse 
France’s executive communications that deal with external energy focus less on 
Russia. When they do cover Russia, they often portray it as a minor actor. On those 
rare occasions when Russia is directly connected to energy issues, French 
communications frame it within the context of its relations with Europe: “it’s the 
inauguration of the Nord Stream pipeline in Germany that highlights the interests 
shared by Europe and Russia in terms of energy, and particularly in terms of energy 
security.”528 It seems that French executive communications deliver a message that 
Russia does not hold direct importance to France’s conduct of energy governance. Yet, 
France’s official communications do recognise Russia’s role in warranting stability of 
 
527 "Launch of the Eu-Russia Year of Science 2014," news release, 22 November 2013. 
528 François Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, suivie de questions - réponses 
sur le renforcement de la coopération bilatérale entre la France et la Russie, la crise de la zone euro, la 








The biggest energy concern about China that transpired from the analysis of both the 
EU’s and France’s communications is sustainability. This category of framing is the 
most associated with China in the two discourses. Both France and the EU view China’s 
action on reducing its carbon emissions as integral part of fighting global climate 
change. In a speech to the European Parliament, Miguel Arias Cañete, Commissioner 
for Climate Action and Energy, declared: 
“the EU only accounts for 10% of global emissions today. At least all the major and 
emerging economies must also come forward by the first quarter of 2015. The US and 
China announcement earlier this month should show that the EU's call is being 
answered by key players and hopefully will incite others to follow suit.”529 
This comparison between the EU’s and China’s carbon emissions is a leitmotiv in 
France’s communications. Natalie Kosciusko-Morizet declares in an interview in 
2009: “Because there is only one planet, because a tonne of carbon emitted in China 
has exactly the same impact on the climate as 1 tonne emitted by the European 
Union.”530 
 
529European Commission, "Speech at the Ep Plenary “2014 Un Climate Change Conference Lima”," 
news release, 26 November 2014. 
530 Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, "nterview de Mme Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, ministre de l'écologie, 
du développement durable, des transports et du logement, à Europe 1 le 9 décembre 2011, sur l'état 
d'avancement des négociations sur le changement climatique à la conférence de Durban.," interview by 
Brice Toussaint, Europe 1, 9 December 2011,  
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She adds on the EU: 
“The European Union in terms of climate change is extremely virtuous, it 
has action programmes, France fulfils its engagements towards climate change 
and international aid […] But if you look at the gas emission represented by 
Europe, its 11% of global emissions. So even doing its work, and Europe will 
do it, it committed itself to do so. You understand, 11% of global emissions 
won’t change the world, and so we need every other country to commit, even 
if at different levels […] in the fight against climate change.”531 
The use of words like “virtuous” is hardly innocent. It betrays the pride and 
significance the French actors place in the EU’s commitments to reducing carbon 
emissions. In this we can see an important narrative alignment between France and 
the EU, where their positions on sustainability and climate change is used to place 
themselves in a good light compared to their emerging partners. This is a narrative 
that is shared at the EU level, Andris Piebalgs, EU energy commissioner argues that 
“we are equally affected by the emergence of China and India as major energy 
consumers and the structural changes in the global energy market that this is bringing 
about.”532 As such, both the EU and France talk of coming to China’s aid to find 
sustainable ways to meet its energy demands. 
For the EU, cooperating with China on sustainable urbanisation seems to be a priority, 
particularly in 2013, when a number of communications centred on this subject. In 
this case, the EU renders the message that is not a ‘teacher’ or ‘saviour’, but a 
counterpart who is willing to learn from China: Subsequent Energy Commissioner 
 
531 Ibid. 
532 Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment." 
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Gunther Oettinger states “I am here because I hope we will be able to learn from each 
other: if there are solutions that work in China we should see if they can work in Europe 
– and vice versa.”533 
In contrast, France’s official communication focus heavily on nuclear energy. In a 
speech following the signing of an agreement between French nuclear companies EDF 
and Areva and China’s own CGNPC, Francois Fillon declares: 
“France is the country where nuclear is the most important in the world. 
China is the country building the greatest number of nuclear reactors. These 
choices assure us a strategic position, at a time when nuclear energy is in a 
renaissance. A strategic position in terms of environmental responsibility. 
Nuclear is a powerful source of energy that produces no carbon emissions. It 
is today the best way to marry economic growth to which both China and 
France are attached, and at the same time the fight against climate 
change.”534 
This statement makes it clear how France frames nuclear energy as contributing to the 
fight against climate change. While France is presented an obvious leader, China is 
portrayed as lagging behind on sustainability which is declared to be a way to achieve 
“environmental responsibility.” Francois Fillon then continues: 
“A strategic position also, in terms of know-how. Nuclear energy demands 
imperatively excellence. Excellence at every level: in the conception, in the 
construction, in the exploitation, and all the way until the dismantling of 
 
533 Günther Oettinger, "Smart City Subforum," news release, 21 November 2013. 
534 Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, sur la coopération nucléaire entre la 
France et la Chine, à Pékin le 21 décembre 2009.." 
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installations. This excellence cannot be acquired in a day: for us it is the 
result of experience that certifies the seniority of our commitment in this 
sector.”535 
And then he adds: “For France, it is an honour and we are proud to have been able 
contribute to China’s mastery of nuclear energy, through a partnership that was 
initiated almost 30 years ago.”536 
Thus, not only is France the purveyor of sustainability to China, but it also brings its 
excellence and experience to Chinese nuclear endeavours. Interestingly, the reason behind 
the need for excellence is never mentioned. 
France also talks, but to a lesser extent, of helping China towards sustainable 
development through renewables. Francois Fillon answers a question on the subject 
in a press conference and declares: 
“The totality of interventions in China by the French Agency for 
Development integrates the fight against climate change as a priority. […] 
French companies and particularly groups such as Schneider Electric, like 
GDF Suez, like Veolia or like EDF, which are groups that have recognised 
expertise throughout the world in terms of energy efficiency, are 
developing their presence on the Chinese territory; and on their side, we 
have noticed Chinese investments in sectors like solar energy or wind 
power.”537 







press conference in 2014, Laurent Fabius, Foreign Affairs minister declares: 
“What has been less noticed is the fact that China has set itself extremely ambitious 
targets in terms of renewable energy which has made China the biggest market for and 
biggest production of renewable energy. China, through a vision that is part of its 
tradition, transformed a challenge into an opportunity.”538 
 
6.5.3 India 
France has more communications mentioning India than Russia (Table 6.4). This is in 
large part due to the fact that, for France, India is a more important energy partner 
than Russia. French communications on external energy frame India in similar terms 
to China, particularly regarding its need for sustainability. Still there is one difference – 
there is more emphasis of India in terms of security of supply. This is, in part, a result 
of President Sarkozy’s visit to India and the subsequent agreement between the two 
countries on nuclear cooperation which was frequently discussed in the French 
communications in 2010. Importantly, many of these communications are intended 
for the Indian public as well as French audiences. A couple of communications were 
released jointly with the government of India. Some were declarations made by 
President Sarkozy in front of Indian public and French communities in India and his 
interview to the Times of India. A diverse pool of target audiences suggests that the 
narrative on France as a leader in nuclear energy field is intended not only for the 
domestic public in France, but for international audiences as well. 
 
538 Laurent Fabius and Martine Aubry, "Conférence De Presse Conjointe De M. Laurent Fabius, 
Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères Et Du Développement International, Et Mme Martine Aubry, Maire 
De Lille, Représentante Spéciale Du Ministre Pour Le Partenariat Pour Le Chine, Sur Les Relations 
Franco-Chinoises, À Paris Le 25 Novembre 2014.," news release, 25 November 2014. 
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In French communications about nuclear energy India, two important themes 
appeared: sustainability and India’s right to nuclear energy. Like with China, nuclear 
energy was framed as an instrument to help India add to its energy capabilities without 
increasing its carbon emissions. However, French communications also strongly 
asserted India’s right to nuclear energy following the lifting of restrictions on the 
import of nuclear materials and expertise. Arguably, the communications succeed in 
skilful linking of the concepts of sustainability, security of supply and right to nuclear 
energy. Nicolas Sarkozy during his visit to India alluded to these aspects, declaring: 
“We have signed agreements in terms of nuclear with two EPR, two first reactors on a 
list of six, which means that French nuclear technology will be powerfully present in 
India. And in the name of what, refuse a democratic country the right to access this 
clean source of energy that is nuclear energy? And how can we say to our Indian 
friends: ‘fight against pollution, preserve environmental balances, and at the same 
time we forbid you access to the cleanest energy source, namely nuclear energy.’ If we 
want the Indians to participate to the equilibrium of the planet, we need to give them 
the means of this participation. And I am pleased that all of the French nuclear sector 
has won these great achievements.”539 
Clearly outlined in this statement is the notion of rights associated with nuclear 
energy. Remarkably, France introduces itself as the defender of these rights numerous 
times. It also frames itself as a saviour of India in this context: 
 
539 Nicolas Sarkozy, "Déclaration Devant La Communauté Française, De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président 
De La République, Sur Les Relations Entre La France Et L'inde, À New Delhi (Inde) Le 6 Décembre 




“France, you know it, was the first advocate (lawyer) of India in the world on the 
question of nuclear energy. We were the first to act to get India out of its isolation that 
it was in since 1998 and to allow it to cooperate with others in this domain. We did it 
because India has always behaved irreproachably in terms of non-proliferation and 
because India needs civil nuclear energy, which is a clean source of energy, for its 
development.”540 
It seems the French official discourse around nuclear energy in developing countries 
goes one step further in India than in China. In China, as discussed above, France was 
bringing nuclear energy and thus assisting in the country’s sustainable development. 
In India, the narrative is of France who has come to the aid of India by helping it 
against the international community to open up its access to nuclear resources and 
technology. That is not to say the French politicians are completely unaware of India’s 
traditions and expertise in nuclear energy field. In another declaration in India, President 
Sarkozy states: 
“We are lucky that France and India are united by links going back to the 
beginning of the 20th century, when was conceived the first laws on 
nuclear and quantum physics. We are lucky that pioneers like Doctor 
Sarabhai for space or Doctor Homi Bhabha for nuclear, kept with their 
French counterparts privileged ties. It is thanks to these visionaries that I 
can come here, to Bangalore, to salute the excellence, Mister President, of 
our collaboration.”541 
 
540 "Déclaration De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président De La République, Sur La Coopération Franco-




Importantly, while this statement acknowledges India’s expertise in nuclear energy 
and space exploration, Sarkozy simultaneously put a claim for France’s part in India’s 
success. 
 
French official communication does mention other types of energy in relation to India. 
For example, India’s search to increase the share of renewable energy in the country. 
However, those were often very brief, passing mentions within larger contexts. They 
did not have the same intensity of focus as nuclear energy. Nuclear energy was often 
featured as the central subject of relations between France and India. It is little doubt 
that without it, India would have been less visible in France’s political 
communications. 
In contrast, in the observed period, the EU’s official communications referenced India 
in the context of external energy highly infrequently. India was presented as an actor 
in a minor focus of attention and rarely in a wider context of energy. 
 
6.5.4 Brazil and South Africa 
Finally, both Brazil and South Africa have little visibility in EU and French 
communications. They both got mentioned as minor actors in most cases. Only few of 
these mentions linked them directly to the subject of global energy matters but rather 
to the issues of sustainability and climate change. 
Brazil appeared a little more in the French communications due to Francois Fillon’s 
visit to the country in 2011 and Dilma Roussef’s visit to France in 2012. Unlike China 
and India, Brazil was presented as an example of an emerging country fighting against 
climate change. In 2009, at a press conference, Nicolas Sarkozy declared: “Emerging 
countries must, like Brazil, commit to reducing global emissions by 50% by 2050, to 
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reach peak emission as soon as possible, and make quantified commitments. 
Only two French communications explicitly referred to Brazil in the context of energy 
during Dilma Roussef’s visit to Paris. These communications stated that energy is 
sector in which Brazil and France should cooperate further and listed potential areas 
to deepen relations. In a joint statement, Francois Hollande and Dilma Roussef 
outlined: 
“The French and Brazilian Presidents, sharing the objective of a sustainable and 
diversified energy mix, feel that the energy sector offers great opportunities for 
a bilateral partnership. They highlight the quality of partnerships developed 
in the area of nuclear energy and commend the dialogue between the CEA 
and the la Commission nationale de l'Energie nucléaire (CNEN).”542 
The two presidents then further detailed cooperation in the nuclear energy sector, 
mentioning cooperation between EDF, GDF Suez and Areva on the one hand and 
Electronuclear and Electrobras on the other as well as the cooperation over the completion 
of the nuclear reactor Angra III.543 The statement then continued: 
They highlight the quality of industrial cooperation for electricity production, particularly 
hydroelectric and wind power production, and highlight the advantages of joint 
research of new technology in bioenergy for the promotion of sustainable development 
and fight against climate change. They invite companies to establish industrial 
partnerships and joint investments in offshore oil exploitation. They wish to encourage 
 
542 François Hollande and Dilma Rousseff, "Déclaration Conjointe De M. François Hollande, Président 
De La République Française, Et De Mme Dilma Rousseff, Présidente De La République Fédérative Du 
Brésil, Sur Le Partenariat Stratégique Franco-Brésilien, À Paris, Le 11 Décembre 2012.," news release, 




industrial partnerships and joint investments in the development of Brazil’s solar 
energy sector.544 
The energy section of the press statement concluded with the information about the 
partnership between EDF and Electrobras in Africa and South America mentioning 
more particularly a hydro-electric project in Mozambique and a project of 
interconnection between French Guyana and Brazil. It is important to note that this 
reference to energy relations between Brazil and France in French communications 
appeared only during Dilma Roussef’s presidential visit. On a more sour note, and as 
mentioned in previous chapters, cooperation over the Angra III reactor was halted in 
2014 because of financial difficulties. One might assume that France’s lack of 
enthusiasm in discussing energy cooperation with Brazil may be linked to these issues. 
Finally, South Africa appeared very little and is never discussed directly in the context 
of energy but rather as an interlocutor during the UN COPs. 
As is clear in Table 6.4, the visibility of Brazil and South Africa in EU communications 
is very low, as they are mostly mentioned as minor actors alongside other merging 
actors. As such there are no salient frames or narratives associated with these 
countries in EU discourse. 
 
6.5.5 The EU 
Sustainability is one of the major frames the EU uses to present itself along with 
politics. As mentioned, the political framing is associated with a large number of 
summits which are the focus of the EU’s communications. Sustainability on the other 





Commissioner Andris Piebalgs explains how the EU seeks to reduce emissions by 
compelling member states to increase the share of renewables in their energy mix and 
increase energy efficiency: 
“Member States endorsed new targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 
2020, rising to 30% in the framework of an international climate change agreement, and 
to increase the share of renewable energy in energy consumption to 20% by 2020, up 
from around 7%. They also called for a cut in 20% in energy demand by 2020. These 
objectives have become known as the 20-20-20 agenda.”545 
The mention of member states makes it apparent that they are willing to take part in 
policy making and setting objectives on sustainability. However, Piebalgs adds: “A year 
ago, the EU adopted a historic package of legislation to make the greenhouse gas 
emissions and renewable energy targets binding on the whole EU.” 546 By mentioning 
binding targets, he also establishes the EU’s authority. Sustainability is an area where 
the EU aims to take a leadership role, both over member states as the previous quote 
shows but also at a global level. Piebalgs argues: 
“The EU has already made its weight felt in the global climate change 
debate and is an important partner for energy consumers and producers 
across the world. All in all, the EU has a unique capacity to help the world 
shift towards a more sustainable and secure energy path.”547 
Security of supply is also an important frame for the EU with discussions of energy 
 






security. Talking about the EU’s role in global energy, Piebalgs argues that “The EU 
has been at the forefront of policies to tackle energy security and climate change head-
on.”548 
Even when it talks about all three of its energy policies categories, it places 
sustainability in first position. For example, a communication about the EU’s 2050 
energy roadmap begins thus: “The EU has set itself the goal to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to 80%- 95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The Roadmap explores how this 
goal can be achieved while at the same time improving the competitiveness and the 
security of supply.”547 As previously mentioned, security of supply is an often-used 
thematic frame when discussing relations with Russia. Gas supply is paramount to EU 
countries’ security of supply. When this gas supply is threatened by Russia’s 
cancellation of the construction of the South Stream project, the EU reinforces the 
need to diversify its sources. VP Šefčovič declares “We will now intensify our work with 
the Member States of the Central Eastern Europe and South-East Europe on the 
interconnection of the European markets and diversification of gas supplies.” He adds 
“These are the objectives of the future Energy Union, which is a priority of the new 
Commission.” These examples highlight the way the EU presents it three primary 
objectives as interconnected; sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness are 
all used in conjunction with each other. 
Discussion on the EU’s internal energy market is also an example of the interrelation 
of all three goals in EU discourse. One press release in 2015 on the progress made on 
the internal energy market quotes Canete: 





made in these few months but we should now move to full scale delivery of 
all actions needed. This will be my focus in 2016: presenting the legislation 
to make our electricity market work better, to further increase the share of 
renewables, to bring down our energy consumption and to ensure security 
of our gas supply. With this, the EU's energy system will be stronger and 
all conditions will be set for the EU's transition toward a low-carbon 
energy system."549 
He then goes on to discuss the role the EU will play at the UN COP 21 in Paris. 
These quotes indicate how the Energy Union, which is arguably primarily an internal 
policy, is framed within the international goals of security of supply and sustainability. 
It also highlights how the competitiveness frame has less implications for the EU’s 
external energy policy. It is above all a goal for the EU’s internal market rather than an 
issue of competition with other external actors. This is an important distinction 
between the EU and French discourse. For France, competitiveness is an issue largely 
associated with its nuclear energy industry which is in competition with that of other 
countries. 
France frames the EU primarily in terms of sustainability. It presents the EU as a 
leader in the fight against global climate change and places itself within this European 
umbrella. 
However, the discussion on the EU’s policies is not limited to sustainability. In a 
communication by foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius, talking about industrial 
development in France he argues: 





Union further supports industry. It is not a question of laying blame on Europe, but of 
overcoming the shortcomings of European policies in this area. All EU actions should 
be evaluated in terms of competitiveness. It should equip itself - as we propose – of a 
common energy policy.”550 
 
By adding the “as we propose” he makes asserts that rather than a policy ‘download’ 
from the EU level to the domestic level, the internal energy market is a French policy 
preference ‘uploaded’ to the EU level. 
 
6.5.6 France 
France presents in terms of sustainability and competitiveness. Sustainability is often 
linked to France’s role in the COPs. However, it is not the only context of discussion 
for sustainability. In a communication about international negotiations and France's 
positions on biodiversity and climate change, Minister of the Environment Delphine 
Batho announces: 
“Competitiveness remains a dimension of this debate, but it is not the only 
one: we have to reconcile the ecological objective of the fight against global 
warming and the economic objective of preserving the purchasing power 
of households whose energy bill are increasing. We must also take into 
account the issues related to the security of our supplies and the reduction 
of our trade balance deficit. All these parameters must be discussed.”551 
 
550 Laurent Fabius, "Déclaration De M. Laurent Fabius, Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères, Sur La 
Politique Industrielle De La France Et Sur La Diplomatie Économique, À Paris Le 6 Novembre 2013.," 
news release, 6 November 2013. 
551 Delphine Batho, "Déclaration De Mme Delphine Batho, Ministre De L'écologie, Du Développement 
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This quote reflects the three thematic frames of sustainability, security of supply and 
competitiveness and addresses their inter-connectedness. Thus, it mirrors the EU’s 
own narrative on sustainability. It should be noted that the rest of her communication 
refers heavily to the EU’s policies such as emissions targets. 
 
However, France does not see itself solely in as a recipient of sustainability narratives 
but also as a leader in Europe in its own right. Discussing the law on energy transition 
in an interview on French media, Environment Minister Ségolène Royale states: “This 
new French energy model […] has served as a reference, not only to Europe, but also, 
for example, during COP21.”552 
Additionally, as has been seen in the case of Fillon’s speech during his visit to China 
France’s nuclear energy is portrayed as a means to attain sustainability. Likewise, 
competitiveness frames for France are closely associated to nuclear energy. 
 
6.6 Instruments 
The final element of the narrative structure is the object or instrument used to perform 
an action. In the context of global energy governance, types of energy can be viewed as 
the tool through which actors engage with other actors. As has been discussed, types 
 
Durable Et De L'énergie, Sur Les Négociations Internationales Et Les Positions De La France À Propos 
De La Biodiversité Et Du Changement Climatique, À L'assemblée Nationale Le 28 Novembre 2012.," 
news release, 28 November 2012 
552 Ségolène Royal, "Interview De Mme Ségolène Royal, Ministre De L'écologie, Du Développement 
Durable Et De L'énergie, À Itélé Le 15 Décembre 2015, Sur Les Leçons Des Élections Régionales, Les 
Débats Autour De Nouvelles Façons De Faire De La Politique Et L'accord Conclu Lors De La Conférence 
De Paris Sur Le Climat.," news release, 15 December 2015. 
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of energy can be more or less associated with different actors since the tool and the 
action are inescapably related. Thus, as shown in Table 6.5, gas is the type of energy 
most mentioned in EU communications, and a type of energy closely associated with 
Russia. Similarly, nuclear energy is the most mentioned type of energy in France with 
India and China framed as important markets for French nuclear industry in the 
French official communications. 
Furthermore, the way each actor portrays each type of energy is revealing in itself. This 
section now turns to discuss the framing of the types of energy in two discourses of 
political communication. 
 


















EU 7 20 2 4 11 4 3 22 
France 23 9 16 15 35 13 11 57 
 
6.6.1 France 
French communications focus strongly on nuclear energy, particularly in 
communications from President Sarkozy and his Prime Minister Francois Fillon. In 
fact, there is a strong division in the way Sarkozy’s government discusses nuclear 
energy and the way President Hollande does. As discussed in previous chapters, their two 
respective parties campaigned for two opposing decisions regarding the role of nuclear 
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energy in France’s energy mix. Hollande’s socialist party wanted to see a reduction of 
the share of nuclear from 75% to 50% of the energy mix. Sarkozy on the other hand 
argued against this change. This important distinction in their energy policies is 
translated in the way they discuss energy. Overall, nuclear energy is mentioned 
throughout French communications on external energy 221 times. However, it is 
mentioned 174 times by Sarkozy’s administration versus 46 times by Hollande’s. This 
is clear evidence that nuclear energy was at the centre of Sarkozy’s government’s 
external energy policies. 
Importantly, both Francois Fillon and Nicolas Sarkozy often invoked the historical 
context in which nuclear energy was developed in France to justify their policies. To 
do so, they instrumentalised past presidents and their actions and placed themselves 
in the continuity of these decisions. For example, Francois Fillon in a speech on 
France-China relations in 2009 declared: 
“Truthfully, 40 years ago, when the general de Gaulle and later Georges 
Pompidou decided on the French electronuclear programme […] they 
didn’t do it because the market demanded it, they did it because at that 
moment they had the political will to provide our country of instruments, 
industrial tools, energy tools, that we continue to benefit from today, and 
that are a source of prosperity in France and in Europe.”553 
This leitmotiv of General de Gaulle, instigator of France’s greatness, is summoned by 
Sarkozy and Fillon a total of eight times. 
 
553 François Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Sur Les Grandes Orientations 
De La Politique Économique Et Sur Les Relations Bilatérales Entre La France Et La Chine, À Pékin Le 
22 Décembre 2009.," news release, 22 December 2009. 
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In this, we see how political psychology impacts the way in which political leaders talk 
about their policies and thus impact their narratives. The filiation with General de 
Gaulle is characteristic of many members of Sarkozy and Fillon’s party, Les 
Republicains, party which in an earlier life was founded by partisans of de Gaulle. After 
many rebrandings, the party continues to claim this lineage. 
Francois Fillon asserts his political allegiance to de Gaulle’s ideas and refer to himself 
as “gaullists.” In fact, Francois Fillon explains this assumed filiation in a speech about 
investment projects in the town of Saint Dizier and European integration: 
“And we554 are gaullists who have been able, I think, who have tried at least, to renew 
Gaullism, that is to say, inspire ourselves from a way of acting, inspire ourselves by a 
life ethic to adapt it to a situation that General de Gaulle never knew. And I say this 
because our Gaullism, […], isn’t a posture, it isn’t simply words that that sound good 
“to do like” General de Gaulle. It is an inspiration of principles, a way of life, a way of 
conceiving public engagement that we have tried to adapt to a completely new 
situation.”555 
His words highlight the imprint that General de Gaulle presidencies and persona have 
left on the psyche of many of France’s political class. 
Interestingly, Sarkozy has in the past rejected this idea of continuity with de Gaulle 
and claimed not to be a Gaullist. As pointed out by Gino Raymond, Nicolas Sarkozy 
 
554 Speaking of himself and Francois Cornut-Gentille, Maire of Saint Dizier at the time and member of 
the UMP (now les Republicains). 
555 François Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Sur Les Grandes 
Orientations De La Politique Économique Et Sur Les Relations Bilatérales Entre La France Et La Chine, 




declared in an interview in June 2008: 
“Me Gaulist? It’s not that simple. The General de Gaulle was a great man 
in June 1940, and later in 1958. In the first instance he gave us our honour 
back, in the second instance he gave us a constitution. But afterwards? 
What was his balance sheet? Let me laugh. What has he done exactly, apart 
from hanging on to power that was escaping his grasp? And frankly, it’s 
about time we were done with this legend.”556 
He no doubt later realised the power of the myth of de Gaulle in summoning ideas of 
French grandeur since he cites de Gaulle as an example in four of the communications 
gathered. These two examples illustrate the duality of narratives, between agency and 
structure and how politicians can use both in forming as well as repeating certain 
narratives. 
In 2011, at a time when they were campaigning against Francois Hollande, Sarkozy 
and Fillon also summon the memory of socialist president Francois Mitterrand, pitting 
his legacy against the socialist party’s decision to reduce the share of nuclear energy. 
When asked about the Greens and Socialist Party’s decision on nuclear by a journalist, 
Francois Fillon declares: 
“I remind you that when Francois Mitterrand was President of the 
Republic, the development of French nuclear continued in a climate that 
was a climate of consensus and that contributed to give France important 
competitive assets. So, it’s also a break with this period and with this sense 
 
556 Gino Raymond, "Sarkozy-De Gaulle: Recycling the Resistance Myth," French Cultural Studies 
24, no. 1 (2013). 
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of responsibility that Francois Mitterrand has embodied at the time.”557 
Likewise, Sarkozy in a speech asserts: 
“If George Pompidou and Valery Giscard d’Estaing made the major 
decision on our current nuclear energy capabilities, I’d like to point it out, 
because it’s true that 40 of the 58 nuclear reactors were linked to the grid 
under Francois Mitterrand’s two terms and that Francois Mitterrand 
himself launched the construction of 13 of these reactors. One recognises a 
man of State by his ability to place himself beyond partisan interest to 
make choices for France. President Mitterrand never put in question the 
industrial and nuclear heritage of his predecessors, because he was 
concerned with energy independence.”558 
It seems every president of France’s 5th Republic can be instrumentalised to prove the 
legitimacy of a government’s action. Doubtless, the memory of war hero and defender 
of France’s grandeur general de Gaulle is the most powerful one used, however 
invoking figures from the opposite political party adds to claims of by-partisan 
credibility. 
These examples clearly show how historical figures of France’s political class are used 
by right wing politicians to justify the choice of nuclear energy and place it as one of 
France’s great achievements. In some cases, this rationale goes further into placing 
 
557 Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Suivie De Questions - Réponses Sur 
Le Renforcement De La Coopération Bilatérale Entre La France Et La Russie, La Crise De La Zone Euro, 
La Situation En Syrie Et La Sécurité Nucléaire, À Moscou Le 18 Novembre 2011." 
558 Nicolas Sarkozy, "Déclaration De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président De La République, Sur La Politique 
Énergétique De La France Notamment En Matière D'énergie Nucléaire, À Pierrelatte (Drôme) Le 25 
Novembre 2011.," news release, 25 November 2011. 
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France above the rest of Europe in terms of energy policies. Francois Fillon, in a speech 
about France’s economy declares: 
“50 years ago, France chose to develop electronuclear capabilities. Today 
these capabilities insure us competitive electricity prices. There, for once, 
we are better than most European countries and that including our 
German friends. And most of all, it insures us a real energy independence. 
We do not rely entirely on gas pipes between Russia and Germany or solely 
on oil imports.”559 
He also adds a comment about the competitiveness of energy in France on the 
European scale at a time when energy prices were on the rise. 560 The quote highlights 
France’s friendly rivalry with Germany and in some sense, the country’s inferiority 
complex compared to its neighbour. It also shows how politicians perceive France’s 
energy policies compared to the rest of Europe and emphasise two arguments used to 
justify the choice of nuclear energy: competitiveness and independence. 
Additionally, as has been discussed in France’s nuclear relations with China and India, 
the use of nuclear is justified through the argument that it is low in carbon emission, 
an attribute that allows the French government to qualify nuclear energy as “clean.” 
So, for the French government under Sarkozy, nuclear energy can be promoted under 
a holy trinity of competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. 
That is not to say that Sarkozy’s government did not talk of other types of energy. Also 
prominent were renewables. However, unlike nuclear energy, they are often mentioned in 
 
559 François Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Sur L'avenir De 
L'industrie Automobile Française Et Le Financement Des Entreprises, À Sablé-Sur-Sarthe Le 25 




an external context, without France as a direct actor. For example, at the time of the 
Copenhagen UN COP, Jean-Louis Borloo talks about the concept of a green fund, 
whereby developed countries would provide others with aid to develop renewable 
energy. France places itself within a coalition of developed countries but is not at the 
centre of the action. Moreover, when renewables were discussed in the local context, 
they often appear alongside nuclear energy. For example, Fillon listed renewable 
energy along with fourth generation nuclear reactors as sectors of the future to be 
invested in. Likewise, Sarkozy declared in a speech in 2009: 
“The CEA has a technological know-how beyond compare in nuclear 
energy, but it allows us also, and it is less known, to appear in the top ranks 
of research globally in the solar energy, biofuels and energy storage. 
Tomorrow, I want it to deepen further this direction in favour of other low-
carbon energies. Because it is about respect the government’s commitment 
to absolute parity in the research effort between nuclear energy and 
renewable energy. The CEA will therefore become the Commission of 
Atomic Energy and of Alternative energies (CEA²)”561 
That is the important distinction between Sarkozy’s government and Hollande’s. 
Renewables until 2012 were somewhat of a secondary focus, often being 
overshadowed by nuclear energy. By contrast, the development of renewables became 
the centre of Hollande’s government’s energy policies and communications about 
global energy governance followed suit. For example, whereas Sarkozy and Fillon 
justified the choice of nuclear energy through the argument that it brought France 
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independence, Hollande makes the same claim about renewables. In 2014, he 
declared: 
“We are recognised as a world power. But if we look more closely, there is 
a weakness, we are dependent on our sources of supply of energy. France 
dedicates 65 billion euros in hydrocarbon imports every year. It’s the 
equivalent of our trade deficit. Diversifying our sources of supply, 
consuming less energy, producing renewable energy, means restoring our 
trade deficit and reinforcing our influence in the world, it means not being 
reliant on a few supply sources.”562 
Thus, there is a shift in the narratives over time where the means to achieve 
independence, both in terms of energy, but also politically, goes from nuclear energy 
to renewables energy and energy efficiency. Importantly, Hollande’s makes a self-
proclamation of France as a world power, a concept that has historically been tied to 
France’s nuclear capabilities. Here again we see a shift of narrative away from nuclear 
towards renewables. 
Finally, like Sarkozy and Fillon before him, Hollande used the memory of past 
presidents in order to justify his policies. In an interview on climate change and the 
Paris conference, Francois Hollande declared: “To paraphrase General de Gaulle, I 
would say that everyone will be ecologist or the world will no longer be.”563 And he 
mentions other past presidents later in the same interview: 
 
562 François Hollande, "Déclaration De M. François Hollande, Président De La République, Sur Les 
Efforts En Faveur De La Protection De L'environnement, À Paris Le 27 Novembre 2014.," news release, 
27 November 2014. 
563 "Interview De M. François Hollande, Président De La République, Dans "L'express" Du 24 
Novembre 2015, Sur La Lutte Contre Le Dérèglement Climatique.," news release, 24 November 2015. 
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“There is in the environmental field a French tradition. The President 
Valery Giscard d’Estaing was one of the first leaders to bring together, at 
the beginning of the 1970s, a conference around the Club of Rome report 
that questioned the dogma of growth at all costs. This awareness was then 
shadowed by the oil crises. Later, Francois Mitterrand personally 
committed himself in the preparation of the Rio conference. […] Then, 
Jacques Chirac, sensitive to the calls of Nicolas Hulot, pronounced a speech 
at the summit of Earth in Johannesburg, in September 2002: “Our house 
is burning and we’re looking elsewhere.” This sentence is still in all our 
memories. […] Finally, Nicolas Sarkozy was the instigator of the Grenelle 
de l’environment.”564 
To conclude, the focus on renewable energy is different between Sarkozy’s government 
and Hollande’s, however the context within which it is mentioned is often similar. 
Renewable energy is linked to the fight against climate change, both abroad and 
domestically. Often mentioned in tandem with energy efficiency, it is portrayed as an 
industry in development that creates jobs. Finally, fossil fuels are presented to have a 
bad reputation -- they do not enjoy the same kind of focus as nuclear and renewables. 
They are framed to contribute to pollution and demand extra expenses. 
 
6.6.2 The EU 
For the EU’s external energy communications, mentions of energy types are low (Table 
6.5). One can argue this is due to the nature of the EU for which energy can’t really be 





that the EU can export or import in the same way that member states do. Nevertheless, 
the EU still aims to have a voice on energy governance throughout its member states. 
Moreover, energy remains a tool for other actors that interact with the EU. And so, 
since Russia received much visibility as a strategic energy partner for the EU, gas is 
one of the most visible types of energy mentioned in EU communications. The most 
pressing issue for the EU with regards to gas is security of supply, a concept that 
appears often in relation to the type of energy. For example, in 2009, a press release 
on the EU’s gas supply after the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis argues: “The crisis also 
showed the vital role of gas storages and reverse flows as short-term crisis response. 
Therefore, the Commission suggests a common infrastructure standard to ensure the 
infrastructure for the security of supply.”565 However, the issue of security of supply does 
not appear only in the context of relations with Russia. In a press release on the 2012 
EU-US energy summit the issue is also one of the EU’s priorities: “the meeting will 
discuss EU/US co-operation to enhance energy security through the diversification of 
gas and oil supply sources and routes. This year there is also a focus on the regulatory 
frameworks that encourage more efficient use of energy sources.”566 
Finally, renewable energy is the other type of energy that the EU mentions the most. 
This is in part due to the role renewable energy targets play in reducing EU member 
states’ carbon emissions. However, the EU also portrays itself as a leader in this type 
of energy. In a statement following the 14th EU-India Summit in 2010, EU 
Commission President Barroso affirms: 
 
565 European Commission, "Gas Coordination Group Discusses the Gas Supply Outlook and the 
Emergency Preparedness in the Eu " news release, 14 December 2009. 




“We can do even more to exploit the enormous possibilities of green and 
clean technologies together, to the benefit of our citizens and businesses. I 
am in particular thinking about the potential of cutting-edge solar energy, 
on which European companies are world leaders.”567 
Renewable energy is a topic on which the EU and France seem to meet each other most 
strongly with climate change and economic growth both drivers of their development. 
A press release about the Energy Union states: “Renewable energies and energy 
efficiency are creating local jobs in Europe, requiring new skills.”568 Likewise a press 
release about the third Africa EU-Summit argues that “Renewable energy is emerging 
as a fundamental requirement for addressing the challenges posed not only by climate 
change, but also by the need to increase economic growth.”569 
In comparison to France, nuclear energy only has a small role in the EU’s discourse on 
global energy governance. Unlike France, it is not a narrative of competitiveness that 
is presented in relation to nuclear energy but primarily one of neutrality but also of 
safety. A press release on the Roadmap 2050 answers a question on the role of nuclear 
in the EU’s strategy. It states: “The EU Commission and the Roadmap 2050 is neutral 
on the question whether or not Member States should use nuclear power. It does not 
give a recommendation or a forecast on the future development of nuclear energy in 
Europe.”570 Likewise Piebalgs in his speech on energy in a global environment states: 
“It remains the case that Member States take the decision at a national level whether 
 
567 "Eu-India Summit in 10 December 2010 in Brussels," news release, 8 December 2010. 
568European Commission, "The Energy Union on Track to Deliver," news release, 18 November 2015. 
569 European Commission, "3rd Africa Eu-Summit 29/30 November, Tripoli," news release, 24 
November 2010. 
570 "The Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050." 
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to use nuclear power or not.”571 He adds however that new rules adopted by member 
states “make the EU the first major regional actor to apply legally binding safety 
standards based on the "fundamental safety principles" of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.”572 
 
 
6.7 Strategic narratives presented in French and EU 
discourse 
Having detailed the different narrative elements and their portrayals in French and 
EU discourse, the different levels of strategic narratives can be presented and 
compared. 
Table 6-6: Strategic narratives in EU and French political communications 
 
571 Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment." 
572 Ibid, 





• Global energy governance is 
largely dominated by states 
with bilateral relations the 
main background of external 
energy discourse 
• Fight against global climate 
change as a worldwide goal 
• Cross-cutting nature of energy 
with politics and economics 
serving the major themes 
• Energy as a competence 
shared between the EU and 
member states 
• Global energy governance is 
largely dominated by states, with 
bilateral relations focussed on 
energy diplomacy 
• Fight against global climate 
change as a worldwide goal 
• Energy as a competence 
primarily held by member 
states, but shared with the EU on 




• The EU’s three main energy 
goals (sustainability, security 
of supply and 
competitiveness) are inter-
related. 
• Sustainability is portrayed as 
the EU’s primary goal 
• It is followed by security of 
supply 
• Before 2012, France presented as 
a competitive nuclear energy 
actor 
• After 2012, France is a leader in 
energy transition both globally 
and at the EU level 
• The EU viewed as a leader in 
sustainability EU priorities 
(sustainability, security of 





• Both the goals of sustainability 
and security of supply can be 
achieved through the creation of 
an EU energy market 
• The EU is a leader in 
sustainability able to impose 
binding targets on EU member 
states 
• Strategic importance of Russia 
as an energy partner 
• China as a large carbon emitter 
that needs help to develop 
more sustainable forms of 
energy 
presented in the French 
political discourse 
• France is a competitive nuclear 
energy actor 
• China as a large carbon emitter 
that needs help to develop more 
sustainable forms of energy. 
Under President Sarkozy’s 
leadership this goes through the 
development of nuclear energy 
in China 
• India is a major market for 
France’s nuclear energy 
industry. France frames itself as 
a saviour and advocate for 




• EU competitivenessin 
renewable energy 
• Dependence on gas from Russia 
• Competitiveness in nuclear 
energy exporting 
• Security of supply and energy 
independence achieved through 
nuclear energy 
• Sustainability achieved through 
low-carbon nuclear energy 
• Use of nuclear energy heavily 




Table 6.6 shows that there is a relatively strong external convergence between the 
system narratives of the EU and France. There is a strong alignment in the perception 
of climate change as a worldwide goal. 
However, the nature of relations between states are somewhat different. For the EU, 
without any resources to export directly, political bilateral relations with 3rd countries 
are the background for energy discussions. However, energy discussions are rarely the 
central topic of discussion. For France, bilateral relations are an opportunity to pursue 
energy diplomacy and agree on energy export contracts with other countries. 
Moreover, while they both view energy as a shared competence between the EU and 
member states, they each perceive their roles in it differently. This narrative has 
implications for both system and identity narrative since it relates to the way they view 
the international order in which energy decisions are made but also their role in it. 
 
Identity narrative 
On identity narratives, there are narratives that are in alignment between the two 
actors and others that are not. Their views on sustainability are in a similar vein and 
France repeats the EU’s narrative strongly when mentioning the EU. It sees, the EU as 
a leader in sustainability and shares a similar view on the interconnectedness of 
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. Views of China as a negative 
actor in the fight against global climate change are overall in alignment. Both see 
themselves as having a role in helping China reduce its carbon emissions. 
However, under president Sarkozy’s leadership China’s need for sustainability is also 
framed as an opportunity for France to export its nuclear energy. Additionally, India 
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is framed as a market for nuclear energy. 
France does not share the same level of concern for Russia’s energy policies as the EU, 
while it recognises the strategic importance of Russia to the EU’s energy security as a 
whole it does not portray itself as threatened by it. 
 
Issue narratives 
Issue narratives are the area where French and EU narratives diverge the Most France 
issue narratives are largely focussed on nuclear energy. This changes over time with 
President Hollande’s leadership focussing more on energy transition and renewables, 
however this is a narrative that does not appear strongly in communications about external 




The EU has two strong narratives: its leadership in sustainability and its need for 
energy security. France recognises the EU’s leadership in sustainability and largely 
aligns its narratives to the EU’s in this area. However, the narrative of energy security 
if far less obvious in French discourse. France on the other hand has a narrative about 
nuclear energy where its system, identity and issue narrative align strongly. By 
comparison, the EU remains neutral on nuclear energy. This tends to show that 
strategic interests do indeed direct the way strategic narratives are formed. 
This chapter addressed the formation of strategic narratives in the EU and France. The 




 : Narratives of Global Energy 
Governance in French Newspapers 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter established the strategic narratives formed and spread by the French 
and EU executive branches of government. The purpose of this chapter is to present 
the narratives appearing in the French mainstream newspapers, leading and 
prestigious opinion forming voices of the nation. This chapter will discuss each 
element of narrative -- as established in Chapter 5—applying them to the analysis of 
the media texts. It will first discuss narrators, observed through the analysis of news 
sources of each article collected. Then, looking at the events discussed prominently in 
each period of observation, the chapter will establish the temporal context within 
which external energy policies were discussed in the French newspapers across 
political continuum. The scene is established through the analysis of the focus of 
domesticity – i.e. whether the main events of each article have relevance to and 
immediate involvement of the French actors (either elites or general public). Actors 
and their actions are discussed together since the two are inseparable from the other. 
In this regard, this chapter will also discuss the visibility and degree of centrality of 
each state actor as well as the thematic frames and evaluation used to present them to 
the news audiences. The chapter will also briefly discuss the presentation of non-state 
actors in the coverage. This chapter will summarise the ways energy types -- which are 
categorised un the rubric of “instruments “used in the narrative analysis -- are 
portrayed in the newspaper coverage. In conclusion, this chapter will establish what 
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main system, identity and issue narratives appeared in the French leading news media 
coverage observed in this research. 
 
7.2 Narrators 
There are, arguably, two narrators for each press article written and published. The 
first is obviously the news author who writes the piece, whether the journalist chooses 
to put their name to it or not. The second is the media source itself – a medium that 
publishes the article. Perhaps, this argument may sound somewhat controversial, 
since the act of making a narrative available is not the act of narration in itself. 
However, media organisations through the collective process of selecting, editing and 
publishing articles take part in shaping the narrative that appear in their publications. 
Therefore, in this chapter, both direct sources of articles as well as publications where 
these articles were published are identified as narrators. 
Figure 7.1 shows how French leading opinion-setting media outlets observed in this 
analysis rely, almost exclusively, on local correspondents and news agencies. Despite 
the alleged crisis of the press around the world, this profile of news sources is not 
surprising and indicative of the French prideful culture of journalism and press 
agenda-defining tradition in the society. Many articles in the sample were written by 
correspondents who are based in foreign countries long-term. Others are written by 
journalists sent specifically to foreign countries when particular events or stories are 
taking place. While this latter observation may seem mundane, it does indicate a 
certain level of importance French newsmakers assign to particular countries and 
events as they need to justify the resources invested. While newspapers do not always 
make a note of where their journalists are based, a quick look at the sample discussed 
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in this thesis shows that Le Figaro, Le Monde and Les Echos each have at least one 
foreign correspondent in Russia and China. For example, a total of 29 articles are 
written by Les Echos’ correspondent in Beijing, likewise, 17 are written by Le Monde’s 
Moscow correspondent. In addition, Le Monde sent a journalist to each of the COPs 
that took place overseas during the period of observation and Les Echos had a special 
correspondent at the Copenhagen conference. Finally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
Les Echos and Le Figaro each had journalists reporting from India in 2010 during 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential visit to the country. It is logical to suggest that 
journalists who are appointed to cover certain events/stories are some sort of experts 
in the subject that they report on. Yet, the editorial choice of a local, French, journalists 
to report from foreign locations also comes with a particular perspective. Almost all 
stories relating to global energy governance published by the three leading French 
newspapers were filtered through the prism of the local focus. This invites the first 
critical reflection of this chapter: while French journalists pride themselves in being 
just and neutral in their reporting, a French point of view seems to dominate their 












Figure 7.1: News Sources of the observed sample from the selected French 
Newspapers Coverage 
 
Foreign sources of the news are often comprised of experts and renown public figures. 
In 2009, Le Figaro published an article by Gazprom CEO, Alexei Miller, who 
commented on an agreement between EDF and Gazprom to cooperate on the South 
Stream project. In 2011, Le Figaro published an article written by Javier Solana, 
former EU official, as well as an article by Angel Saz-Carranza, an academic. These 
commentators talked about the climate conference in Durban and the need for a new 
system of global energy governance. In 2015, Le Monde published a piece by author 
Naomi Klein and Professor in Glaciology Jason Box commenting on the COP21 in Paris. 
Articles written by international journalists and the reprinted by the French newspapers 
came from highly respected newspapers such as the Financial Times or The Economist. 
Arguably, the top status/expertise of these foreign contributors adds to the overall 
messages sent by the leading French newspapers -- only proven foreign top experts on 
a topic get published. 
Figure 7.2 displays the number of articles analysed each year for each publication. It 
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shows that issues related to global energy are often more present in the business-
oriented Les Echos than in other three sources (those are more popular in their 
coverage). Not only the Les Echos’ numerous articles discussed energy from both political 
and economic angles, but they also analysed topic of energy in depth (more so than the 
other mainstream newspapers in this study). In 2009, articles in the context of the 
Copenhagen conference contributed to a high volume of articles related to energy. 
While the number of articles on energy natters dropped for the two other publications 
in 2012, Les Echos’ numbers went up. That year, many economic discussions in France 
were linked to energy. Recurrent topics in Les Echos in 2012 included reports about 
shale gas extraction in the US and Gazprom’s activities (including the launch of the 
South Stream project). Both these topics may have important repercussions for 
investors in the energy sector, and thus it is predictable that the Les Echos featured 
















Each newspaper had particular features to its coverage of energy matters. These 
caveats will be referenced to throughout this chapter. Importantly, these peculiarities 
set outlet- distinct contexts in which global energy governance is discussed. The is not 
to say that events don’t happen externally of the media but each publication discusses 
and attaches more or less importance to each event. 
 
7.3 Context - Events 
Figure 7.2 is the first illustration that reporting on external energy-related events 
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fluctuates over the years. This section details the most significant events reported each 
year and the ways they are reported on. Some recurring events or ongoing situations 
appear throughout this analysis and allow for an analysis of the evolution of the 
narratives over time. 
 
7.3.1 2009 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the French government attached a high level 
of importance to the COP in Copenhagen in 2009, with many official communications 
discussing it. It was clear that ahead of the conference there were strong expectations 
on world leaders to strike the accord and high hopes for the successful conclusions of 
the conferences. Le Monde’s editorial on the 7th December 2009 - reprinted in 54 
newspapers around the world -- concludes: 
The politicians in Copenhagen have the power to shape history's judgment on this 
generation: one that saw a challenge and rose to it, or one so stupid that we saw 
calamity coming but did nothing to avert it. We implore them to make the right 
choice.573 
However, the outcome of the conference was framed as a failure, particularly for the 
EU. On its front page, Le Monde publishes: 
While the EU appeared, before the Copenhagen summit, as the good student of the 
fight against global warming, its marginalization in the final stretch of the discussions 
- the text was negotiated between the United States, China, India, South Africa and 
Brazil - was all the more spectacular. Some, like France, seem to blame the EU, unable 
 
573 "A Copenhague, Faisons Triompher L'optimisme: Cinquante-Six Journaux Lancent Un Appel 
Commun Aux Chefs D'état De La Planète," Le Monde 7 December 2009 
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to be heard. Others believe, on the contrary, that it is the desire of the Heads of State 
and governments to put themselves forward that has weakened Europe.574 
Other newspapers share the sentiment that while the EU showed ambition and good 
will during the negotiations, it was side-lined by major powers who had other agendas. 
Gabriel Gresillon from Les Echos writes: “And the goodwill of the EU, ready to propose 
a reduction of 30% of its greenhouse gases, was of no use against China intractable on 
its sovereignty and Barack Obama who came without real proposals.”575 In Le Figaro, 
Alain Barluet argues that “Europe is virtuous but powerless.”576 
Other energy-related events got reported rather systematically. The situation in Iran with 
its nuclear programme for example was one of the most visible energy events. The Iran 
crisis is a good example to show the cross-cutting nature of energy topics. Actors in 
articles focussing on Iran take a range of political actions (such as high-level meetings 
and agreements) as well as economic actions (e.g. sanctions) to deal with energy in the 
context of security and military issues. Articles about Iran’ nuclear programme also 
highlighted the geopolitical importance of energy and often framed actions in the 
energy field in this context. The issue of nuclear proliferation was presented as an issue 
to be debated, argued and controlled by the international community. Among the 
BRICS, Russia and China were more visible in the reportage on the Iran crisis (more 
so that Brazil, India and South Africa). However, Le Monde did make a note of Brazil’s 
 
574 "Après L'échec De Copenhague : L’Europe Qui Pleure, L’OPEP Qui Rit," Le Monde 24 Décembre 
2009 
575 Gabriel Gresillon, "Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine au banc des accuses," Les Echos 21 December 
2009. 




effort to raise its profile on the issue. It reported on Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 
visit to Brazil and noted that the then President of Brazil Lula hoped to play a mediator 
role in the crisis. 
Also present in the coverage were energy diplomacy events with France in the spotlight 
of media attention. In late November, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin 
visited Paris. He came to sign and oversee agreements between Russia and France. One 
of the most prominent agreements among them focussed on the EDF’s involvement in 
Gazprom’s South Stream project. Le Figaro noted then that energy was one of the 
essential portfolios of the 14th intergovernmental seminar between the two countries, 
which was noted to be “by nature” economic and commercial.577 Arguably, the 
reportage on Russia’s energy diplomacy in France (both in Le Figaro and Le Monde) 
exposed a particular frame -- Europe’s energy dependence on Russia Other articles 
talked about the EDF the systematically talk about rival project -- the Nabucco 
pipeline. The two pipeline projects were framed in those articles as a contest, with 
France’s support for South Stream reported as potentially undermining the Nabucco 
project. Writing in Le Monde, Jean Michel Bezat states: “Like Germany and Italy, 
France sees no contradiction between a presence in two projects [North Stream and 
South Stream], which will increase its dependence on Russian gas, and its support to 
the European Nabucco pipeline project.”578 Equally conflictual frame was given to 
issue of the gas transit through Ukraine. It got mentioned in articles about Putin’s visit. 
In the same article, Bezat writes “the European Union no longer wishes to be taken 
 
577 Frédéric de Monicault and Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, "EDF et GDF Suez dans les tubes de Gazprom," 
Le Figaro 27 November 2009. 




hostage by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.”579 As will be discussed later, the 
metaphorical image of the war was frequently used by newsmakers when they covered 
Russia in the context of energy. This image has intensified when relations between 
Russia and Europe have deteriorated in the subsequent years. 
Around the same period, a delegation led by the Chinese Commerce Minister was also 
in the French capital to sign contracts, including the ones in the field of energy. These 
articles focused on economic aspects of relations and were much less political in nature 
than the news focussing on the Russian visit. Energy -- and more particularly nuclear 
energy -- often appeared as a secondary focus in those news items. At that time, 
France’s EDF, China’s nuclear energy company CGNPC and the Chinese Commerce 
Minster were expected to sign and confirm a 2007 cooperation agreement for the 
construction of two EPR nuclear reactors in Taishan. In the following month, the 
French PM, Francois Fillon, visited China furthering France’s energy diplomacy and 
this visit was widely reported by the French media. While articles about the visit 
focussed on a wide array of economic agreements, nuclear energy occupied a very 
visible position in the respective reportages. Often mentioned alongside Fillon (the 
leading French political actor) are EDF’s CEO Henri Proglio and Areva’s President Anne 
Lauvergeon (prominent leaders of the business circles in France). 
 
7.3.2 2010 
In the 2010 period of observation, one of the big energy events for France was 
President Sarkozy’s visit to India. Energy featured as a major theme of articles 





agreement. An initial bi-lateral agreement on the construction of two EPR nuclear 
reactors in Jaitapur by Areva was made in February 2009. Sarkozy took part in 
negotiating the terms of this deal which concerned not only the construction of 
reactors, but also the supply of nuclear materials including uranium. The articles 
reporting this negotiation stressed extensively the price of the nuclear contract -- 7 
billion euros – highlighting by this impressive amount the competitiveness of France’s 
nuclear industry. But all was not well for France’s nuclear giant Areva. Cracks started 
to show. Some reporters wrote that the sale might be the end of a dark period for Areva, 
others pointed out that the contracts remained in negotiations. The delays in the 
construction of the EPR reactors elsewhere started making into the news. 
Le Figaro and Les Echos each published multiple articles about Sarkozy’s visit to India, 
with the nuclear energy contract presented as either a major or secondary focus. In 
contrast, Le Monde published in the same period only one article about the 
presidential visit to India presenting a somewhat different view of the contracts. This 
article pointed out that the Indian press does not pay the same attention to the nuclear 
contracts. When the Indian media do look into them, they express some concerns over 
the safety of the reactors of the new generation. To be fair, this concern over nuclear 
safety was also picked up by Le Figaro - it reported on a Greenpeace protest against 
this deal in Jaitapur. 
Finally, the French newspapers reported Prime Minister Fillon’s visits to Moscow to 
promote a range of economic contracts. Among them was an agreement between the 







On 11 March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused the most important 
nuclear disaster of the last decade. This date does not feature within the period of 
observation in this study, but the media fallout from the event lingers throughout 2011 
and beyond. One of the main consequences of the Fukushima disaster is exacerbating 
Areva’s difficulties in confirming export contracts for its technologies. 
Interviewed by Le Figaro, the new president of Areva, Luc Oursel, remained confident. 
He declared that before Fukushima, his company hoped to see an increase of nuclear 
energy from 390 gigawatts (GW) globally to 690 GW in 2030. He claimed that since 
the incident, they had reviewed those numbers to 590 GW. He lists ongoing 
construction contracts for EPRs in the UK, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
Czech Republic, noting however that contracts with China and India have been 
suspended. He did not mention increasing delays in the construction of these EPRs. 
Yet, the media commentators were less optimistic. Le Figaro worried about potential 
job cuts in France, predicting losses between 1000 and 2700 jobs. This is despite the 
assurances from Minister of the Economy, Francois Baroin, that there would be no job 
losses. Le Monde reported on seismic risks in the Indian region of Jaitapur, 
highlighting the risk for future nuclear accidents. Looking externally, Les Echos is 
critical of Areva’s plans of selling 10 new reactors to China in the following five years, 
pointing out that leadership change in China could slow down any industrial contracts. 
The Fukushima events and French reaction to them coincide with an important 
political shift in France. The Socialist Party, led by Francois Hollande, is campaigning 
on the notion of energy transition and a reduction of nuclear energy in France. Indeed, 
while Hollande has declared his support for the construction of the EPR in 
Flamanville, a political agreement between the PS and the Greens detailed the closure 
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of 24 plants and the end to the exploitation of recycled uranium (MOX). 
Le Monde and Le Figaro came with distinctly different ways of reporting on this 
political issue. Le Monde explored the possibility of transitioning entirely away from 
nuclear energy. It reported on the safety risk of the EPR and the delays and costs of the 
construction site in Flamanville. In contrast, Le Figaro was more critical of Hollande’s 
political decision and reported on the government’s hopes to rescue Areva. Discussing 
the Socialist Party’s decision to partly transition away from nuclear energy, Frederic 
de Monicault writes in Le Figaro: “(The) UMP580 stigmatizes an ‘irresponsible’ 
decision that jeopardizes an entire sector of industry. In this context, for the 
government there is no question of Areva pulling back on the reins in France."581 While 
reports in both newspapers remained largely neutral in their tone, the two outlets 
transpired their respective political positions through the framing and choices of the 
voices commenting on the issue. 
 
7.3.4 2012 
In 2012, a visit from Dilma Roussef, the then president of Brazil, raises her country’s 
visibility in the French media. The coverage focussed explicitly on messages of political 
friendship and economic ties, leaving energy matters on the margins of the visit. This 
framing was in a stark contrast with the coverage of the previous political visits (of 
Russian officials to France and of French officials to India). Those reports dedicated 
much attention to the issues of energy diplomacy. 
 
580 The Union for a Popular Movement, Centre right party in France since re-named Les Republicains. 




As Russia launches the construction of its pipeline, South Stream reappears in the 
news coverage. However, in the 2012 reports, Russia’s actions were viewed with more 
suspicion than previously. In Les Echos, Benjamin Quenelle warned: “Russia is tightening 
its embrace on Europe a little more.” The metaphorical image expresses both the sense 
of a friendly embrace yet a suffocating grip. Meanwhile, an investigation by European 
Commission into Gazprom’s potentially uncompetitive practices elicited comments from  
Russian officials. They were reported bearing Russia’s threatening message of 
consequences for Europe if the company was to be sentenced. In doing so Russia was 
presented as “regaining the upper hand” in a power play with Europe.582 In parallel, 
multiple articles discussed the north-east route linking Europe to Asia through the 
Arctic. Le Monde in particular dedicated a long article about this navigational route. 
With climate change lengthening the season of sailability, the route has been 
increasingly used as an alternative to the Suez Canal. These climatic opportunities 
were presented as beneficial to Russian companies such as Gazprom exporting 
hydrocarbons from the Yamal peninsula. The author thus pointed of the profitability 
of climate change for Russia. 
 
7.3.5 2013 
In late November 2013, alongside the UN climate conference, Warsaw hosted the 
World Coal Summit. Irony was not lost on French newspapers. Articles in that period 
focussed on the viability of carbon capture to reduce emissions, particularly putting 
into question the cost of these technologies. Yet, the news acted as a reminder that 
 




Poland’s energy mix is highly dependent on coal and that the country can sow division 
in the EU’s climate change agenda. 583 Around the same time, a number of articles was 
published regarding pollution in China linked to the use of coal. These articles 
generally discussed the Chinese government’s response including shutting down 
factories, controlling traffic and reducing output goals of heavy polluting industries such 
as steel. However, they also described daily lives of people living in industrial towns in 
China and the effects of pollution on their health. These reports have succeeded in 
presenting a human-interest story about the use of coal. 
As mentioned earlier, 2011 was a critical year for Areva. The company was faced with 
the consequences of the Fukushima disaster and delays in the construction of its third-
generation reactors. In 2012, only one article focussed on Areva’s nuclear energy 
programme in the period of observation. It once again reported on Areva’s failure to 
meet construction deadlines and attract new clients and orders. Yet, in 2013, things 
started looking more positive with a contract to finish the construction of a nuclear 
reactor in Brazil. It is noted that these reactors are not EPRs and that instead of a new 
contract, it is the continuation of a contract signed by Siemens and suspended in 
1986.584 A few articles additionally pointed out that emerging countries continued to 
consider and secure nuclear energy supply to meet increasing energy demands. Some 
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The G20 meeting in Brisbane in November 2014 was the background for some 
discussions about energy. Two themes appeared alongside it -- the issue of climate change 
and ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. A number of articles mentioned the 
G20’s first time engagement in fighting climate change and detailed many countries’ 
position on the subject. India’s position was described as lukewarm. Articles 
mentioned that while the country had promised to reduce the carbon intensity of its 
GPD, the country was unwilling to sacrifice its economic development. Nevertheless, 
its decision to develop solar energy and halt imports of coal from Australia were 
assessed positively by the French media. India’s ability to act on the threat of climate 
change was at time weighed against China’s, arguing that China has more means to 
act. With that said, China’s engagement was noticed in a positive light. Ahead of the 
G20 meeting at the APEC meeting, President Xi Jinping made an agreement with the 
US aiming at reducing emissions. One journalist in Le Monde wrote that it was difficult 
for reluctant countries such as Australia and Saudi Arabia to resist the inclusion 
climate change in the G20’s final statement when faced with a united front from the 
US and China. 
However, the most discussed topic regarding the G20 was Russia’s conflict with 
Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea which took place earlier in the year. Once again, 
energy was portrayed as a geopolitical instrument used by Russia to further its strategic 
interests. Strategic interests that are seen to go further than Ukraine. One article 
detailed Angela Merkel’s concern over Russia’s actions. It mentioned: “Russia would 
seek to use the money from gas to force Belgrade to come closer to Moscow’s positions. 
The construction of the South Stream pipeline is an economic pressure instrument on 
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the whole region. Bosnia-Herzegovina but also Bulgaria are under this menace.”585 The 
prevalence of war and conflict metaphors is to be noted here, particularly since the gas 
pipeline not only described as an instrument of influence but also as a weapon. 
Tensions between Russia and Europe are discussed beyond the context of the G20 and 
so are metaphors of war. Talking about sanctions between Russia and Europe, 
Dominique Fache’s article in Les Echos is rife with metaphors of gambling (with death) 
and war (specifically, the cold war). His introducing sentence reads: 
“Between the game of bluff of gas negotiations and the Russian Roulette 
speculating on the rounds in Vladimir Putin’s barrel, […] the least we can 
say is that we are nearly reaching zero degrees in our relations with 
Russia.”586 
The rest of the article was as rich in metaphors about Russian-European relations: consider 
“energy weapon”, “gas conflict” or “arm wrestle.”587 Other articles used similar 
metaphors, yet with less intensity and density. 
In early December 2014, Vladimir Putin and Alexei Miller, President of Gazprom, 
announced the end of the South Stream project. Putin was reported to blame Europe, 
declaring “if Europe does not want to realise it, then it will not happen”588 and “since 
the European Union has adopted a negative position, preventing the project from 
coming to fruition, we will find other clients. It is up to our European friends.”589 
 
585 Nicolas Barotte, "Angela Merkel s’inquiete pour les Balkans," Le Figaro 17 November 2014.b 
586 "Energie : du poker menteur à la roulette russe," Les Echos 21 November 2014. 
587 Ibid. 
588 Veronique Le Billon et al., "South Stream : pourquoi Moscou stoppe son projet," Le figaro 02 
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Importantly, articles in all French newspapers under observation portrayed it as a 
political failure for Putin. Jean Michel Bezat in Le Monde wrote: 
“Wasn’t South Stream launched in 2007 to nip in the bud the Nabucco 
pipeline project defended by the European Union? And wasn’t it Brussels, 
menacing to sanction member states that were willing to welcome a part 
of the pipeline, that turned the situation to its advantage and forced Putin 
to throw in the towel?”590 
Other journalists pointed out that in fact the project had been blocked by the European 
Commission which disagreed with the monopoly Gazprom would hold on the use of 
the pipeline.591 The EU was presented as a secondary actor in these articles. Some 
articles, as was shown, viewed the cancelling of South Stream as the EU’s victory. 
Others reminded their audiences of the EU’s needs for energy security. On this subject 
however, Budget Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva was quoted in two articles 
saying: “Russia’s decision to stop South Stream and the way this has been decided 
confirms how much the diversification of sources of supply is important for Europe.” 
592 
One thing that was blamed for Russia’s decision to abandon South Stream was falling 
oil prices. Articles argues that with its economy dependant on the export of 
hydrocarbons, Russia was affected by the drop in prices. It would no longer be able to 
continue an expensive project such as the South Stream. Some articles claimed that 
some in the higher echelons of the Russian government saw the US and Saudi Arabia’s 
 
590 Jean Michel Bezat, "Gazprom : baisse de pression pour le géant russe," Le Monde 03 December 
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hand in declining oil prices as a way to weaken Russia. Hélène Despic-Popovic in 
Liberation noted: “like with every setback, leaders in Moscow, even at the highest 
level, favour conspiracy theories.”593 In her article titled, “The Kremlin with clay 
feet”,594she described brittle state of affairs for Putin faced with western sanctions. 
It was clear however that predictions made in 2011 about fracking came to pass. 
Production of shale gas in the US did indeed disrupt the global economy with oil prices 
falling 40% from spring to autumn 2014.595 
 
7.3.7 2015 
With the COP21 taking place in Paris, the most discussed topic in the 2015 period of 
observation was climate change. In fact, 43.9% of articles that referenced energy in 
2015 mentioned climate change. Comparatively, during the 2014 period of 
observations, less than 20% of articles with energy references mentioned it. This was 
despite fears that the 13th of November terror attack in Paris and its aftermath would 
overshadow the climate conference. With climate change so prominent, the 
newspapers initiated prolific discussions about renewable energy and development of 
new possible applications. Many articles on energy envisioned what the future may look 
like, both in terms of technological innovations but also in terms of the effects of 
climate change. 
With the launch of the International Solar Energy Alliance during the summit, India 
 
593 Hélène Despic-Popovic, "Russie, le Kremlin aux pieds d’argile," Liberation 21 November 2011. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Rabah Arezki and Olivier Blanchard, "The 2014 oil price slump: Seven key questions," VoxEU, 
January 13 (2015). 
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took a position of leadership in climate negotiations. Joel Cossardeaux commented: 
“India will federate the solar energy demand of the South.”596 For French journalists, 
this position of leadership means standing up to developed countries regarding their 
climate responsibility. The reported commented that the narrative regarding the duty of 
developed countries to reduce their emissions to a higher degree than developing 
countries was prevalent in all climate negotiations, but this position of leadership was 
usually reserved to China. 
Finally, oil prices in 2015 remained low. Whereas in 2014, this drop in prices was 
attributed to the development of shale gas, in the 2015 reportage it was seen as a 
strategy from oil producing countries, and in particular Saudi Arabia. Fabrice Node-
Langlois argued: 
“Saudi Arabia assumes responsibility for letting prices go. It wants to 
preserve its market share and hopes that its competitors will end up 
closing their wells and freeze their investments in shale gas deposits in the 
US, deep-sea oil in Brazil or Russia’s far North – that are only profitable 
above 50, 60 maybe even 80 dollars a barrel. By comparison, Saudi 
Arabia and other gulf countries like Iraq, possess giant deposits, with easy 
access, where a barrel can be extracted for 20 dollars if not less.”597 
So, while oil prices were generally seen by journalists as an economic indicator, they 
took on a political dimension when prices were seen as being manipulated or when 
their fluctuations have a particular impact on countries. More will be discussed on this 
 
596 Joel Cossardeaux, "L'Inde lance son alliance en faveur du solaire," Les Echos 01 December 2015. 




later in this chapter. 
This chapter will move on to briefly discuss the setting of the articles analysed – 
another key element in the narrative analysis. 
 
7.4 Scene – Focus of Domesticity 
In addition to a temporal setting discussed in the previous section, narratives also 
include a scene. The analytical concept of the focus of domesticity allowed this 
research to systematically evaluate the category of the scene. The concept led to 
establish whether the action in each article takes place locally (in France), in the EU 
(either in a member state other than France or at a more general EU level), or outside 
Europe in a specific country, or at a global level. Figure 7.3shows that global energy 
reporting by the three French newspapers concentrated largely on actions presented 
to take place externally. This is hardly surprising since this research is concerned with 
global energy governance. However, it tends to show that journalists see an interest for 
world news among readers. Finally, a global positioning of actors also betrays France’s 
self-perceptions of being a global leader and taking charge in global events. France was 
observed as an actor in 22.8% of articles which located the reported action in third 
countries and 28.2% of articles in a global setting. Additionally, even when France as 
a country was not mentioned, local non-state actors may still be in the reportage in 
some capacity. The patterns in assigning domesticity to the reports on energy was 
largely similar in Le Monde and Le Figaro. In contrast, Les Echos had a different 




Figure 7.3: Focus of Domesticity in the observed French Newspapers (2009-2015) 
 
In local, French-specific coverage, China was by far the most cited external actor, 
appearing in 63.9% of articles that focussed on local French energy-related events. For 
the majority of these mentions, China appeared as a minor actor. However, when 
China was presented as a major or secondary actor in the article that had a local, 
French ‘hook’, China most often appeared as a competitor to France in the area of solar 
energy, an investor into local French renewable energy sector, or a France’s customer 
of nuclear energy. More on this will be discussed further in this chapter. The other 
BRICS were typically discussed in a more ‘distant’ mode -- in the third country context 







7.5 Actors and Actions 
7.5.1 Visibility 
Looking at actors and their actions in the media coverage, the first indication of their 
perceived importance to the topic of global energy governance is their visibility. 
Visibility is assessed through two means: volume of coverage – the number of times 
an actor is mentioned – and degree of centrality. Through the degree of centrality, this 
research assesses whether the actor mentioned was a major focus of the article, 
secondary, mentioned on equal footing to other actors in an article or minor, a fleeting 
reference often just a sentence or within a list of actors. Figure 7.4 presents both the 
volume of coverage and the degree of centrality of the BRICS as well as the EU and 
France in the French newspapers observed. 
Strikingly, China is the most mentioned actor, followed by Russia. It is important to 
note however that the proportion of stories that presented Russia as a major actor was 
higher than stories that reported China as a main actor. There are 142 major China 
articles representing 19.6% of all articles mentioning China. In comparison, there are 











Figure 7.4:Visibility of Actors in French Newspapers (2009-2015) 
 
Following Russia, France is the third most visible actor in the observed sample. This 
marks a significant difference between the media discourse representations of the 
global energy matters and the executive power’s discourse. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, political narrators (French and EU executive branches) placed themselves at 
the centre of the actions discussed. Within the media discourse, however, France and 
the EU are place third and fifth in terms of visibility respectively. It should be noted 
that French actors were often mentioned without the direct mention of ‘France’. 
making the country more present in the coverage than would appear in Figure 
6.1French communications word frequency cloud. India is the fourth most mentioned 
actor, just ahead of the EU. There is a distinction with the French political 
communications which placed India as the third most visible actor after France and 
China and ahead of Russia. The volume of coverage of the EU is low. However, it is 
worth noting that the proportion of major (19.8%) and secondary (39.7%) is relatively 
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high. As in the political executive communications observed in the previous chapter, 
Brazil and South Africa are the least visible actors. 
 
7.5.2 Thematic Framing 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (literature review), the EU established three priorities for its 
external energy policies, namely: competitiveness, security of supply and 
sustainability. Part of this research sought to establish whether news coverage in 
France about global energy governance would match these priorities. In other words, 
this chapter traces whether the leading newspapers in France frame the issues of global 
energy governance within those frames. The analysis detailed below shows that energy 
could be framed within a political or economic context, outside of these categories. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, types of energy can be economic indicators (e.g. oil 
prices) or can be the subject of political negotiations (e.g. nuclear negotiations with 
Iran). Figure 7.5 presents the list of the thematic frames detected in the coverage of 
global energy governance matters in France and distribution of thematic frames for 












As shown in Figure 7.5 the most predominant thematic framing for China in media 
coverage was sustainability. This recalls results from the previous chapter where 
issues of sustainability were also dominant in political communications of both France 
and the EU. With the COPs taking place during the period of observation, this is not 
surprising. A large proportion of thematic frames of sustainability came with minor 
profiles in the news texts. These are not immaterial since China is often noted in 
passing as one of the world’s biggest polluters, often grouped with the US and India. 
When looking specifically at articles where China was cast as a main actor, the 
proportions of Competitive (40), Security of Supply (44) and Sustainability (40) 
frames becomes rather balanced. 
It is also worth noting that economics was a more prominently used thematic frame for 
China than politics. While China was present in negotiations of some political nature 
(such as negotiations with Iran), on the whole it is presented by stressing its economic 
might more than its political power. 
Russia was largely portrayed as a competitive to France actor in the global energy field. 
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This is largely linked to its position as an energy producer and exporter. Importantly, 
the prevalence of the competition frames remains when looking specifically at articles 
where Russia is a main actor. As was seen in the section ‘Events;’ above, the Russian 
gas company is often framed as an agent of Russian energy in French media and is 
closely associated to the framing a competitiveness. In an article about Gazprom’s 
acquisition of a German company’s gas storage facility, Jean-Michel Gradt wrote in 
Les Echos: “Gazprom continues push its pawns in Europe, a zone where the Russian 
giant seeks to impose its domination on imports.”598 
While much of Russia competitiveness in energy is focussed on Europe, Russia’s 
eastern contracts were also observed. Looking at a deal between China and Russia for 
the construction of oil and gas pipelines between the two countries, Massimo Prandi 
wrote that it will be “a contract that would allow Russia to diversify its sales outside of 
Europe.”599 He later adds that “China could quickly become the main market for 
Russian oil.”600 
Importantly, it should be noted that proportionally Russia is framed more as a political 
actor than China. These frames are often observed in the coverage of Russia’s actions 
towards Ukraine. As has been discussed, gas is often portrayed as an instrument of 
pressure in Russia’s international politics. 
Much like China, India’s framing in French media is largely centred around 
sustainability. Once again, the COPs may influence the prevalence of sustainability 
issues in the observed coverage. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that India is 
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the country most associated with this type of framing. It is often pointed out that India 
ranks third in terms of global carbon emissions behind China and the US. Yet, some 
articles point out that per capita, India’s carbon emission are below the global average. 
The situation in India is seen as an example of the tension between reducing carbon 
emissions and allowing for development through the democratisation of access to 
energy. For example, an article in Le Monde argued: “India, third global polluter, 
defends its right to development.” It continues: “India, whose growth exceeded that of 
China in 2015, still has 300 million poor people who do not have access to 
electricity.”601 The article as a whole, focusses on India’s position at the COP21 and 
claims that the biggest challenge in the conference are divisions between North and 
South. China and India have displayed similar positions regarding the responsibility 
of developed countries to tackle climate change. Yet, while this position in China is at 
times seen as hypocritical since China’s development is portrayed as almost complete, 
it is better understood from India. Thus, India is portrayed as a more legitimate leader 
of developing countries. 
Like China, India’s sustainability framing can be somewhat misleading. When 
controlling for the degree of centrality of India in news articles, security of supply (25) 
becomes a more important frame in articles where India is a main focus and 
sustainability (14) is less often used. India’s rising demand for energy is often 
mentioned and with it its ambitions in increasing the share of renewable energy in its 
energy mix. However, it is not renewable energy that is most associated with India’s 
security of supply framing, but nuclear energy. President Sarkozy’s visit to India in 
 
601 Simon Roger and Julien Bouissou, "COP21 : l’opposition Nord-Sud, clé des négociations," Le Monde 
30 November 2015. 
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2010 to promote cooperation between India and France appears prominently in the 
media coverage observed, and with it, India’s demand for nuclear energy. Fabrice 
Node Langlois writes in Le Figaro at the time: “Nicolas Sarkozy reminded us of it, the 
Indian giant’s thirst for energy is colossal.”602 
Brazil’s framing indicates that sustainability is a dominant framing overall. Yet, in 
articles where Brazil was reported as a main actor, competitiveness was Brazil’s most used 
frame above sustainability. Competitiveness frames for Brazil refer to the country’s oil 
resources offshore. Anne Feitz writes: “Thanks to the discovery of giant deposits off its 
coast, Brazil could become one of the future oil heavyweights of the planet in the not 
too distant future.”603 
South Africa’s security of supply and sustainability media frames relate to the reality 
of its dependence on coal and its attempts to diversify its energy mix both through 
renewables and nuclear energy. Sophie Bouillon in Liberation summarized this: “At 
the Durban Summit, South Africa is showing its willingness to reduce its CO2 
emissions. But its urgent electricity needs require massive use of fossil fuels and nuclear 
energy.” 604 She later added, “South Africa is a case study to illustrate the energy paradox 
of emerging countries. Like its fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China), South 
Africa is a glutton that urgently needs abundant and affordable energy.”605 
The EU was the actor least framed according to the energy trifecta (competitiveness, 
security of supply and sustainability) with economic and political frames taking a 
 
602 Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, "Une puissance atomique forte de vingt réacteurs et maîtresse de sa propre 
filière," Le Figaro 06 December 2010. 
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larger share of its framing. This is significant since these categories come from the EU’s 
own vision of its external energy policy. Of these categories, competitiveness was the 
frame least used. For the EU, competitiveness goes through establishing an integrated EU 
energy market. While there is no doubt this is covered in French newspapers, rarely in 
association with the BRICS and therefore does not appear much in the observed news 
coverage. It is fair to say that it is therefore not viewed as an instrument of foreign 
policy for the EU in the eyes of French media. The EU investigation into China’s alleged 
dumping of solar panels in Europe was most often the topic of discussion under which 
the EU is framed in terms of competitiveness of energy. This is in part due to reporting 
on China’s response to the investigation which accuses the EU of subsidising its solar 
energy industry. 
The EU’s security of supply was most often put into question in relation to its 
dependence on Russian gas. This has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
sustainability framing had most to do with the EU’s role in the COPs. 
Political summits such as EU-Russia summits or negotiations on the fate of Iran’s 
nuclear programme account for much of the political framing of the EU. Meanwhile 
economic frames appear with stories mentioning the effects of oil prices on the EU’s 
economy. 
Along with Russia, France has the highest proportion of competitiveness framing. 
With many articles focussing on France’s energy market this is hardly surprising. 
Nevertheless, France takes pride in the competitiveness of its energy. This is best 
displayed in 2012 in articles discussing a world barometer for the quality of energy. In 
the study by KPMG and the Choisel Institute France ranked 9th overall and came in 
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first position in terms of competitiveness of energy.606 Les Echos introduced the 
subject in the following way: “We will not deny our pleasure to see France for once, 
ranked first in the world in a record of competitiveness.”607 It adds: “it should be 
pointed out that this performance is linked to our "important nuclear fleet", 
inconvenient but essential truth.”608 Likewise in Le Figaro, Fabrice Node Langlois 
writes: “This gold medal is ‘the consequence of a large nuclear fleet;. The result of this 
barometer of ‘the energy competitiveness of states’ […] will not fail to fuel the debate 
on the energy transition that is to be kicked off Thursday. It will strengthen the 
defenders of the atomic park of EDF and make tense those who want to reduce the 
weight.”609 These quotes are also a reminder of the politicisation of nuclear energy 
from 2011 onwards which will be discussed further in this chapter. 
However, it should be noted that nuclear energy figures prominently in France’s 
relations with other actors such as India and China where France’s competitiveness in 
nuclear energy is employed to help these countries reach their rising energy demand. Alain 
Barluet in Les Echos writes: 
“Paris does not hide that cooperation in nuclear power is one of the ‘main 
beams’ of its partnership with India. In Bangalore, on Saturday, the 
President recalled the enormous energy needs of India. He also cited the 
example of France (which draws 80% of its electricity from the atom) and 
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stressed that the two countries share the belief that nuclear provides ‘an 
unparalleled response’ to the challenge of energy security.”610 
France’s second most visible Frame is sustainability. This is largely associated with the 




While the above framing helps establish the nature of each actors’ actions that were 
picked up in French newspapers, this research also seeks to assess the evaluation made 
of these actions. Figure 7.6 presents the evaluation of each actor. 
Figure 7.6: Evaluation of Actors in French Newspaper Coverage 
 
 
While overall the coverage remains largely neutral, China has one of the highest 
 
610 Alain Barluet, "Nicolas Sarkozy mise sur le nucléaire civil en Inde," Le Figaro 06 December 2010. 
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proportions of negative coverage along with Russia. China’s lack of sustainability and 
high levels of pollution are often the targets of these critiques. Much of this negative 
coverage is about China’s continued use of coal as an energy source. In an article titled 
“China, ailing from its coal”, Patrick Saint-Paul writes: “In the Shanxi region, coal 
continues to reign, in spite of Beijing’s pledge in favour of the climate. The paradox of 
China’s development model has reached its height: though this industry is a health 
malediction, it is also a benediction for corruption and the job market.”611 
Additionally, China’s stance in climate negotiations is not always seen in a positive 
way. 
Reports are often mentioning China’s high rate of atmospheric pollution and carbon 
emissions. As was mentioned earlier in the ‘Events’ section of this chapter, the 
pollution resulting from coal consumption adds to also a negative evaluation for China. 
The EU’s investigation into China’s solar panels was also presented as a point of 
contention in French newspapers. Anne Feitz in Les Echos writes: “Brussels has 
opened anti-dumping and anti-subventions investigations. The Chinese have rolled over 
Europe’s [solar] industry.” 612 
Portrayed as resource hungry, China’s territorial claims in the South China sea were 
not introduced positively in the French media. In Le Figaro, an article titled “South 
China Sea, Beijing positions its pawns in the oil war” discussed a quarrel between 
Vietnam and China regarding oil exploration in disputed waters. 
There were fewer positive mentions of China than of other BRICS. When the positive 
evaluations surfaced, many of these related to economic opportunities for France in China. 
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Efforts in sustainability did not go entirely unnoticed in the French media. An article 
discussing China’s increase in wind power capacity brought together both of these 
themes: “The Chinese market makes Western wind power actors salivate.” 613 
Figure 7.6 shows the evaluation of Russia in the French media coverage. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, media portrayals of Russia have evolved over time with Russia 
being viewed increasingly as a threat for Europe. The European Commission’s 
investigation into Gazprom and the termination of the South Stream project were 
firmly linked by the media writers to themes of suspicious moves by Russia. 
Additionally, falling oil prices and western sanctions in the context of Russia-Ukraine 
conflict invited media in France to question Russia’s ability to balance its books. 
 
With the climate negotiations taking place during the period of observation, Russia’s 
presence in the COPs has also been criticised. Laurence Caramel in Le Monde write: 
“Where has Russia gone? Since the beginning of the negotiations the third most 
polluting country in the world has been literally invisible.”614 After describing Russia’s 
lack of involvement in the Copenhagen conference, she concluded: “Given the energy 
waste of this major oil and gas producer, Russia has enormous margins for energy 
savings and could do much better. But the political will is not there.”615 
On the positive side, some articles argue that Russia’s economic power is 
underestimated and that France should seek to develop commercial links with Russia. 
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For example, in an article about French investments into Russian energy companies, 
the CEO of Total was quoted: “Vladimir Putin wants to bring in foreign companies. […] 
In this way, the Russians don’t hold everything, on the contrary, it is about winning 
together.”616 It should be noted that the majority of ‘positive’ and ‘between positive and 
neutral’ articles (45) were published in 2009 (26) during Putin’s diplomatic visit to 
France to various contracts. 
India, along with South Africa, was the actor with the most neutral coverage (Figure 
7.6). India’s opposition to binding targets on the reduction of carbon emissions on the 
grounds of development was at occasionally presented from a negative standpoint in 
the observed French newspapers. Its dependence on coal was also occasionally seen in 
a negative light. However overall, the four French newspaper featured very few 
criticisms of India regarding its energy policies. Yet, there were only a few positive 
mentions of India. Its economic development and power were occasionally lauded, as 
a reminder that India should be counted as a “great power.”617 
Within the BRICS Brazil was the country the least negative in the reportages. Its 
willing attitude in the COPs earned it a few positive mentions and newspapers did 
recognise its economic power and the fact that thanks to offshore oil supplies, the 
country is set to become an “oil heavy weight.”618 Meanwhile, South Africa’s coverage 
was neutral for the most part. Its dependence on coal and resulting pollution earn it a 
few negative mentions. 
The EU was the most positive actor along with France. This evaluation was most 
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typically in the reports on the EU’s role in the COPs, leadership role foremost. Overall, 
the EU was presented to be making a positive contribution to the fight against climate 
change and described often as an example to follow. The metaphor of a “good pupil” is 
one that was recurrent for the EU is this area. 
As discussed, France’s competitiveness is a point of pride in France and newsmaker 
generally assigned positive evaluations to France when it was concluding partnerships 
with other world powers such as China, Russia or India in the energy field. And 
echoing and paralleling the findings of the political discourse analysis, media reports 
framed France as a saviour towards emerging countries. For example, Yann Rousseau 
writes: “The French Prime Minister has proposed, yesterday, a proliferation of 
cooperation to help China reduce its emissions of pollutants gases.”619 
 
In terms of leaders of the respective states, Russian President Putin was the most 
reported (63 articles). This visibility was definitely raised by his visit to France during 
the period of observation. Yet, he was also presented as a stateman whose decisions 
may impact global energy relations (e.g. his position on energy prices discussed 
above). Indian and Chinese leaders have received comparable level of visibility, with 
Indian leaders being slightly more visible (15 mentions of President Singh and 15 
mentions for President Modi vis-à-vis 8 mentions of President Xi Jinping, 4 mentions 
of President Hu Jintao and 9 mentions for Premier Wen Jiaboa). President Singh was 
reported to participate in the negotiations with French on the sale of nuclear reactors in 
India. In these news texts, he was presented as the primary target of France’s energy 
 




diplomacy. Additionally, he also visited the US to discuss cooperation on nuclear 
energy. This was reported by the French media. President Modi’s appeared in the 
reports about the launch of the International Solar Energy Alliance during the COP 21 
in Paris. In comparison, there were fewer events during the period of observation 
where Chinese leaders took a visible role in exercising energy policies. 
 
7.5.4 Non-State Actors 
This research has been focussed so far on state actors and their actions. However, it 
also paid attention to the appearances and framing of non-state actors. This helps give 
a wider picture of the system narratives present in the media in France. Figure 7.7 
shows that businesses and international organisations were the most cited among 
these actors. 




Among business actors, several French companies are referenced frequently in the 
240 
 
sampled news on energy affairs in the global context: EDF has 98 mentions, Areva 88, 
Total 51 and GDF-Engie 42. High visibility sends readers the message of salience of 
these French companies in the energy matters – global as well as domestic. For 
example, EDF appears frequently in the articles that have a local French “hook” (43), 
but it is also reported in the news about South Stream due to its association with the 
Russian company Gazprom and the Italian company ENI in the project. Appearance 
of a French company in such news “anchors” local actors in international contexts, 
arguably raising local readers’ interests towards international news. Also, it shows to 
the readers that French business actors are capable and recognised international 
players on their own accord. Specifically, Areva appeared in articles that set energy 
reportage in a global context (28) as well as in countries outside Europe (28). This is 
due to its role as the purveyor of France’s primary energy export – nuclear energy. In 
addition, it was often reported as a beneficiary of France’s energy diplomacy towards 
emerging countries. 
In the reportage of BRICS non-state energy actors, a Russian company Gazprom was 
by far the most visible energy company (64 mentions). This chapter has detailed the 
coverage of Gazprom above. Here it should be noted that the company was typically 
referred to as “the giant Gazprom”620 -- a descriptor that in many articles was used to 
render the image of threat emanating from a global energy actor in geographical 
proximity to France. Other visible Russian energy companies included Rosneft (16) 
and Rosatom (12). 
 
620 Natalie Nougayrède, "Paris veut dialoguer avec Moscou sur les questions politico-militaires," Le 
Monde 26 November 2009. 
Quenelle, "Moscou et Pékin négocient le prix du gaz naturel." 
Patrick Saint Paul, "Berlin durcit le ton contre Poutine," Le Figaro 14 November 2012. 
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In the reports about China, China General Nuclear Power Group (CGNPC) was the 
most visible energy company (23 mentions). This is followed by China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with 12 mentions. 
Companies from the other BRICS countries do not share similar visibility. India’ 
nuclear energy company Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) 
received only three mentions in the observed periods. This is despite its collaboration 
with Areva on the construction of nuclear plants in India. For Brazil, Petrobras was 
mentioned eight times and Electronuclear once. South African companies were not 
visible in the analysed texts collected over five years. 
Among international organisations, the United Nations (UN) was the most visible 
non- state actor (169 mentions), but its visibility is largely due to the COPs as a 
timeframe for observations. In this context, the UN was portrayed more often as an 
actor in combatting climate change rather than global energy actor. International 
Energy Agency (IEA) was mentioned 52 times. It often comes as a reference/source of 
energy data and observer of energy trends. The Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEP) was mentioned 33 times. Since none of the key actors 
observed in this research are members of the OPEP (although some are oil producers), 
the visibility of the OPEP in the energy- related reportage is indicative of the centrality 
of oil to the discussion on global energy. OPEP has a significant role in the conduct of 
energy policy since their decisions directly affect other countries’ internal and external 







To finalise the mapping of narratives in French newspapers, the analysis moves to the 
presentation of different types of energy, conceptualised in the narrative structure as 
the instrument through which actors pursue their external energy policies. Figure 7.8 
presents the visibility of each energy type in French newspapers 
 
Oil was the most reported type of energy. As discussed previously, oil prices are often 
used as a key economic indicator thus its frequent reference. Oil prices also have a 
global impact on economies and this often attracts media attention. Several reports in 
the sample specifically discussed the influence of the falling oil prices on the economies 
of Russia and China; other articles mentioned them in brief. Oil was also frequently 
used by journalists as a point of reference for other types of energy. 
Gas was largely associated with Russia’s foreign policy towards Europe/the EU and 
the EU’s eastern neighbours. In these reports, gas was often compared to “weaponry” 
adding to the image of threat when Russian energy policy is reported. 
The third most visible type of energy was nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is France’s 
Figure 7.8: Visibility of Energy Types in French Newspapers Coverage 
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primary tool in its conduct of external energy policies, particularly under President 
Sarkozy’s leadership. In the narratives put forward by his government, nuclear energy was 
framed as a competitive type of energy necessary to meet rising demand in emerging 
countries and help them reduce their carbon emissions. This narrative is repeated in 
the news coverage. Yann Rousseau in Les Echos wrote: “François Fillon has welcomed 
a nuclear cooperation allowing France and China ‘to be at the forefront of global 
ecological responsibility.’”621There is also a temporal dimension associated to the 
framing of nuclear energy. This is similar to the patterns traced in political 
communications. Talking about the decision to move away from nuclear energy, 
Francois Vidal writes: “it would create a breach in the energy independence of France 
wanted by General de Gaulle, preserved since then with intransigence by all successive 
governments.”622 
Importantly, portrayals of nuclear energy evolve over time due to a number of inputs. 
The first impact was the disaster in Fukushima. It illuminated with new intensity the 
dangers related to this type of energy. The second input was Areva’s financial 
difficulties as a result of the Fukushima disaster as well as ongoing delays in the 
construction of its lead reactor, the EPR. The third factor was the political decision by 
the socialist party to reduce the share of nuclear energy in France’s energy mix. 
Together they have influenced how media presented the nuclear energy issue -- 
specifically putting into question the choice of prioritising nuclear energy over other 
types of energy. Media reports started to point out more systematically that nuclear 
 
621 Rousseau, "Fillon veut aider la Chine à « décarboner » son économie." 
622 "La politique énergétique de la France mérite mieux," Les Echos 21 November 2011. 
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energy “is not unanimous.”623 Construction projects were judged in comparison to the 
situation in Fukushima, with seismic risks evaluated. The predicted ‘nuclear 
renaissance’ was put into question by journalists. Nevertheless, emerging countries of 
BRICS were still presented to remain France’s primary targets and markets in nuclear 
energy field: the newspapers reported abundantly how China, India, Brazil and even 
South Africa all make the choice to build nuclear reactors. 
Gas and oil were both associated with the detrimental impact they have on climate 
change. Yet it was coal that was framed as the main culprit. Coal was often described 
in the reports as the energy type to move away from. It was heavily associated with 
atmospheric pollution in China in the French newspapers observed. 
Metaphors of revolution are often used in conjunction with renewables,624 and they 
are generally seen as the key to responding to climate change. Gregoire Allix writes: 
“the deployment of renewable energies, key to the fight against climate change, is 
progressing rapidly when the negotiations stagnate.”625 Particularly with solar energy 
there are often references to the future and innovations that will make this source of 
energy more competitive. So, while it is recognised that renewables are necessary in 
combatting climate change, there is a consensus that they are not enough to meet 
global energy demands efficiently. 
While shale gas and other unconventional energy types are initially near invisible with 
only one mention in 2009 and in 2010, the subject starts to appear more frequently 
from 2011 to reach 24 mentions in 2014. Articles that mention this type of energy need 
 
623 Pascal Colombani, "Le gaz grand gagnant de la nouvelle donne," Le Figaro 05 December 2012. 
624 Jean Pierre Farandou, "L'énergie solaire devient competitive," Les Echos 08 December 2014. 




to initially introduce what they are to their audience. Two countries are of interest to 
these articles: the US and Poland. The US is the country where shale gas has taken root 
and has become an increasingly strong alternative to oil imports. So much so that shale 
gas is seen as having the potential to “disrupt global markets.”626 Poland on the other 
hand is the European country with the highest potential for the exploitation of non-
conventional gases, along with France. However, unlike France where popular 
concerns for the environment have led the government to cancel exploration permits, 
Poland seeks to use these resources. Articles note that indeed shale gas has the 
potential to change Europe’s relationship to Russia by reducing the “old continent’s 
energy situation.”627 Nevertheless, there are some articles that look at China hopes for 
shale gas production, arguing that the country may have the largest reserves in the 
world. 628 
 
7.7 Strategic Narratives in French Newspapers 
By analysing each element of narratives presented in the French newspapers, this research 
can now piece together the main narratives presented. These are to be divided in three 
types: system narratives, identity narratives and issue narratives. 
 
626 Emmanual Grasland, "L'essor du gaz non conventionnel a bouleversé le marché Mondial," Les 
Echos 15 December 2009. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Gabriel Gresillon, "Gaz de schiste : le grand bluff de Pékin," Les Echos 29 October 2013. 
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Table 7-1: Strategic Narratives in French Newspapers 
System 
Narratives 
• Global energy governance is a cross-cutting issue where 
economic and political interests have a role to play. 
• States are the major actors of global energy governance. 
• This means that countries with the most economic and 
political weight are more visible and their external energy 
policies have a bigger impact. 
• Businesses are also present however they are often portrayed 
as an extension of the state’s action. The “nationality” of 
energy companies is often referred to and state’s energy 
diplomacy plays a major role in helping them secure contracts 
across borders. 
• International organisations are for the most part observers. The 
UN is a facilitator for negotiations; however, states are the 
main actors in these. Only the OPEP can have a major 
influence on the conduct of global energy governance. 
• Demand for energy in emerging countries will continue to 
grow in future decades, making them primary markets for all 
types of energy. 
• Global climate change is never put in question in the coverage 
and is instead a problem that needs to be addressed through 
global energy transitions and helping emerging countries 





• France’s identity narrative is closely associated to nuclear 
energy and its competitiveness. However, post 2011, this is put 
more into question. There are however no strong competing 
narratives presented. France is also framed in terms of 
sustainability but no types of energy are presented as an 
instrument used to achieve it. 
• The EU is a negligible energy actor. However, the strongest 
narratives associated to it is as a market regulator, its 
dependence on Russian gas and its leadership in the COPs. 
• China is the most visible actor, however its issues with 
sustainability give it a somewhat negative image. It is often 
described as energy and resource hungry. 
• While it is less visible, India’s thematic coverage resembles 
closely that of China with sustainability and security of supply 
being major frames. 
• Of the BRICS grouping, Russia is the country which is 
portrayed as having the most influence on energy affairs. On 
the flip side it is also the country on which fluctuations in the 
energy market has the biggest impact. 
• Brazil and South Africa are comparatively absent from the 
coverage of global energy governance. 
• China, India, Brazil and South Africa are all presented as 





• Before 2011, nuclear energy is framed as a response to the 
three main thematic frames of energy. It’s an instrument of 
competitiveness for France to help emerging countries 
achieve security of supply and sustainability. However, this 
narrative is put into question with issues raised over the safety 
of nuclear energy post-Fukushima, political debates introduce 
themselves in the coverage and Areva’s competitiveness is put 
into doubt.  
• The EU’s dependence on gas from Russia also one of the major 
issue narratives. Gas is then portrayed in terms of 
competitiveness and security of supply but also as a political 
tool and associated with weaponry metaphors.  
• Emerging countries’ efforts towards sustainability are major 
concerns and viewed as essential in tackling global climate 
change. In that view their use of coal and resulting pollution 
is viewed largely negatively. Meanwhile transition towards 
renewable energy is seen positively.  
• Domestically, from 2012 onwards, France has a strong 
narrative of energy transition, reducing the share of nuclear 
energy in France’s energy and increasing the share of 
renewables. However, this is a minor issue in the coverage of 
external energy policies and the BRICS don’t appear seem to 






Three narratives come out as the most powerful due to the narrative alignment 
between the different levels of narrative. The first is the impact that emerging 
countries and in particular China and India, have on global climate change and 
sustainability. At the system level, they have a large role to play in limiting global 
• Oil prices are a major global economic indicator and its impact 
on Russia, China and the EU’s economies is discussed in the 
coverage. This economic impact is a tool used by OPEP 
nations making it also a political tool. Moreover, occasional 
mentions of oil embargoes further this image as a political 
tool. However, without specific analysis of coverage of OPEP 
and more generally Middle Eastern countries, these narratives 
remain secondary.  
• Likewise, shale gas and unconventional energies are seen as 
having a revolutionary impact on energy markets. However, 
without analysis of the US as an energy actor, more exact 
narratives cannot be established.  
• Discussions about Iran’s nuclear programme display the issue 
of nuclear proliferation. This is an issue where members of the 
security council +1 are the most visible actors negotiating to 
find a solution. 
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carbon emissions, which is one of the major goals of global energy governance. 
Individually, they are strongly associated with the issue of sustainability, their 
dependence on coal is criticised and their efforts to develop renewable energy are for 
the most part lauded. 
Russia’s external energy policies and in particular gas policies also feature a strong 
narrative quality. Russia is a strong energy player and uses gas exports to exert 
influence on other actors. This narrative was particularly strong in 2014, at the height 
of the Ukrainian conflict, when President Putin cancelled the construction of the South 
Stream pipeline meant to transport Russian gas to Europe without transiting through 
Ukraine. 
Finally, prior to 2011, the French government’s narrative about nuclear energy is 
presented in the French newspapers. This narrative is one of a competitive French 
nuclear energy industry exported to emerging countries (China and India) to help 
them meet their rising energy demands and reduce their carbon emissions. However, 
all of these narrative elements are put into question after Fukushima. First of all, 
France’s competitiveness in nuclear energy is tested with Areva’s inability to export it 
EPR technology and ongoing delays in its construction. The expertise of other actors 
in nuclear energy, such as Russia, Japan the US become more recognised. While the 
predicted nuclear renaissance comes to a halt, emerging countries continue to be markets 
for nuclear energy, however, other actors are strong competitors in meeting this 
demand. Finally, the safety of nuclear energy is challenged by Fukushima and thus can 
no longer be viewed as sustainable. 
The next chapter will bring together these results with the results from political 
communications. It will discuss the projection narratives formed by the French and 
EU executives to a domestic audience through newspapers in France. 
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 : Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
Previous two chapters identified and assessed narratives on external energy matters 
formulated and projected by executive branches of the French government and the EU 
(political discourses) as well as by French leading newspapers (media discourse). In 
combination, the two chapters answered two questions: How is a strategic narrative 
formed and projected at the domestic level of an EU member state (case of France)? 
And how do France and the EU’s narratives about global energy governance relate and 
differ? The answers to these research questions helped to test six hypotheses (see 
Chapter 4). 
The first hypothesis predicted that an actor’s interests will frame the narrative this 
actor forms about a particular policy issue. This hypothesis will be addressed in the 
first section of this chapter (with a special focus on the EU). Final discussion around 
the first hypothesis will demonstrate the link between the EU’s interests and policies in 
energy field with its strategic narratives on global energy governance. The discussion aims 
to illuminate the first stage in the life-cycle of a strategic narrative, namely formation. 
The chapter will then discuss the findings in relation to the concept of internal 
coherence of strategic narratives. As explained in Chapter 4, internal coherence is an 
alignment between the system, identity and issue narratives of a single actor. In the 
following section, this chapter will elaborate the notion of external convergence of 
narratives (in this case, between France and the EU) and address the initial expectation 
that France, as a member state of the EU, will align its narratives with the EU’s 
narratives (hypothesis 2). The alignment of narratives between two actors is what is 
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referred to as external convergence. 
The discussion around the third hypothesis will address the issue of narrative 
misalignment. It will dissect whether a member state’s interest differs from that of the 
EU, the member state – in this case France – will formulate a different strategic 
narrative. 
The fourth and fifth hypotheses are in place to look deeper into the process of 
formation. The fourth hypothesis predicts a links between an actor’s interests in 
energy and the way it frames external energy actors in its strategic narratives. The fifth 
hypothesis suggests a role possessed by elected leaders in the formation of strategic 
narratives. The final two hypotheses are applied to understand the projection of 
France’s and the EU’s narratives in the French media. This research predicts that 
strategic narratives with strong internal coherence will have more resonance in the 
media vis-à-vis other narratives with weaker internal coherence. 
Lastly, the thesis hypothesises that strategic narratives projected by France have more 
resonance in the French media than the strategic narratives projected by the EU. 
 
8.2 Formation 
The formation of strategic narratives in this research was defined as the way political 
leaders shape their narratives according to their strategic goals and interests. The EU and 
France’s energy policies were detailed in Chapter 2 and their relations with were 
presented in Chapter 3. This next section will therefore compare these policies and 
goals to the discourses analysed in Chapter 6 in order to test the first hypothesis of this 




8.2.1 EU Interests and policies 
 
This research hypothesised that the EU’s particular energy interests and policies would 
direct the way it frames and project itself as an international energy actor (see Chapter 
4). Reviewing the EU’s energy policies (Chapter 2), this research outlined the EU’s 
three energy priorities: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. These 
themes were introduced in the Commission’s 2006 green paper on the EU’s energy 
strategy.629 Attached to each of these themes is an area of the EU’s energy policy. 
The Energy Union 
The creation of an EU-wide internal energy market is the policy associated with 
competitiveness. As discussed in Chapter 4, the energy market is above all one of the 
EU’s internal policies.630 This is confirmed by results in Chapter 6 which show the 
absence of competitiveness framing in the EU’s discourse on external energy relations. 
This is not to say that the internal energy market does not figure in the EU’s 
communications on global energy governance. Richard Youngs highlighted that by 
helping the EU achieve better energy security, this policy could also be viewed as a 
component of its external energy policy.631 Empirical results have indeed confirmed 
this argument -- the EU’s energy union was framed as a means to achieve energy 
security. Moreover, within internal energy market, EU member states are encouraged 
to increase the shares of renewable energy in their energy mixes, and priority assigned 
 
629 European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy,"  
630 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, Energy policy in the European Union. 
631 Youngs, Energy security: Europe's new foreign policy challenge, 53. 
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to this type of energy is a component of the EU’s external sustainability policy. The 
renewable energy target is often portrayed in EU political discourse as a way to lead by 
example in fighting global climate change. To conclude, this research did not trace an 
overarching competitiveness narrative at the EU level. Rather, the creation of the 
energy market – one of the EU’s primary policies regarding competitiveness -- is 
framed as a tool to achieve the EU’s other two goals: sustainability and security of 
supply. 
Sustainability and leadership in fighting global climate change  
Analysis of the European Commission’s communications showed that sustainability 
was the most important frame used in relation to external energy policies. In this discourse, 
the EU placed itself in a position of leadership in fighting global climate change. This 
is claimed to be achieved through renewable energy and energy efficiency targets. As 
commented in Chapter 2, a number of scholars have argued that sustainability and the 
efforts made in tackling climate change have been a major drive of the EU’s energy 
policies. As discussed in Chapter 6, sustainability is often the framing that precedes 
security of supply and competitiveness: the latter two objectives are achieved through 
the implementation of the first. In its communications, the EU portrayed its member 
states as willing to set binding sustainability targets for themselves. These targets were 
used, in EU political discourse, to showcase the EU’s ability to lead by example in 
climate change negotiations. China was one of the main external actors in the EU’s 
discourse, and it was framed mostly in terms of sustainability, both as a country with 
high carbon emissions and for its efforts to limit them. High visibility of renewable 





Security of supply was the second most prominent frame of the EU behind 
sustainability. This framing was most visible when the EU’s energy relations with 
Russia were discussed (one of the dominant threads within the EU’s political 
discourse). Since 2009, the Russia- Ukraine gas conflict has been the background to 
discussions on some EU countries relying strongly on Russian gas. The EU framed its 
role as a mediator in the conflict. However, it also solidified the framing of Russia as a 
partner of strategic importance. Russia was the most visible external energy actor in 
EU political discourse in the EU’s narratives on global energy. 
The analytical of tool of the three frames helped to demonstrate that the EU’s 
narratives on external energy projected through EU communications are largely 
consistent with the EU’s stated priorities and policies in this issue-area. 
However, this analysis added two more categories of frames: politics and economics. 
The EU’s discourse on its energy relations with Russia highlighted that energy is often 
framed as a part of a wider political discussion. EU discourse on the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict in 2014 emphasised that energy can itself be a subject of geopolitical debate. 
On the other hand, energy can be framed as an economic indicator or a driver of 
development and growth. These additional framing categories highlighted that 
political and economic frames can be used to narrate energy issues and conflicts 
around them. For instance, the EU’s mediation between Ukraine and Russia can be 
used not only to resolve a violent conflict between the two countries, but also address 
the gas dispute between the two countries affecting EU counties. 
In summary, empirical analysis confirmed the link between the EU’s strategic interests 




8.2.2  Narrative alignment: internal coherence 
 
Table 8-1 presents the summary of the EU’s strategic narratives about global energy 
governance analysed in observed the European Commission’s communications. A 
quick reminder here -- system narratives describe narratives about international order (in 
this case energy governance); identity narratives pertain to the way actors present 
themselves and others – it sets out actors’ values and interests; and issue narratives 
relate to specific policy areas. 
Chaban et al. argued that strategic narratives with the best coherence between system, 
identity and issue narratives are expected to have the biggest persuasion impact on 
other actors.632 Following this logic, the empirical analysis revealed coherence 
between the two most powerful EU narratives -- sustainability and security of supply. 
 
Table 8-1:Summary of the EU's Strategic Narrative about Global Energy 
Governance 
System Narrative • Global energy governance is largely dominated by states 
with bilateral relations the main background of external 
energy discourse 
• Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal 
• Cross-cutting nature of energy with politics and economics 
serving the major themes 
 
632 Chaban, Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin, "The EU's Peace and Security Narrative: Views from EU 
Strategic Partners in Asia." 
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• The EU’s three main energy goals (sustainability, 
security of supply and competitiveness) are inter-
related. 
• Sustainability is portrayed as the EU’s primary goal 
• It is followed by security of supply 
• Both the goals of sustainability and security of supply 
can be achieved through the creation of an EU energy 
market 
• The EU is a leader in sustainability able to impose 
binding targets on EU member states 
• Strategic importance of Russia as an energy partner 
Issue Narrative • EU competitiveness in renewable energy 
• Dependence on gas from Russia 
 
 
8.2.3 Narrative alignment: external convergence 
Chapter 4 argued that in addition to internal coherence, alignment could also take 
place between the narratives of different actors. This was described as external 
convergence. In that light, this research hypothesised that France as a member state of 
the EU would parallel the EU’s narratives in its own discourse, especially in the areas 
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where its own strategic interest did not differ from the EU’s. Chapter 6 detailed 
structural similarities between France’s and the EU’s political discourses. 
8.2.4 France ‘downloading’ the EU’s Energy priorities 
Empirical analysis of French policy discourse explicated a strong external convergence 
with the EU’s narratives on sustainability. This is not surprising. As discussed in the 
literature review section of this thesis, the EU has exerted a strong influence on 
France’s energy policy in areas of sustainability. Bocquillon and Evrard in particular 
pointed out this Europeanisation of France’s energy policies.633 The implementation 
of renewable energy targets within the Loi Grenelle de l’environment in particular is 
understood as the adoption of the EU level policy.634 Policy results showed that France 
often aligned itself with the EU’s position with regards to fighting global climate 
change. The EU’s renewable energy targets for example were often presented as 
putting the EU is a position of leadership in the UN COPs. 
France’s energy situation is often characterised by its independence. With nuclear energy 
meeting a large majority of its energy needs, France is less reliant on fossil fuels than 
other European countries.635 Additionally, its energy imports are generally more 
diversified than other EU member states. It is fair to conclude that security of supply is 
above all an EU priority and not directly part of France’s energy policy. Nevertheless, 
energy security is a frame that does appear in French political discourse when 
 
633 Bocquillon and Evrard, "Rattraper ou Devancer l'Europe? Politiques Francaises des Energies 
Renouvelables et Dynamiques d'Europeanisation." 
634 "LOI n° 2009-967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre du Grenelle de 
l'environnement (1),"  
635 Simon Beck, Evelyne Misak, and David Mombel, "Conjoncture énergétique. Quatrième trimestre 
2018,"  (2019). 
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discussing Russia-EU energy relations. Further, this frame is often used in discussions 
about the EU’s energy policies. This is indicative of yet another alignment between 
France’s and the EU’s narratives. 
Competitiveness was a frame much used in the French political discourse (in relation 
to nuclear energy in particular). Here, it is important to comment on the framing of 
EU energy competitiveness policies in the French discourse. Indeed, the energy union 
is presented not only as a favoured energy policy but as a French policy preference 
‘uploaded’ to the EU level. 
Overall, France strongly mirrored the EU’s policy objective and the interrelations between 
the themes of sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. This, arguably, 
shows the external convergence of narratives between France and the EU. As such, 
this research’s second hypothesis stating that France’s narratives of global energy 
governance would mirror the EU’s narratives was confirmed (H2). 
However, France does have particular energy interests that differ from the EU’s 
interests. This concerns nuclear energy foremost. In this instance, France’s narratives 














Table 8-2:  Summary of France's Strategic Narratives about Global Energy 
Governance 
System Narrative • Global energy governance is largely dominated by states, 
however international negotiations figure more 
prominently 
• Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal 
• Energy as a competence primarily held by member states, 




• Before 2012, France presented as a competitive nuclear 
energy actor 
• After 2012, France is a leader in energy transition both 
globally and at the EU level 
• The EU viewed as a leader in sustainability 
 
• EU priorities (sustainability, security of supply and 
competitiveness) all presented in the French political 
discourse 
• France is a competitive nuclear energy actor 








 an opportunity for French nuclear energy actors 
Issue Narrative • Competitiveness in nuclear energy exporting 
 
• Security of supply and energy independence achieved 
through nuclear energy 
• Sustainability achieved through low-carbon nuclear energy 




8.2.5 Narrative misalignment: the radiance of France 
 
As repeatedly stated throughout this research, France’s nuclear energy policies make 
France unlike other EU member states. This energy preference prescribes France different 
priorities and strategic interests when it comes to the conduct of external energy 
policies. France’s visions are somewhat different than the EU’s visions. Empirical 
analysis showed the EU’s narrative framing the use and benefits of nuclear energy in 
a largely neutral light. The EU associated itself mostly with the overseeing the safety 
of nuclear reactors in this narrative. In contrast, France’s narratives about nuclear 
energy are much more positive and multileveled. Formulated on different levels, they 
presented strong internal coherence, with system, identity and issue narratives aligning. 
As seen in Table 8-2, France’s nuclear energy narrative goes along the following lines: 
France engages in energy diplomacy with other states to sell nuclear energy, an 
industry in which it is the most competitive actor. Additionally, nuclear energy can 
help emerging countries with energy security – since it provided France with energy 
independence – and sustainability as well as fight against global climate change. This 
is due to the fact that nuclear is a low carbon energy. While not unchallenged, this 
narrative remains one of the strongest narratives presented by the French executive 
discourse. As such, this analysis supports the third hypothesis -- France’s different energy 
interests trigger different energy-related narratives to those formed and projected by the 
EU (H3). 
Analysis of the policy discourse in Chapter 6 showed that China was the most visible 
external energy actor in both the EU’s and France’s respective discourses. However, 
thematic frames showed that the actor was presented differently. Whereas both actors 
framed China in terms of challenged sustainability, France also saw China as a market 
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for nuclear energy. In this relationship, France placed itself in the position of saviour, 
helping China achieve “environmental responsibility”636 through the use of nuclear 
energy. Therefore, France’s strategic interests framed its relations with external actors 
(H4). This is further demonstrated by the difference in visibility assigned to Russia 
and India in EU and French political discourses. In the EU’s political discourse, Russia 
was the second most visible external actor after China; India came third. This reflected 
the strategic importance of Russia in the EU’s conduct of energy policies. In contrast, 
in the French discourse, India was the second most visible external actor, ahead of 
Russia. As a market for nuclear energy, India has more strategic importance to France 
and thus features more prominently in its narratives. The French executive discourse 
asserted India’s rights to nuclear energy and framed France as an advocate for that 
right. 
Finally, this research hypothesised that France’s strategic narratives about external energy 
would be influenced by the political concerns of elected leaders of the country (H5). 
The literature review in Chapter 2 highlighted the fact that political change in France 
in 2012 created a shift in energy policies particularly with regards to nuclear energy. Szarka 
argued that under President Sarkozy’s leadership, France sought to exports nuclear 
energy and gain competitiveness in the industry.637 However, the 2012 election of 
President Hollande introduced a partial transition away from nuclear energy with the 
goal to reduce the share of nuclear energy from 75% of the French energy mix to 
 
636 Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, sur la coopération nucléaire entre la 
France et la Chine, à Pékin le 21 décembre 2009.." 




50%.638 Results detailed in Chapter 6 confirmed this hypothesis. From 2009 to 2011, 
under President Sarkozy’s administration, nuclear energy was mentioned much more 
often than between 2012-2015 under President Hollande. Moreover, President Sarkozy 
and his Prime Minister contextualised the use of nuclear energy with mentions of great 
political figures such as President De Gaulle and President Pompidou. Using temporal 
narrative elements, they thus reinforced their narrative of nuclear energy as a source 
of energy independence and competitiveness. Comparatively, under president Sarkozy’s 
leadership, renewable energy was a secondary focus. Conversely, President Holland’s 
communications on nuclear energy are reduced and, although with less frequency, 
renewable energy is placed in a historical context. So political leaders’ perceived 
strategic interests will determine the narratives formed by executive leads in France. 
It should be noted that President Hollande’s decision to move away from nuclear 
energy was the result of a political agreement between his political party (the PS) and 
the Greens. This was demonstrated by Brouard and Guinaudeau and discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this research.639 However, the Fukushima disaster and possible inside 
knowledge of Areva’s subsequent inability to further export nuclear energy 
competitively may have influenced this decision. This is speculation however; media 
coverage of nuclear energy post-Fukushima made these major themes. 
This chapter has so far addressed hypotheses relating to the first stage in the life-cycle 
of strategic narratives – formation. It was observed through the lens of political 
executive communications. This chapter will now address the second stage in the 
 
638 L'Obs, ""François Hollande veut une transition énergétique massive"," Le Nouvel Observateur 4 
April 2012. 
639 Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French 
pro-nuclear energy policy." 
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narrative cycle: projection. 
 
8.3 Projection 
8.3.1 Narrative resonance: internal coherence 
This research conceptualised the spread of strategic narratives through the lens of the 
cascading activation framing theory.640 Once formed within the executive branch of 
government in France and the EU, these narratives are then projected and spread to 
the media. This research hypothesised that strategic narratives with the strongest 
internal coherence would resonate more when projected to the media (H6). In other 
words, narratives with sound alignment between system, identity and system 
narratives would be picked up more frequently and more prominent by the media. A 
summary of the narratives circulated by the media is presented in Table 8-3. 





• Global energy governance is a cross-cutting issue where 
economic and political interests have a role to play. 
• States are the major actors of global energy governance. 
• Demand for energy in emerging countries will continue to grow 
in future decades, making them primary markets for all types of 
energy. 
 
640 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11." 
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• Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal 
Identity 
Narratives 
• France as competitive nuclear energy actor 
• The EU is a negligible energy actor. However, the strongest 
narratives associated to it is as a market regulator, its 
dependence on Russian gas and its leadership in the COPs. 
• China as negative sustainability actor and in need of security of 
supply 
• India mirrors China’s framing 
• Russia is competitive energy actor 
• China, India, Brazil and South Africa are all presented as 
markets 
for France’s nuclear energy industry. 
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Issue narrative • Pre-2011, nuclear energy as instrument of competitiveness, security 
of supply and competitiveness. Narrative loses coherence after 
2011. 
• EU dependence on Russian gas 
• Post-2012, coverage of France’s energy transition is limited. 
• Oil prices are a major global economic indicator 
• Shale gas and unconventional energies are seen as having a 
revolutionary impact on energy markets. 
• Discussions about Iran’s nuclear programme 
 
The narrative with the strongest internal coherence in the French discourse was the 
narrative about nuclear energy before 2012. Results from the newspaper analysis in 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that this narrative resonated strongly in the French media. 
France was presented as a competitive actor in nuclear energy with markets in emerging 
countries and nuclear energy was placed in the historical context and legitimised 
through frames of energy independence and sustainability. Importantly, these are also all 
the elements of the strategic narrative presented by the French political executive 
discourse. This research thus found evidence that narratives with strong internal 
coherence have strong resonance and are picked up more often by other actors. 
Post-2012, this narrative in political discourse is weakened. France’s competitiveness 
in the industry is put in question, and members of the government no longer make 
links between nuclear energy and security of supply and sustainability. This was 
reflected in the media discourse -- coverage of nuclear energy focussed almost solely 
on Areva’s difficulties. France, once framed as the leader in the industry, was now 
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presented to be confronted with a growing number of competitors from other 
countries. 
In comparison, under President Hollande’s leadership -- and a dominant narrative of 
energy transition -- renewable energy was put forward. However, without a strong 
identity narrative associated with renewable energy, the internal coherence of this 
narrative was more fragile. In the media observed, there was less resonance of the 
energy transition narrative. The narrative was doubtfully present in the domestic 
coverage of energy matters, however in relation to the BRICS its visibility was limited. 
This showed one more time that narratives with strong internal coherence have more 
resonance and are projected more easily to the media. This chapter will now analyse the 
resonance of externally converging narratives. 
 
8.3.2 Narrative resonance: external convergence 
This research hypothesised that France’s strategic narratives would resonate more strongly 
in French newspapers than the EU’s (H7). However, media results show that this 
hypothesis was confirmed only partially. Indeed, narratives about Russia as an energy 
actor and the EU’s dependence on gas had relatively high visibility in the French 
newspapers observed. In political discourse, Russia was more visible in EU 
communications than in French ones. Conversely, India, an important part of France’s 
narrative about nuclear energy was more visible in French political communications 
than in the EU’s communications. However, in the French media coverage, Russia had 
more visibility than India. This can be explained in different ways. Firstly, while India 
remains a market for France nuclear energy industry throughout the period of 
observation, France’s energy diplomacy towards India was largely concentrated in 
2010. In comparison, coverage of the construction and cancellation of the South Stream 
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pipeline is an ongoing topic in the observed coverage. Secondly, Russia’s higher media 
visibility may be a consequence of its proximity or importance compared to India. 
Westerståhl and Johansson have argued that these factors may have a causal link in 
the visibility of international events in the media.641 Finally, stories about South 
Stream often feature the local hook of EDF’s involvement in the construction of the 
pipeline. This finding means that dominance of France’s strategic narrative over the 
EU’s cannot be confirmed and would require further study. 
 
8.4 Implications of this research 
An important aspect of this research was the relationship between strategic narratives from 
the EU and its member states. Miskimmon argued that “the formation, projection, and 
reception of the EU strategic narrative is complicated by the hybrid nature of the 
institution—reflecting both supranational and intergovernmental aspects, which frustrates 
efforts to speak with a single European voice in international affairs.”642 As an 
intergovernmental entity, the EU’s positions tend to be the most common 
denominator between member states. This make the EU’s communication less reactive 
to international events. Miskimmon stated that “the EU has often been slow or 
reluctant to explicitly set out a strategic narrative.”643 This was in part displayed in the 
difference in nature of political communications from the EU and France. French 
politicians are interviewed in French media on a near daily basis, allowing them to 
 
641 J. Westerståhl and F. Johansson, "Foreign news: news values and ideologies," European Journal of 
Communication IX, no. 1 (1994). 
642 Miskimmon, "Finding a unified voice? The European Union through a Strategic Narrative Lens." 
643 Ibid. p91 
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communicate on day to day events and voice opinions. The observed EU 
communications were for the most part press releases and speeches at political 
summits.644 Arguably, with a more streamlined communication structure, the EU was 
able to communicate one coherent message, but this message tends to be less 
immediate. 
Focussing on the concept of narrative alignment, this research has shown that member 
states formulate their narratives in alignment to the EU’s where they have no other 
interest at play. This was particularly visible in France’s narrative about security of 
supply. Energy security is not a priority for France. Nevertheless, the French 
government communicates on the EU’s security of supply, recognising for instance 
the strategic importance of Russia to the EU’s energy market. Further, the EU’s 
narrative can be used to further France’s strategic interest. Under president Hollande in 
particular, the EU’s policies and narratives are used to justify France’s energy transition. 
However, where France’s interests differed from the EU’s -- in particular with regard 
to nuclear energy -- its narrative differed significantly from the EU’s. Particularly 
before 2012, France’s narrative was strongly focussed on nuclear energy and its 
exportation to emerging countries. It should be noted that France’s narrative does not 
directly contradict that of the EU since it has stated its neutrality on the use of nuclear 
energy. Moreover, it uses the stated goals of the EU (competitiveness, security of 
supply and sustainability) to justify the use of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, with the 
link between interest and the formation of strategic narratives empirically established, 
this research shows how a strategic narrative on a policy area such as external energy 
is formed at the EU level and the domestic level of an EU member state. 
 
644 That is not to say that EU commissioners don’t communicate individually with the media. 
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Using Entman’s cascading activation framing theory645 to conceptualise the way 
strategic narratives are projected, this research also sought to establish where a 
supranational entity such as the EU can be placed on the cascade. In other words, how 
would the EU’s strategic narratives be projected to the domestic level of a member 
state? By analysing the external convergence of strategic narrative between France and 
the EU, this research showed that at least some of the EU’s narratives are picked up by 
member state officials and then projected at the domestic level. Moreover, the results 
also show that the resonance of the EU’s narratives was not weaker in the media than 
the member state’s. However, results for the last hypothesis remain inconclusive and 
it is fair to say that more research in this regard is needed. 
 
8.5 Further research 
This research has focussed on EU member state, France, which has displayed different 
interests in the conduct of external energy policies to other member states and the EU 
as a whole. As such, it provided a good case study for the role of interests in the 
formation of strategic narratives and on alignment and misalignment of narratives 
between the EU and its member states. The results of this research can be tested and 
further analysed in the conduct of a similar study using data from more member states. 
Miskimmon addressed the issue of multiple narratives emanating from the EU and its 
member states, analysing the narratives projected by Mario Draghi and Angela Merkel 
on the euro crisis.646 In this light, future analysis could explore projections by leaders 
 
645 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11." 
646 Miskimmon, "Finding a unified voice? The European Union through a Strategic Narrative Lens." 
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from multiple member states which have with competing interests. 
Taking a rationalist perspective of constructivism, this research conceptualised the 
role of executive leaders as the impulse of strategic narrative. Leaders have been 
portrayed as being driven largely by their perception of their own interests. Using logic 
from Entman’s cascade, this research analysed only the narratives emanating from 
government officials. However, in liberal democracies, oppositions have a role in 
spreading competing narratives. This has been somewhat addressed in the analysis of 
communications from two different French administrations. However, analysing the 
fractured nature of democracy in the US, Entman revised his cascading activation 
framing theory to better reflect the ideological divide operating in American politics. 
In this cascade, the administration no longer holds primacy over the spreading of frames. 
Rather, this position is divided between democratic party elites and republican party 
elites whose communications are spread to mainstream media but also to liberal and 
conservative media close to their own ideology, and directly to their public through 
social media. This research focussed therefore on a minor part of this cascade -- the 
projection of narratives from the executive branch of government to the mainstream 
media. However, future research could take on this revised cascade which better captures 
modern media ecologies to analyse the spread of strategic narratives. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
This research asked two questions: how are strategic narratives on the topic of global 
energy governance aimed at a domestic audience formulated and projected in an EU 
member state? And how does a member state (France) align – or not – its strategic 
narratives to those of the EU? This chapter, by addressing the seven hypotheses made 
267 
 
in this research, has answered these questions. Formation of narratives at the EU and 
member state level is primarily driven by interests and policies. Member states will 
align their strategic narratives with the EU when their interest matches that of the EU 
or when no other interest competes with the narrative. However, narratives will become 
misaligned when member states have policies that do not match the EU’s priorities. 
On projection, strategic narratives with internal coherence between the different levels 
of narratives have more resonance and are picked up more frequently by other actors 
such as journalists. Finally, there appears to be no stronger resonance of a member 
states strategic narrative then the EU’s in the media. This result cannot be entirely 
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